The appearance of these works was sufficiently formidable; and the hills, which they covered, could be ascended only by a narrow road, commanded by artillery, and numerous stockades and breast-works filled with men, apparently all armed with muskets. As soon as the artillery and rockets had made an impression upon the enemy's works, and silenced several of his guns, the troops advanced to the assault. The 1st Bengal brigade, consisting of the 13th and 38th regiments, was directed to advance by the beach, and storm the height in front, and the six companies of the 87th regiment, which had advanced through the jungle to the right, drove every thing before them on that side. Nothing could surpass the steadiness and resolute courage displayed in this attack. Scarcely a shot was fired in return to the enemy's continued vollies. The 38th regiment, which led, first entered the enemy's entrenchments on the heights, driving him from hill to chill, over precipices which could only be ascended by a narrow stair, until the whole of the formidable position, nearly three miles in extent, was completely carried. During the attack, the flotilla, whose cannonade had been most usefully effective, pushed past the works, and succeeded in capturing all the boats and stores which had been brought down for the use of

river, now remained to be disposed of. So quiet had this general kept himself, and so carefully were his men concealed from observation, that it was at first doubtful whether he had not quitted his works, and retired in silence. On its being ascertained however, that he still maintained his original ground, preparations were made for immediately attacking him. On the morning of the 5th December, the troops intended for this service under general Cotton, were carried across the river by the flotilla, and landed somewhat higher up the river than the stockades, a rocket brigade, and a mortar battery having been established during the night, on a small island in the channel, within range of the enemy's works, and opening their fire at day break. speedily retreated from his position on the river; but, on taking possession of it, it was discovered that they had a stockaded work about half a mile in the interior, completely manned, and mounted by guns. Brigadier Armstrong, colonel Brodie, and colonel Godwin, immediately moved upon its centre and right; general Cotton himself led the royals to the left, and the work was instantly carried, the enemy leaving three hundred dead on the field, and dispersing in every direction. From three hundred to three hundred and fifty muskets were taken, having been abandoned by the enemy. The whole of the defences were set on fire.

The enemy

Thus, in the course of four days, the immense army of Ava, which had threatened to envelope Prome, and swallow up the British troops, had melted away like a vapour, and sir A. Campbell was at liberty to march upon the capital, still

though we could not overlook those dangers, those inconveniencies, and that inexpediency, in a case in which remote interest and doubtful policy were alone assigned as motives for war, we would cheerfully affront them all, in a case-if it should arrive where national faith or national honour were concerned. Well, then a case has now arisen, of which the essence is faith, of which the character is honour; and, when we call upon parliament, not for offensive war, which was proposed to us in 1823 but for defensive armament; we are referred to our abstinence in 1823, as disqualify ing us for exertion at the present moment, and are told, that, because we did not attack France on that occasion, we must not defend Portugal on this. I, Sir, like the proposers of the amendment, place the two cases of 1823 and 1826, side by side, and deduce from them, when taken together, the exposition and justification of our general policy. I appeal from the warlike preparations of to-day, to the forbearance of 1823, in proof of the pacific character of our counsels; I appeal from the imputed tameness of 1823, to the message of tonight, in illustration of the nature of those motives, by which a government, generally pacific, may nevertheless be justly roused into action.

"It has been suggested, Sir, that we should at once ship off the Spanish refugees, now in this country, for Spain; and that we should, by the repeal of the Foreign Enlistment act, let loose into the contest all the ardent and irregular spirits of this country. Such expedients I disclaim. I dread and deprecate the employment of them. So far, indeed, as Spain herself is

concerned, the employment of such means would be strictly, I might say epigrammatically, just. The Foreign Enlistment act was passed in the year 1819, if not at the direct request, for the especial benefit, of Spain. What right,

then, would Spain have to complain if we should repeal it now, for the especial benefit of Portugal?

The Spanish Refugees have been harboured in this country, it is true; but, on condition of abstaining from hostile expeditions against Spain: and more than once, when such expeditions have been planned, the British government has interfered to suppress them. How is this tenderness for Spain rewarded? Spain not only har bours, and fosters, and sustains, but arms, equips, and marshals the traitorous refugees of Portugal, and pours them by thousands into the bosom of great Britain's nearest ally. So far, then, as Spain is concerned, the advice of those who would send forth against Spain such dreadful elements of strife and destruction, is, as I have admitted, not unjust. But I repeat, again and again, that I disclaim all such expedients; and that I dread especially a war with Spain, because it is the war of all others in which, by the example and practice of Spain herself, such expedients are most likely to be adopted. Let us avoid that war if we can,-that is, if Spain will permit us to do so. But in any case, let us endeavour to strip any war-if war we must have of that most formidable and disastrous character the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham) has so eloquently described, and which I was happy to hear him concur with me in deprecating, as the most fatal evil by which the world could be afflicted.

"I do not see how the withdrawing the French troops from Spain could effect our present purpose. The French army in Spain is now a protection to that very party which it was originally called in to put down. Were the French army suddenly removed at this precise moment, I verily believe that the immediate effect of that removal would be, to give full scope to the unbridled rage of a fanatical faction, before which, in the whirlwind of intestine strife, the party least in numbers would be swept away.

"So much for the immediate effect of the demand which it is proposed to us to make, if that demand were instantly successful. But, when with reference to the larger question of a military occupation of Spain by France, it is averred, that, by that occupation, the relative situation of Great Britain and France is altered; that France is thereby exalted and Great Britain lowered, in the eyes of Europe:-I dissent from that averment.

"I do not blame those exaggerations; because I am aware that they are to be attributed to the recollections of some of the best times of our history; that they are the echoes of sentiments, which, in the days of William and of Anne, animated the debates and dietated the votes of the British

parliament. No peace was in those days thought safe for this country while the crown of Spain continued on the head of a Bourbon. But were not the apprehensions of those days greatly over-stated? And is the Spain of the present day. the Spain of which the statesmen of the times of William and Anne were so much afraid? Is it indeed, the nation whose puissance was expected to shake England from her sphere? No, Sir, it was quite another Spain-it was the Spain, within the limits of whose empire the sun never set-it was Spain "with the Indies" that excited the jealousies and alarmed the imaginations of our ancestors.

"It would be disingenuous, indeed, not to admit that the entry of the French army into Spain was, in a certain sense, a disparagement-an affront to the pride, a blow to the feelings, of England :—and it can hardly be supposed that the government did not sympathize, on that occasion, with the feelings of the people. But I deny, that, questionable or censurable as the act might be, it was one which necessarily called for our direct and hostile opposition. Was nothing then to be done?Was there no other mode of resistance, than by a direct attack upon France-or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What, if the possession of Spain might be rendered harmless in rival hands-harmless as regarded us-and valueless to the possessors? Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained, and the policy of our ancestors vindicated, by means better adapted to the present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked

though we could not overlook those dangers, those inconveniencies, and that inexpediency, in a case in which remote interest and doubtful policy were alone assigned as motives for war, we would cheerfully affront them all, in a case-if it should arrive where national faith or national honour were concerned. Well, then-a case has now arisen, of which the essence is faith, of which the character is honour; and, when we call upon parliament, not for offensive war, which was proposed to us in 1823 -but for defensive armament; we are referred to our abstinence in 1823, as disqualify ing us for exertion at the present moment, and are told, that, because we did not attack France on that occasion, we must not defend Portugal on this. I, Sir, like the proposers of the amendment, place the two cases of 1823 and 1826, side by side, and deduce from them, when taken together, the exposition and justification of our general policy. I appeal from the warlike preparations of to-day, to the forbearance of 1823, in proof of the pacific character of our counsels; I appeal from the imputed tameness of 1823, to the message of tonight, in illustration of the nature of those motives, by which a government, generally pacific, may nevertheless be justly roused into action.

"It has been suggested, Sir, that we should at once ship off the Spanish refugees, now in this country, for Spain; and that we should, by the repeal of the Foreign Enlistment act, let loose into the contest all the ardent and irregular spirits of this country. Such expedients I disclaim. I dread and deprecate the employment of them. So far, indeed, as Spain herself is

concerned, the employment of such means would be strictly, I might say epigrammatically, just. The Foreign Enlistment act was passed in the year 1819, if not at the direct request, for the especial benefit, of Spain. What right, then, would Spain have to complain if we should repeal it now, for the especial benefit of Portugal?

The Spanish Refugees have been harboured in this country, it is true; but, on condition of abstaining from hostile expeditions against Spain: and more than once, when such expeditions have been planned, the British government has interfered to suppress them. How is this tenderness for Spain rewarded? Spain not only harbours, and fosters, and sustains, but arms, equips, and marshals the traitorous refugees of Portugal, and pours them by thousands into the bosom of great Britain's nearest ally. So far, then, as Spain is concerned, the advice of those who would send forth against Spain such dreadful elements of strife and destruction, is, as I have admitted, not unjust. But I repeat, again and again, that I disclaim all such expedients; and that I dread especially a war with Spain, because it is the war of all others in which, by the example and practice of Spain herself, such expedients are most likely to be adopted. Let us avoid that war if we can,-that is, if Spain will permit us to do so. But in any case, let us endeavour to strip any war-if war we must have of that most formidable and disastrous character the hon. and learned gentleman (Mr. Brougham) has so eloquently described, and which I was happy to hear him concur with me in deprecating, as the most fatal evil by which the world could be afflicted.

"Two honourable members insist that the French army in Spain has been, if not the cause, the encouragement, of the late attack by Spain against Portugal; that his majesty's government were highly culpable in allowing that army to enter into Spain, that its stay there is highly injurious to British interests and honour, and that we ought instantly to call upon France to withdraw it.

"I do not see how the withdrawing the French troops from Spain could effect our present purpose. The French army in Spain is now a protection to that very party which it was originally called in to put down. Were the French army suddenly removed at this precise moment, I verily believe that the immediate effect of that removal would be, to give full scope to the unbridled rage of a fanatical faction, before which, in the whirlwind of intestine strife, the party least in numbers would be swept away.

"So much for the immediate effect of the demand which it is proposed to us to make, if that demand were instantly successful. But, when with reference to the larger question of a military occupation of Spain by France, it is averred, that, by that occupation, the relative situation of Great Britain and France is altered; that France is thereby exalted and Great Britain lowered, in the eyes of Europe :→→ I dissent from that averment.

"I do not blame those exaggera tions; because I am aware that they are to be attributed to the recollections of some of the best times of our history; that they are the echoes of sentiments, which, in the days of William and of Anne, animated the debates and dietated the votes of the British

parliament. No peace was in those days thought safe for this country while the crown of Spain continued on the head of a Bourbon. But were not the apprehensions of those days greatly over-stated? And is the Spain of the present day the Spain of which the statesmen of the times of William and Anne were so much afraid? Is it indeed, the nation whose puissance was expected to shake England from her sphere? No, Sir, it was quite another Spain-it was the Spain, within the limits of whose empire the sun never set-it was Spain "with the Indies" that excited the jealousies and alarmed the imaginations of our ancestors.

"It would be disingenuous, indeed, not to admit that the entry of the French army into Spain was, in a certain sense, a disparagement →→ an affront to the pride, a blow to the feelings, of England :-and it can hardly be supposed that the government did not sympathize, on that occasion, with the feelings of the people. But I deny, that, questionable or censurable as the act might be, it was one which necessarily called for our direct and hostile opposition. Was nothing then to be done? Was there no other mode of resistance, than by at direct attack upon France-or by a war to be undertaken on the soil of Spain? What, if the possession of Spain might be rendered harmless in rival hands-harmless as regarded us-and valueless to the possessors? Might not compensation for disparagement be obtained, and the policy of our ancestors vindicated, by means better adapted to the present time? If France occupied Spain, was it necessary, in order to avoid the consequences of that occupation, that we should blockade Cadiz? No. I looked