enemy merely to gain time, was no sacrifice on the part of the British commander; for the season and the state of the country would not have permitted him to take the field at an earlier period.

On receiving the proposed terms of peace, his majesty of the Golden Foot broke out into the most intemperate bursts of impotent passion, and gave orders to his gene, rals immediately to renew offensive operations. His vigorous preparations had again collected in the neighbourhood of Meaday, an army of between 50,000 and 60,000 men. He had sent down from Ava, a veteran leader of great experience, Maha Nemiow, who was to introduce a new mode of conducting the war, and had attached to his army a body of eight thousand Shans, a species of force bearing a high character for gallantry, and who had not yet met a British army in the field. Along with them were three young wo men of high rank who were believed, by their superstitious countrymen, to be not only endowed with the gift of prophecy, but to possess the miraculous faculty of turning aside balls and bullets or rendering them innoxious. Confident in their strength, and urged by the threatening mandates of their monarch, the Burmese chiefs had no scruples of delicacy in violating the truce, Scarcely had they departed from the place of conference at Neoun-ben-zeik, when numerous irruptions were made by predatory bands from their army, transgressing the line of demarcation laid down in the armistice, laying waste the country almost to the walls of Prome, interrupting the supplies of the army, ascending the river, and threatening, and plainly intended,

to cut off the communication with Rangoon. When remonstrances were made to the Burmese commanders, they with their usual disregard of truth, denied all knowledge of these marauding expeditions, although it was proved by the prisoners taken, that they were acting directly under orders from head-quarters. At length, when the armistice had nearly expired, the thin mask was taken off, and the following haughty and laconic answer was returned to the proposals of peace made at Neounben-zeik: If you wish for peace, you may go away; but if you wish either money or territory, no friendship can exist between us. This is Burman custom.”

The whole army of Ava, nearly sixty thousand strong, immediately advanced along the banks of the Irrawaddy against Prome, and the six thousand British and native Indian troops by whom it was occupied. It was divided into three bodies, which moved parallel to each other, but were dispersed with so little tactical skill, that insuperable physical obstacles prevented any one of them from supporting any other, all being thus exposed to the imminent danger of being destroyed in detail. The right division, consisting of fifteen thousand men, under the command of Sudda Woon, moved along the right or western bank of the river. the opposite bank, separated by the whole breadth of the Irrawaddy, advanced the centre, consisting of between twenty-five thousand and thirty thousand men, headed by the Kee Wonghee in person, and escorted by a considerable armament of war boats. Maha Nemiow himself took the command of the left division,

On

which likewise was fifteen thousand strong, and contained the Shan horsemen; it marched on the same side of the river with the centre, still more to the east ward, but was completely separated from it and the river by an impenetrable forest several miles in depth. The different divisions advanced in the ordinary style of Burmese warfare, creeping onwards slowly and certainly, stockading and entrenching themselves at every step, risking no general engagement, patiently working themselves round Prome to obtain positions in its rear as well as in its front. On the 10th of November, the advanced guard of Maha Nemiow, on the extreme left, was at Watty-goon, a village to the north-east of Prome, and not more than sixteen miles distant; his intention being to turn the right of the British position, and thus, at the same time, throw succours into the kingdom of Pegu on the east. Colonel M'Dowgal, with two brigades of native infantry, was ordered to dislodge them, and approached them in three divisions; one marching by the direct road to Watty-goon, the two others by circuitous routes, but with the design that they should all reach the point of attack at the same time, and act simultaneously against the front, flank, and rear of the enemy. But the plan was disconcerted by the forwardness of the Burmese, who, instead of awaiting the attack in their position, met the centre and principal division of the detachment half way, and, bringing on large bodies of Cafray horse, wherever the road emerged from the jungle into ground sufficiently open for cavalry to act, both retarded and weakened it by a con

tinued succession of brisk skirmishes. The division, however, made good its advance to the neighbourhood of Watty-goon; but colonel M'Dowgal, having been killed while reconnoitring the works, there being no appearance of the two other divisions, and the force and position of the enemy being much too strong to be attacked without their assistance, a retreat was effected, with the loss of four officers and sixtyone men killed, and ten officers and a hundred and twenty men wounded, besides forty missing.

Maha Nemiow was emboldened by this partial success to advance closer to Prome, but was not seduced from his cautious and secure mode of approach, throwing up his stockades at every step that he gained. The centre and the right division advanced simultaneously, in the same mole-like manner; and in the end of November, the centre, under the Kee Wonghee was distinctly visible, stockaded in the difficult heights of Napadee, which run along the right bank of the river about five miles above Prome, while Sudda Woon, with the right, was posted opposite to him in a similar manner. The British army, in the mean time, remained quiet in its positions, anxious that the enemy should be seduced to attack, and even giving him apparent encouragement to risk an assault. The troops never showed themselves beyond the lines; batteries were erected and entrenchments thrown up, as if in apprehension of the approach of the assailants; and rumours were circulated that preparations were making for a sudden retreat to Rangoon. But every expedient failed to divert Maha Nemiow from his own sys

tem. He had now approached within a morning's walk of Prome, and stockaded himself strongly at Simbike and Kyalaz, on the Nawine river. As his detached parties gave serious annoyance to the river convoys of the army, and as it was of much importance that no part of the fitting season for efficient operations should be suffered to pass away unimproved, sir Archibald Campbell, small as his force was, determined to become the assailant himself.

The inferiority of the British troops in point of number was, in a great measure, counterbalanced by the unskilful disposition of the three great masses of the Burman army, which, separated from each other by a broad and rapid river, or an impenetrable forest, formed in reality three distinct armies, which might be attacked and routed successively without any possibility of mutual co-operation and assistance. On the 30th November, the British commander made his dispositions. The division of Maha Nemiow himself, posted at Simbike on the left of the grand army, was the first and principal object of attack; but, to divert the attention of the centre and the right, a demonstration was to be made against the heights of Napadee, and the flotilla was to maintain a fire against both sides of the river. At day-break on the 1st December, 1825, sir Archibald Campbell, leaving four regiments of native infantry in the works at Prome, marched with the rest of the force, to dislodge the corps of Maha Nemiow from its position on the Nawine river; and, as had been previously concerted, the flotilla, and a regiment of native infantry, acting in co-operation on, the bank of the river, shortly after VOL. LXVIII.

day-light commenced a heavy cannonade on the enemy's centre, and continued nearly two hours to attract his chief attention to that point.

On reaching the Nawine river," at the village of Zeouke, the force was divided into two columns, the right column, under the command of brigadier-general Cotton, continuing to advance along the left bank of the river, while the commander-in-chief, with the other column, crossed at the ford of Zeouke, and advanced upon Simbike and Lombek, in a direction nearly parallel with the brigadiergeneral's division. The troops had to contend with every disadvantage of a difficult and enclosed country, and the information acquired regarding the position occupied by the enemy had not enabled the general to make any previous fixed arrangement for intercepting the retreat of an enemy, to whom every footpath in the jungle was familiar, and whose irregular flight would be made by every path that promised safety at the moment. The object, therefore, was, that whichever colump hould have the good fortune to fall in with the enemy first, should attack him vigorously in front, while the other' should endeavour to occupy such positions as would enable it to cut in upon him, when driven from his defences. The route followed by brigadier-generalCotton brought him in front of the stockaded position at Simbike, which he at once assaulted; and when his fire first opened, the other column was about a mile and a half distant to his left and rear. Sir A. Campbell, in consequence, sent a detachment to guard the fort at Zeouke, the main road leading to Neounbenzick, and the position of the [P]

Kee-Woonghee, while, with the rest of the column, he pushed on towards Sagee, in the hope of falling in with the enemy retiring upon Watty-goon. Brigadier-general Cotton and his division did not allow time for completing this movement. In less than ten minutes every stockade was carried, the enemy completely routed, and the second column had only an opportunity of cannonading his panic-struck masses as they rushed fast through the openings of the jungle in front. Every thing had been confusion within the stockades from the moment that general Cotton's column entered them, at the first assault; the very numbers of the enemy, crowded within their works, disabled them for effective resistance. The Shans alone maintained their character, and fought bravely. Animated by their young prophetesses, and the example of their chobwahs, or chiefs, they maintained the contest till the greater part of them were cut down. One of the prophetesses received a mortal wound, and old Maha Nemiow himself fell, encouragg his men in the hottest of the conflict, to desperate resistance.

the troops only two hours repose, he returned the same evening to Zeouke, where the army bivouacked for the night, having performed during the day a harassing march of twenty-nine miles, and fought a battle.

At daylight in the morning of the 2d, they were again in motion. It was the general's intention to have cut in upon the river so as to divide the Kee-Woonghee's force; but the impassable nature of the intervening country prevented him from reaching Pagaon, the point selected for breaking through the line; and the only road that could be discovered led to the front of the fortified ridge of Napadee, which, from its inaccessibility on three sides, could be attacked only in front, and by a limited number of men. Early in the morning general Cotton's division endeavoured to push round to the right, and gain the enemy's flank by every path that could be discovered; but, after great exertion, the effort was abandoned as wholly impracticable. The artillery being placed in position, opened with great effect, while the flotilla under commodore sir J. Brisbane, moved forward and cannonaded the heights from the river. At the same time, brigadier Elrington was directed to advance through the jungle to the right, where the enemy opposed him with great gallantry and resolution, defending every tree and breast-work with determined obstinacy. To the Brigadier's left, six companies of the 87th regiment were ordered to drive in the enemy's posts to the bottom of the ridge. This service was successfully performed, and the enemy was driven from all his defences in the valley, retreating to his principal works on the hills.

The appearance of these works was sufficiently formidable; and the hills, which they covered, could be ascended only by a narrow road, commanded by artillery, and numerous stockades and breast-works filled with men, apparently all armed with muskets. As soon as the artillery and rockets had made an impression upon the enemy's works, and silenced several of his guns, the troops advanced to the assault. The 1st Bengal brigade, consisting of the 13th and 38th regiments, was directed to advance by the beach, and storm the height in front, and the six companies of the 87th regiment, which had advanced through the jungle to the right, drove every thing before them on that side. Nothing could surpass the steadiness and resolute courage displayed in this attack. Scarcely a shot was fired in return to the enemy's continued vollies. The 38th regiment, which led, first entered the enemy's entrenchments on the heights, driving him from hill to hill, over precipices which could only be ascended by a narrow stair, until the whole of the formidable position, nearly three miles in extent, was completely carried. During the attack, the flotilla, whose cannonade had been most usefully effective, pushed past the works, and succeeded in capturing all the boats and stores which had been brought down for the use of the army.

The two divisions which had been advancing along the eastern bank of the Irrawaddy were now completely dispersed, with the loss of their artillery, ammunition, military stores, and the bravest of their troops. Only the right division under Sudda Woon, stock aded on the western bank of the

river, now remained to be disposed of. So quiet had this general kept himself, and so carefully were his men concealed from observation, that it was at first doubtful whether he had not quitted his works, and retired in silence. On its being ascertained however, that he still maintained his original ground, preparations were made for immediately attacking him. On the morning of the 5th December, the troops intended for this service under general Cotton, were carried across the river by the flotilla, and landed somewhat higher up the river than the stockades, a rocket brigade, and a mortar battery having been established during the night, on a small island in the channel, within range of the enemy's works, and opening their fire at day break. The enemy speedily retreated from his position on the river; but, on taking possession of it, it was discovered that they had a stockaded work about half a mile in the interior, completely manned, and mounted by guns. Brigadier Armstrong, colonel Brodie, and colonel Godwin, immediately moved upon its centre and right; general Cotton himself led the royals to the left, and the work was instantly carried, the enemy leaving three hundred dead on the field, and dispersing in every direction. From three hundred to three hundred and fifty muskets were taken, having been abandoned by the enemy. The whole of the defences were set on fire.

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