to quit sit at his pleasure. He applied himself sedulously to the improvement of his military forces, and was a determined enemy of Buenos Ayres, who looked upon Paraguay as part of their own possessions, and on Francia as a rebel, or at least an usurper. Nothing but want of force had hitherto prevented the arms of the confederation from being turned against the dictator; and the dictator, therefore, found it to be his interest to draw closer to so powerful an ally as the emperors of Brazil. Bonpland, the French naturalist, had been detained for several years at Assumption, the ordinary fate of scientifico travellers who imprudently trusted themselves in the power of Francia; for such persons he uniformly detained, from no other apparent motive than to keep the rest of the world in ignorance of the state of his own sovereignty. Don Pedro took advantage of an application which he Imade for the liberation of Bonpland, to open a negotiation with the supreme director, and ex-pressed his willingness to guarantee to him the province which he had so long governed. Francia replied that he had envoys in Europe treating [with the Spanish government, and and he would introduce no change rotill their mission was ended; but, if Spain refused to receive his commissioners, he would then treat with Brazil, and send M. Bonpland to Rio Janeiro as his plenipotentiary s -esIn the united provinces of the river Plate, Rivadavia was again elected President, almost unanimously, and found himself at the head of a government, involved in the most embarrassing financial

difficulties. No greater error had yet been committed by the united provinces than the hurrying into an expensive war, without any urgent necessity, at a moment when their Treasury was in no condition to bear the burthen of a costly and protracted struggle. The means, too, adopted by the government to supply its wants, and maintain its credit, were to the full as bold and uncalculating as had been its attack upon Brazil.

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The Congress had lately established a national bank, and it now enacted, that, for the two following years, the bank should not pay its notes in cash, except during the last six months of the year following the date of the law, to the amount of one-third of the notes in circulation; during the next six months, to the amount of one-half of its circulation; during the last six months of the second year, to the amount of two-thirds of its circulation; and, even to the partial extent in which payments in specie might be required, they were to be made only in ingots of the value of a thousand dollars, and of five hundred dollars. At the same time, it was decreed, that the notes should be current for their nominal value throughout the whole of the territory of the republic. This was a new experiment in finance; it was the first time that the world had seen the establishment of a national bank, followed almost immediately by a declaration of its inability to meet its engagements, and by a suspension of cash payments. It added not a little to the singularity of the transaction, that this forced circulation of paper money should have occurred in the very region of gold and silver, and in

a state whose very name, in some measure, connects it with metallic wealth. Another extraordinary vcircumstance was, that, in this state of affairs with a newly established bank unable to pay in specie, and its notes enormously depreciated, its sanguine contrivers gravely talked of establishing branch banks in the different proovinces, and expatiated on the benefits which would accrue from the wide circulation of this depreciated paper money. The public Jsanction thus given to such a currency tended only to involve the government in further pecuniary difficulties. As the notes of the bank were to be received, in payment of taxes, at their nominal value, the real amount of the revenue was diminished in proportion to their depreciation; and it was scarcely tin a season of difficulty like that which now existed, when the sources of revenue, such as they might be, were all deranged by vwar, that Congress would venture to impose new burthens to supply the deficiency, or that the exécutive could have means of compelling the payment of them. On On the other hand, many of the expenses of the government were of a kind in which the notes of its -bank could be of no use. British and American merchants would not accept them in payment of naval and military stores, nor would they be taken in London in discharge of the interest of the debt of Buenos Ayres. In such a state of things the confederation could hold out little hope of being able to meet even the necessary charges of its own internal administration, much less to provide for the expenses of a pro

A spirit of disunion among the states which compose it, andda jealousy of Buenos Ayres, were two of the greatest disadvantages that the confederation of the Rio de la Plata had to struggle with. The latter disposition could not be allayed by an act passed during this session of congress, declaring Buenos Ayres the capital of the republic, an empty honour which might have been formally assumed at a more favourable opportunity, while her situation, her wealth, and her strength would have sufficiently secured the natural influence of the province. The spirit of disunion which threatened to make the states burst the bond of confederation in which they were united, and deprive the general government of every thing but the shadow of efficient controlling power, was manifested in the inability of that government to perform its publie and solemn contracts. On its establishment it had formed the design of aiding its resources by the mineral treasures of the country, and had endeavoured to allure from foreign countries the capital for working its mines which its own subjects were unable to supply. Its func

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tionaries sent directions to their agents in Europe to form an asso. ciation for the purpose of working the mines within its limits. This company was formed under the name of the Rio de la Plata Mining Association; the government contracted to assign to it certain mines as the subjects of its operation; the capital was subscribed; á considerable expenditure was incurred, and ultimately it turned out, that the undertaking was a hopeless enterprise, because the government which seduced the share-holders into it, had not strength enough, or honesty enough, to fulfil its own engagements. The provinces thought fit to dispose of their own mines according to their own views, and disavow the contract of the general government. An agricultural and emigration assoeiation, formed under the same auspices, shared a similar fate. How could a government come into any money market in Europe to raise a loan, when it had already shown itself unable, or unwilling, to observe the most solemn engagements?

Financial embarrassment, disregard of public credit, and internal dissention, manifested them-selves still more distinctly in Colombia. In some of the provinces, and especially in Venezuela, and Apure, there had long been a strong spirit of discontent with the existing central form of government, and a decided superiority of opinion in favour of a federal constitution. By the fundamental laws of the republic, however, no congress was to be held, for the purpose of revising or altering the constitution till 1831; but the example of Vene

zuela proved how little fundamental laws were to be regarded, how feeble the bond was which held the provinces together, and how completely the general government was dependent upon military leaders. General Paez, the military commandant of Venezuela, had been, next to Bolivar, the most distinguished leader in the revolutionary war. He was himself a mulatto; his division, consisting almost entirely of mulattos, was the flower of the Colombian army, and his cavalry, in particular, had been the terror of the hussars of Ferdinand. Living in a perfect equality with his men, sharing their sports, their exercises, and their meals, he was the idol of his own formidable troops, and a general favourite throughout the army. Though possessed of this dangerous power, he had hitherto been a quiet subject of the government of Bogota, and had been content to act a secondary part to Bolivar, who had gained him by prudence and affability: But an act of the government, which he thought injurious to his honour, convinced the executive, that he was little inclined to submit in all things to its constitutional authority, and that he was both able and willing, if much provoked, to dissolve the whole confederation into its original elements. By a law of the general Congress for the organization of a militia, every male throughout the republic, between the ages of sixteen and fifty, had been required to enrol his name for service. When the decree of the executive for carrying this law into operation appeared, great and general opposition to it was manifested, and the government, justly

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Representatives; that body, in the absence of Bolivar in Pera, whose prudence might have quenched the rising flame, took up the subject with great warmth, and sent up an impeachment of the general to the senate. The senate admitted the accusation, and a decree was issued on the 30th of March, depriving Paez, in the mean time, of his command, and calling him to Bogota to answer the charges which had been preferred against him. To neither of these mandates was the haughty soldier, surrounded by his troops, over whom his authority was absolute, inclined to pay any obedience; and he knew well that the appearance of momentary submission would instantly call forth the hosts of his adherents. Although, therefore, he made no preparations for proceeding to the capital, he opposed no ostensible resistance to general Escalona, who had been appointed his suecessor, assuming the command of an army, which he was perfectly aware would not submit, without his own orders, to have any commander but himself.

apprehensive of the consequences of popular discontent, enjoined those who were engaged in giving effect to it, to use the utmost circumspection. General Paez had taken upon himself the responsibility of suspending its execution in Venezuela altogether, until, in December 1825, he was induced to enforce it, in consequence of real, or pretended, apprehensions of a rebellion among the slaves of the province. Twice, in the course of December, he had summoned the inhabitants of Caraccas by proclamation to assemble for the purpose of being enrolled; but the proclamations were unheeded; of itself a sufficient proof of the utter feebleness of the government. He issued a third proclamation on the 6th of January, intending, as he himself expressed it, "to make them feel my authority, and to proceed with an energy becoming the honour of the military power." This proclamation was no better obeyed than the others had been, and Paez forthwith had recourse "to military energy," filling the streets with patroles, who seized the citizens, and dragged them by force to the barracks. These arbitrary proceedings were suspended only by the interposition of the intendant of the province, and the conduct of Paez was represented to the executive in no favourable colours, while the executive itself did not dare to show much favour towards an officer who had exposed its decrees to popular odium. The complaints of the public of a violation of their civil rights by military force were loud; the national Congress was sitting; the municipality of Caraccas denounced. Paez to the House of

nicipality joined them in their clamours, not probably so much from any wish to see retained in his command the very officer of whose arbitrary proceedings they themselves had complained, as from inability to resist the soldiery, and the necessity of submitting to them to preserve the city from bloodshed and pillage. Not satisfied, however, with restoring him to his military command, which, of itself, was setting at defiance the powers of the general government, the municipality assumed all the privileges of independence, and conferred upon Paez the supreme authority of the province, civil as well as military. The general accepted it, with many protestations of reluctance and moderation, the usual marks of rebellious ambition... "The entire population," said he, writing to Bolivar, assembled in the municipal hall, loudly demanding that the decree from Bogota should be suspended, and that I should be retained in the command, I accepted the charge, because I thought it necessary to the maintenance of good order, and my authority was instantly recognized by the troops." He immediately issued a proclamation, on the 3rd of May, declaring that his removal had been obtained by the importunities of his personal enemies, and was an outrage upon the national honour." The people," said he," through the organ of the military intendant of Valencia, sanctioned by the legitimate authorities, have restored to me a power which I had resigned in virtue of that subordination which has ever marked my military career; but I have thought fit to take upon myself the office

with which public opinion has invested me, because I could not neglect the demonstration of affection towards me shown by my countrymen, nor see them, with indifference, exposed to internal disorders, at a season when I have the most powerful reasons for dreading the one and the other. "I shall second the object of this movement by maintaining the public tranquillity with the armed force under my orders, and by securing the other benefits arising from it; and this force shall not interfere with the resolutions of the people in the exercise of their sovereignty for the provision of their welfare and security." The meaning of all this simply was, that he applauded the province for having set the government at defiance, and that the people, in the exercise of their sovereignty, might act as they pleased, provided they did not interfere with his control over the army, or the control of the army over them.

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It is not probable that the merely personal interests and ambition of Paez would have made his quarrel be adopted as a popular cause throughout the province. In all his communications with Bolivar, he complained bitterly of general Santander, the vicepresident, as abetting and forwarding intrigues which were intended for his ruin; but the popularity of Santander was proof against the ebullitions of his irritation. On the 15th of May, the vice-president tendered his resignation, but it was refused by Congress almost unanimously, only five members voting that it should be accepted. Paez, therefore, immediately secured his own personal interests, by wedding