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and his legitimate successors.

It the other deserters from its army was provided that the subjects of or navy, or even from its merchant each power should havefull religious vessels, and to expel from its dotoleration when residing in the minions, so soon as an application territories of the other; should to that purpose should be made, all enjoy all the rights, privileges, and persons accused of treason, felony, exemptions, which had been, or or the forging or coining of money thereafter might be granted to the whether metallic or paper. The most favoured nation; and were not stipulations regarding the duties to be subject to military service or on shipping and goods, and the contributions, or forced loans and character of Brazilian vessels were imposts. It was declared that to continue in force for six years vessels of the one country enter- from the date of the ratification; ing the harbours of the other, the

others were to be perpetual. should pay no higher dues for ton- The treaty was ratified at Paris nage, &c. than vessels belonging on the 19th of March. to the most favoured nation, but To the European powers, by far that Portugal should not be taken the most important part of the as the term of comparison, if it foreign policy of France, was her should come to enjoy commercial conduct in regard to the affairs of privileges in Brazil, and that, until Portugal. When the armed in

, the deficiency of seamen could be terference of Spain against the supplied, all vessels built or owned regency and constitution of Portuby Brazilian subjects, and carrying gal, compelled Britain to send her a Brazilian captain and mate, should troops to the peninsula for the probe held to be Brazilian ships, tection of her ally, the peace of although three fourths of the crew Europe depended on the cabinet of should not be subjects of the em- Versailles. An exaggerated dislike, pire; that, under the same modi- on its part, of the establishment of fications, articles of French growth popular institutions, excessive comor manufacture should be admitted plaisance to the wishes of Ferdiinto Brazil, either in French or in nand, or jealousy of the influence, Brazilian vessels on payment of no and, still more, of this armed higher duties than those imposed interposition of England, could on the most favoured nation; and, hardly have failed to light up a on the other hand, that the produce war. It was, indeed, impossible of Brazil, imported into France that France, governed, herself, by for consumption, whether in Bra- a representative body, could, with zilian or in French vessels, should any regard to decency, become the pay no higher duties than those enemy of the Portuguese constituimposed on them by the French tion, merely because it was framed tariff when imported in French after the model of her own. As bottoms. In accordance with this the charter had emanated voluntaarticle, France abolished, in favour rily from the legitimate and soveof Brazil, the additional duty of reign authority, it was equally im10 per cent on merchandize im- possible for her, with any regard ported in foreign ships, and like to consistency, to wish well to the wise the distinction between stuffs Portuguese insurgents, who were of long and short wool. Each in open rebellion against their law. state bound itself to deliver up to ful sovereign. And still less could

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she, with any regard to good faith, have formed an anomalous species. support the intrigues of those who of armed neutrality which Britain laboured, by rebellion, to elevate a could not have recognized : for she treasonable faction that was deter- evidently was equally entitled to mined to annul the separation of bombard Cadiz or Barcelona, and the colonies from the mother coun- besiege Badajoz or Ciudad Rodritry; since, by the treaty, which go, whether they were garrisoned has just been mentioned, she had by French or by Spanish troops. If, solemnly

recognized the independ- again, France should withdraw her ence of Brazil, and the legitimacy troops altogether, it was perfectly of its imperial dignity. These certain, from the internal state of were considerations to induce the Spain, from the crowds of exiles French cabinet to allow the new on account of their political faith, order of things in Portugal to try ready to return to her shores with its own strength, and take its na- fresh hopes, and the additional tural course, and to lend no ear to excitation communicated by the the bigotted apprehensions, or any establishment in Portugal of a free countenance to the intrigues of constitution given by its native Spain. Other considerations even monarch, and protected from fomade it still more decidedly her reign attack by the power interest, unless she wished for a land, that the departure of the war without an object, to be pro- French army would be the signal secuted for its own sake by the for an immediate renewal of the sacrifice of all principle, to use her revolutionary excesses, and tumulinfluence in preventing, on the tuary government, the suppression part of Spain, any aggression of which had been the very object against the Portuguese govern- for which she had marched her ment. France knew well that, in squadrons across the Pyrenees. the event of such an aggression France had entered Spain to mainbeing made, Britain was bound by tain, as it were, the public peace; treaty to support Portugal in re- and she would now be quitting it, pelling it; and the decision and just because that peace which she rapidity with which, when it was had gone thither to maintain, was made, British troops were con about to be broken. Unless, thereveyed to the Tagus, proved to all fore, she gave up all that she purthe world that Britain would not chased, or thought to have purbe tardy or hesitating in fulfilling chased in 1823 with so many her obligations. But a war be- sacrifices, France could not avoid tween Britain and Portugal on the war, if the conduct of Spain to one hand, and Spain on the other, wards Portugal_should provoke while Spain was occupied by a hostilities with England ; but to French army, would almost neces- her sueh a war could have no obsarily involve France as a party, ject ; it could add nothing to her however contrary it might be to real power, and its inconsistency her policy and her interests. That would have lowered immensely French troops should fill the bar- her influence on opinion. It, racks, and occupy the fortresses of was thus equally her interest and Spain, and perform theduties of the her duty to preserve the peace

of interior, to let loose a Spanish army Europe, by preventing, if possible, against Britain in the field, would the mad extravagancies of Ferdin

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nand, and expressing decidedly her or Robespierre cheering on the

1 disapprobation of his hostile and blood-hounds of the Jacobin Club. faithless policy for Ferdinand, With such principles, and against blind and bigotted, as he was, had such prejudices, it was difficult to no resource but abject submission, reason; such apprehensions prewhen left to cope with the giant vented all solidity and consistency power of England, unaided by the of conduct ; and, accordingly, these active co-operation, and even un- men, while they were the chosen consoled by the friendly sympathy, apostles of the absolute power of of the Bourbons of France. . kings, justified, and supported, and

Fortunately the ministers of applauded, the Portuguese rebels, France were moderate and just; who were marching in arms to and these plain considerations of dethrone their lawful sovereign, good policy decided their conduct and acknowledged the title of Don They went hand in hand with Bri- Miguel, to usurp the crown of his tain in endeavouring to bring Fer- brother and his niece, From the dinand and his advisers to their press they unceasingly demanded senses. But there was a clamorous, that the ministry, should send an and, in some respects, an influen- army into Portugal, a friendly coun

party in France, whose wishes try, and up-root every germ of the pointed in a very opposite direction, constitution, the willing gift of its and who were eager for a war hereditary monarch. It would be which must be unprofitable, on easier, they said, now, to move grounds which, to sound reason, the army from Spain into Portugal, were untenable. The ultra-royal- than it had been three years before ists, consisting partly of many to march it from France into Spain, members of the old noblesse, and At all events, they insisted that supported by almost all the multi- every thing should be done to aid farious influence of the clergy, the wiles and efforts of Ferdinand considered the representative go; against the constitution, that he vernment of Portugal as much an should be backed with all the coun. object of terror and abhorrence as tenance which France could give; did even Ferdinand himself. In and that

i every encouragement every thing that approached to the should be secretly given to him, and nature of a popular institution, to the Portuguese rebels, whom they they saw the subversion of the designated royalists, because they altar, the proscription of nobility, were fighting against their king, and the downfall of the divine The private intrigues of the party to rights of monarchy; the charter of confirm Spain in her policy, were Don Pedro was not in their eyes, more successful than their public much less pregnant with misery declamations to force France into and crime than the most tumul- a war. The baron de Moustier, tuary. ordinance that ever issued the French minister at Madrid, from the National Convention; lent himself to their views. As and the Princess Regent of Portu- the French ministry had nothing gal, exhorting her chambers to pro- to gain by falsehood, and as their ceed faithfully and prudently, in whole conduct spoke nothing but settling the government which her sincerity, it is impossible that they brother had bestowed, presented to could have given this man private them in a milder form, Danton instructions at variance with the


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sentiments which they uniformly been the determined attitude of expressed to the British cabinet ; Britain, equally prepared for war, but secret instructionis "he" un- as solicitous' for peace, that had doubtedly had from the leaders of confirmed them in a just the ultra-royalists: and, trusting to ourable line of policy. The secret the influence of that party to jus- springs, however, by which the ultify whatever he might do in fur- tra-royalists worked behind "the therance of their schemes, he ven- curtain, were powerful; but, altured to trifle with the policy, and though De Moustier, on his arcompromise the character of his rival at Paris, 'in December, was government. 'He strengthened the admitted to an audience of the Spanish cabinet in its resolution to king, the cabinet immediately took refuse 'acknowledging the Portu- another step which told much more gưese regency, and assisted all its plainly how sincere was their reexpedients to evade the demands solution to lend no aid or counteand the remonstrances of the Por- nance to the policy of Spain, than tuguese envoy. Although the mi- the recalling of an ambassador. nister of a power which had re- When the French army took posa ceived in Paris an accredited di- session of Spain, two regiments of

" ] plomatic agent' of Portugal, and Swiss guards, troops of ancient had itself accredited to Lisbon an proverbial fidelity, had been spe ambassador of high rank, he pre- cially assigned for the protection tended, when requested to state of the royal person, and when



cognized that of Portugal, that it in 1824, these regiments had been was á matter which did not con- allowed to remain at the particular cern him, that he knew nothing, request of Ferdinand. France and had received no instructions now recalled them ;' and in about it. The pretext, under calling these troops, in preference which Spain endeavoured to veil to any others, she seemed to inher obstinate hostility was, the ne- tend to impress upon Ferdinand Cory of knowing the sentiments the opinion which she entertained

allies ; and De Moustier took of his conduct personally. Every care that she should never want an expedient was had recourse tò by the excuse for pretending to be still Spanish government to have the officially ignorant of the determi- order revoked ; Ferdinand himself nation of France. When the wrote a letter to his most christian French ministry learned this con- majesty. But the French minisduct of their servant, they ex- try would not sacrifice their own pressed their opinion both of him character, already somewhat comand of Ferdinand, by instantly re- promised by the conduct of De calling him. Less they could not Moustier, to save him from the have done, unless they were wil- consequences of his own folly and ling to make themselves proverbial stupidity persisted in with an obexamples to Europe of falsehood stinacy which only bigotry could and insincerity ; and a severer cen- have produced. The Swiss regisure would have tended better to ments left Madrid in different diremove from them every taint of visions, and returned to France in suspicion, that it might only have the month of January. England VOL. LXVIII.


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and France were thus united to dark and dreary reign of despotism preserve the peace of Europe in so and superstition, amid whose palfar as it was menaced by Spain. pable obscurity they prowled for Such an union deprived the cabinet iheir own prey, or, when sated and Camarilla of Madrid of their with victims, slumbered on in brulast hope of being able to extend tish indolence. over a neighbouring country the

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