Bishop v. Moorman. The law using that term in a limited sense and as opposed to equity furnishes no remedy for quieting title. One in possession could secure a decree quieting title only from a Court of Chancery and never from a court of law; in such cases no remedy at all was obtainable from the common-law courts. An action of trespass might give damages, but it could not clear title. There is therefore no adequate legal remedy. The rule upon this subject is thus stated by the Supreme Court of the United States: "It is not enough that there is a remedy at law; it must be plain and adequate, or in other words as practical and efficient to the ends of justice and its prompt administration, as the remedy in equity." Watson v. Sutherland, 5 Wall. 74. In many cases this rule has been adopted and enforced by this court. English v. Smock, 34 Ind. 115; s. c., 7 Am. Rep. 215; vide opinion, p. 124; Elson v. O'Dowd, 40 Ind. 300, vide opinion, p. 302; Clark v. Jeffersonville, etc., R. Co., 44 id. 248; Thatcher v. Humble, 67 id. 444; Spicer v. Hoop, 51 id. 365, see p. 370; Bonnell v. Allen, 53 id. 130. The principle involved in the rule stated has been carried much farther than it is necessary for us to carry it in this case. Thus it has been held that an injunction will lie to restrain the enforcement of a judgment shown by the record to have been annulled. Rickets v. Hitchens, 34 Ind. 348. So it has been held that a sale upon a judgment satisfied of record will be enjoined. Bowen v. Clark, 46 Ind. 405. A tenant by entirety may enjoin sale upon a judgment against his co-tenant of the land owned jointly, although the record discloses the character of the title and the nature of the judgment. Hulett v. Inlow, 57 Ind. 412; s. c., 26 Am. Rep. 64; Davis v. Clark, 26 Ind. 424. The sale of property not subject to execution, as for instance, the property of a municipal corporation, may be enjoined. President, etc., v. City of Indianapolis, 12 Ind. 620; Lucas v. Board, etc., 44 id. 524, 553. Of the class of cases just mentioned it may be said that the record much more clearly discloses the fact that no title can pass than in such a case as this, for in the first named class of cases, a public law notifies the world that no title can pass by the sale, and there is therefore a much stronger application of the rule in such cases than is required in this. In the case of First National Bank v. Deitch, 83 Ind. 131, the court quoted, with approval from a work on injunctions, the following: "And it may be asserted as a general proposition, that a sale of lands Bishop v. Moorman. under execution which would confer no title upon the purchaser, and whose only effect would be to cloud the title of others, will be enjoined." 1 High Inj. 242. 1 High Inj. 242. In view of the cases we have cited, we cannot perceive that there can be any doubt that the controlling question in this case has been set at rest in this State. Looking to the decisions of other courts, we shall find that our cases are not without firm support. Key City, etc., Co. v. Munsell, 19 Iowa, 305, the case was in all material respects precisely like that under discussion, and it was held that injunction was the appropriate remedy. The opinion in that case was written by Judge DILLON, and makes clear the right there adjudged the plaintiff. The Supreme Court of California, in Hickman v. O'Neal, 10 Cal. 292, said: "The right of a party to enjoin a sale of his property for another's debt is not denied, and is supported by several decisions of this court." We refer, without comment, to the following cases as sustaining our views: Bank v. Schultz, 2 Ohio, 471; Norton v. Beaver, 5 id. 178; Bennett v. McFadden, 61 Ill. 334; Vogler v. Montgomery, 54 Mo. 577; Uhl v. May, 5 Neb. 157. The case of Cartright v. Briggs, 41 Ind. 184, is not in point, for the facts are essentially different from those before us. In that case the main point of the decision is that the plaintiff had no title to the land which he sought to prevent the auditor from selling. The decision in Trueblood v. Hollingsworth, 48 Ind. 537, in so far as it is in point at all, is against rather than for the appellees; for the clear implication from it is, that a sale in such a case as this may be enjoined; but the point really decided in that case was, that the complaint was insufficient because it did not state such facts as gave color of authority to make the sale, and only alleged "empty threats." When the case cited was again before this court, it was expressly held that injunction would lie. Hollingsworth v. Trueblood, 59 Ind. 542. The decision in Mead v. McFadden, 68 Ind. 340, is that a widow cannot enjoin the sale of lands of the husband upon executions received by the sheriff during the life-time of the husband, and is not in point. What is there decided is that executions bound the husband's interest, whatsoever it was, and did not affect the widow's rights, and that the lien of the judgments was paramount to the widow's claim to the $500 allowed by law. No one of these cases is in conflict with those heretofore cited; nor can either of them exert any influence upon the decision of the present case. Reichert v. Geers. The execution plaintiffs were proper, if not necessary, parties to this action, for they were the real parties in interest, and it was proper to bring them into court for the purpose of finally determining the controversy. Judgment reversed with instructions to overrule the demurrers to the complaint. REICHERT V. GEERS. (98 Ind. 73.) Nuisance-slaughter-house. The operation of a slaughter-house in a populous locality is prima facie a nuisance, and may be restrained at the suit of neighboring residents injured thereby.* A CTION for injunction. The opinion states the case. The injunction was granted below. W. A. Bickle, for appellants. H. C. Fox, for appellees. FRANKLIN, C. Appellees brought this suit to enjoin appellants from continuing a nuisance in the use of a certain slaughter-house, in the city of Richmond, Indiana. An issue was formed upon the complaint by a denial. There was a trial by the court, finding for plaintiffs, and over a motion for a new trial, judgment was rendered for plaintiffs. A motion to modify the judgment was also overruled. The errors complained of and insisted upon are the overruling of the motion for a new trial and the motion to modify the judgment. The slaughter-house complained of was situate on the bank of White Water river, in the midst of three other slaughter-houses, two above and one below, in the south-west part of the city, all of which discharged the offal and refuse matter into the bed of the river, to be carried off south away from the city by the running water in the stream. * See Farrell v. Cook, ante, 721; Pruner v. Pendleton (75 Va. 516), 40 Am Rep. 738. Reichert v. Geers. The plaintiff Geers resided about one hundred yards from defendants' slaughter-house, and the plaintiff Merings about three hundred yards distant on the west side of the river. There were from four hundred to five hundred people residing within a radius of one-eighth of a mile of the slaughter-house; the most of them northeast thereof, and composing the south-west part of the population of the city; the river running south upon the west side of the city. South-east of the slaughter-house the lands were low, wet and unimproved. The complaint charges that the defendants kept their slaughterhouse in an unclean, impure and filthy condition, so as to allow the offal and refuse animal matter to be and remain in and about the premises until they became putrid and decayed, filling the air with noxious and offensive odors; the gathering in and keeping in pens upon the premises all kinds of stock preparatory to slaughter, and permitting the pens to become foul and filthy, until they emitted offensive odors, and the causing of unusual, loud and hideous noises by the stock while in the pens, and their groans and outcries while being killed both by day and in the night time, so as to essentially interfere with the plaintiffs, and the citizens residing in the immediate vicinity thereof, comfortably living upon and enjoying their property. The evidence is conflicting as to the manner in which the defendants' slaughter-house had been kept for two or three years preceding the trial. There was evidence on the part of the plaintiffs clearly tending to prove the truth of the charges in the complaint, and to sustain the finding of the court. In such cases this court will not weigh the evidence and reverse the judgment on account of the overruling of a motion for a new trial, based upon the weight of the evidence. The court rendered judgment "that the defendants and each of them, agents and employees and servants, be and they are hereby perpetually enjoined from carrying on, maintaining and operating a slaughter-house, or permitting the same to be done by others, for the purpose of killing, slaughtering and butchering hogs, cattle, sheep and other animals upon the lands owned by defendants, or either of them, as described in the complaint and situate within the corporate limits of the city of Richmond, Wayne county, Indiana, and bounded as follows, to-wit:" After giving a description of the land, then the judgment proceeds to enjoin the defendants. VOL. XLIX — 93 Reichert v. Geers. from carrying on and conducting the slaughter-house in the manner in which it had been conducted and carried on as charged in the complaint. 66 A motion to modify the judgment by striking out that part included in the above quotation was overruled by the court. The conducting of the business of a slaughter-house in a densely populated part of a city may not be considered per se a nuisance; still it will be considered prima facie a nuisance. Wood Nuis. 571. Slaughter-houses, being generally of a noxious character, should not be established in public places, but rather in the outskirts of towns, away from habitations and public roads, and their establishment elsewhere is always perilous to the owner, for if they cannot be so conducted as not to become of a noisome character, either to individuals or the public, they will be stopped by a court of equity, or by action or indictment in a court of law. Even when they are originally built in a place remote from the habitations of men, or from public places, if they become actual nuisances by reason of roads being afterward laid out in their vicinity, or by dwellings subsequently erected within the sphere of their effects, the fact of their existence prior to the laying out of the roads, or the erection of the dwellings, is no defense." Wood Nuis., § 572; Brady v. Weeks, 3 Barb. 157. And the same doctrine has been held by the English courts. See authorities referred to in note to above section of Wood Law of Nuisances; Sims v. City of Frankfort, 79 Ind. 446; State v. Louisville, etc., R. Co., 86 id. 114. Ordinary manufactories, mills and workshops within a populous city are not necessarily per sé or prima facie nuisances. Though "A lawful business may be so conducted as to become a nuisance, but, in order to warrant interference by injunction, the injury must be a material and essential one. Damages may be paid by the author of the nuisance and the business not be stopped, but if injunction issues then the right to conduct the business is at an end. The necessity which will authorize the granting of the writ of injunction, to restrain the carrying on of a business lawful within itself, must be a strong and imperious one. If it were otherwise, all mills and manufactories might be stopped at the demand of those to whom they caused annoyance, even though the injury complained of might be slight and trivial. Courts interfere by injunction against establishments such as mills and manufactories, with great caution, and only in cases where the facts are |