the laws of nature being fixed permanent and invariable, this frame of things is eternal; that the earth and all the apparatus of bodies in this and other systems were ever in the state they now are, and will ever continue the same. In this their scheme they think no God needful.”—Dr. WOODWARD, Nat. Hist. of Earth, p. 9.

I should merely state the matter thus:-The existing permanence and uniformity of nature is no proof that the world had not a beginning. The existence of order and adjustment is the proof of design and Divine Intelligence. The assumption of a Deity in natural philosophy would but render the evidence of natural theology a petitio principii.

LORD BROUGHAM in more than one instance charges Paley with a distaste or incapacity for metaphysical speculation; and in particular exemplifies the charge in the absence (as he contends,) of all distinct mention in Paley's argument of the proofs of mind as the origin of the design and adaptation found in the material world. "He (Paley,) assumes the very position which alone sceptics dispute. In combatting him they would assert that he begged the whole question; for certainly they do not deny, at least in modern times, the fact of adaptation. As to the fundamental doctrine of causation not the least allusion is ever made to it in any of his writings, even in his Moral Philosophy."— (Disc., note, p. 79.)

In reply to this, Dr. Turton (p. 122,) quotes a passage from Paley's chapter on The Personality of the Deity, in which he distinctly contends that the evidences of design

prove a personal agent; that they are the evidences of mind, and that mind constitutes personality. He further traces our conviction of this to similar effects produced by moral agents within our observation.

Dr. Turton has in another place ably explained the plainness of style and absence of profound metaphysical speculation which characterize Paley's writings as originating in the manifest design he all along entertained, and so successfully pursued, of putting the whole argument in a perfectly popular form, so as to place it within the grasp of the most limited or least cultivated understanding. This consideration appears to me to afford at once a perfectly satisfactory vindication of Paley, if he had not entered into the details of the question. But I cannot help thinking that in this (as in some other instances,) the Regius Professor has been somewhat too severe on the noble author. The fact certainly does appear to me, upon the most careful review of the passages adduced, to be much in favour of the justice of Lord Brougham's complaint of the omission of an exact, philosophical discussion of the point in question. That the omission was designed, and wisely designed, in reference to Paley's particular object, does not affect the question of its being an omission, when considered in a strictly metaphysical light. The precise point of the inference of mind is rather asserted than proved, rather illustrated than rigidly analyzed. It is a subject worthy of more profound investigation than I have happened to find bestowed upon it. So far as the doctrine of causation is concerned I may venture to hope that the illustrations conveyed in these pages may not be useless towards supplying the deficiency. At any rate it is one of the most valuable points of Lord Brougham's Discourse, that it urges attention to this particular question with so much force and originality.

Lord Brougham, in his note on cause and effect, in the

course of some remarks on necessary connexion, refers to the doctrine of a first cause; contending that the idea of causation which we derive from our volition (before referred to,) is essential to that doctrine. Had we not such an idea, that of "power or causality could never have been obtained by us from any observation of the sequences of events. The idea of design or contrivance in like manner must have been wanting to us; and hence I cannot understand how, but for the consciousness of power, we could ever have been led to the belief in the existence of a first cause."-(P. 231.)

If we take the term causation in the sense to which I have above referred, of moral causation, the justness of these remarks will be fully admitted; that distinction has not been introduced by the author.

On the "psychological argument," as well as on several other important questions connected with this subject, some acute observations will be found in a small tract, entitled, Remarks on Lord Brougham, &c., by T. Martin. London, 1835.

NOTE H. p. 191.

THE anecdote of Boyle referred to in the text has been often repeated. I have not, however, been able to discover the precise authority for it; but the sentiment will be found expressed in his Considerations on the Usefulness of Experimental Philosophy, p. 12, ed. 1664.

A similar opinion is advocated by Bacon, (De Aug., lib. i.,) applying the passage in the Proverbs, "The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord." (xx. 27.)

NOTE K. p. 196.

THIS prejudice against what is called the pride of science, as an impious intrusion on forbidden ground, is precisely that expressed by Pliny, when speaking of Hipparchus forming his catalogue of the stars; he says,—“ Ausus rem etiam Deo improbam annumerare posteris stellas." I have commented upon the influence of such prejudices in my History of Science, in the Cabinet Cyclopædia, p. 83. The reader is also referred for some admirable observations on the "Pride of Reason," (powerfully illustrated by comparison with the "Pride of Eye-sight,") to the Rev. J. Blanco White's Observations on Heresy and Orthodoxy, p. 84.

The celebrated controversy between Newton and Leibnitz was disgraced by the attempt of the latter to fix upon the doctrines of his great rival the charge of a tendency to materialism and atheism. The malicious character of such an attempt was equalled only by the absurdity which must manifestly attach to it in the eyes of any one who had read Newton's writings. Groundless as such a charge was, yet it tended much to keep up the prejudices which for a long while prevailed against the reception of the Newtonian theory; and received support from the readiness with which the generality of men cling to the authority of a distinguished name, especially if it sanction them in rejecting any new doctrines, which are always distasteful to the mass of mankind simply because they are new and require thought, and perhaps the surrender of established ideas. To such sources we may perhaps trace the prevalence of still-lingering prejudices against physical philosophy in general as having a tendency to cherish intellectual vanity, and a spirit hostile to the inculcation of religious truth.

VIEWS similar to those here stated have the sanction of some of the highest philosophical authorities. Thus Aristotle in his treatise, De Mundi, cap. vi., represents it as unworthy of the Supreme Being, αυτουργειν παντα;» supporting it by a comparison with the condition of a monarch and his subordinate functionaries, &c. The same idea is upheld also by Lord Bacon, De Augmentis, book iii. c. 4.

Boyle observes, "As it more recommends the skill of an engineer to contrive an elaborate engine, so as that there need nothing to reach his ends in it, but the contrivance of parts void of understanding, than if it were necessary that ever and anon a discreet servant should be employed to concur notably to the operations of this or that part, or to hinder the engine from being out of order; so it more sets off the wisdom of God in the fabric of the universe, that he can make so vast a machine perform all those many things which he designed it should, by the mere contrivance of brute matter, managed by certain laws of motion and upheld by his ordinary and general concourse, than if he employed from time to time an intelligent overseer to regulate and control the motion of the parts."-Inquiry into the Vulgar Notion of Nature.

Lord Kames, in his "Essay on the Laws of Motion, &c.," Edinb. Phys. and Lit. Essays, vol. i., after quoting the above passage of Boyle, remarks: "What may be the opinion of others I cannot say, but to me this argument is perfectly conclusive. Considering this universe as a great machine, the workmanship of an intelligent cause, I cannot avoid thinking it the more complete the less mending or