Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company v. McVay. was held that the fact, that a physician in the service of a railroad company is authorized to buy medicines on the credit of the company, does not imply a power to bind the company by a contract for board, lodging, attendance and nursing of a brakeman injured on one of the company's trains. In the case of Rankin v. New England, etc., Silver Mining Co., 4 Nev. 78, it was held that "No one can be held upon a contract executed by another as agent, until it is satisfactorily shown that he possessed the authority to act for the principal in that particular character of transaction," and hence, that the full power of a foreman to employ workmen for the construction of a mill, and pay them for their services, does not include or imply the power to purchase lumber or enter into contracts respecting it. The case of Marquette, etc., R. Co. v. Taft, 28 Mich. 289, was an action by a surgeon against the company for services rendered an employee who was injured while on duty. He was employed by the superintendent and the yard-master who had charge of the business and men in the yard, where the employee was engaged when injured, and who had the right to employ men for all purposes they were required for in the yard, and to discharge them. While the court divided as to the authority of the superintendent, the judges all agreed that under the evidence the yard-master had no authority to bind the company by the employment of the surgeon. The court said: "There is certainly nothing in the evidence respecting the business required of Theil (yard-master), or in his position in the company's service, which suggests his possession of authority to bind by contracts for professional services. He was a mere yardmaster, charged with local and very circumscribed duties, and those duties do not appear to have had any connection with the employment of professional assistance for the company." Two of the judges held that without proof of authority on the part of the superintendent, other than that furnished by his title simply, the com pany was not bound by his employment of the surgeon. The case of Cox v. Midland, etc., Ry. Co., 3 Exch. 268, cited in Wood on Master and Servant, at page 506, section 262, was an action by a physician against the company to recover for attendance upon a person injured by the company's employees. The physician was employed by a station master, who acted as the chief officer of the passenger and other departments. It was held that the company was not liable. PARKE, B., delivering the opinion of the Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company v. McVay. court, after giving several illustrations to show that the company was not liable, said: "The employer of an agent for a particular purpose gives only the authority necessary for that agency under ordinary circumstances." In the case of Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Reisner, 18 Kans. 458, it was said: "The authorities cited sustain the proposition that a station agent of a railroad company is not authorized, by virtue of his position as such agent, to employ a hotel-keeper, at the expense of the company, to attend to one of its brakemen, injured while. working for the company, nor to furnish such employees with board and lodging while disabled." The same doctrine is fully recognized in the following cases: Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues, 47 Ill. 188; Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Prince, 50 id. 26; Cairo, etc., R. Co. v. Mahoney, 82 id. 73; Pacific R. Co. v. Thomas, 19 Kans. 256; Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Reecher, 24 id. 228; s. c., 1 Am. & E. R. R. Cas. 343. See also, 1 Rorer Railroads, 666. Many more cases to the same effect might be cited. We know of no authority to the contrary, and think none can be found that would hold the company liable upon the contract alone of the road-master, under the circumstances of this case. As there is nothing before us to show that the contract made with appellee by the road-master was within the line of his employment, or that he had authority to represent or bind the corporation by such a contract, we must hold that the corporation is not bound by it, unless it was recognized and ratified by the corporation. That a contract which an agent has no authority to make may be ratified by the corporation, so as to become binding upon it, is well settled by the authorities. If the general manager in this instance had authority to represent and bind the corporation by such contracts, he had authority to ratify the contract made by the roadmaster. If he had such authority, the evidence here is ample to show that the contract by the road-master was ratified, and thus became obligatory upon the corporation. Here we meet the most important and difficult question in the case. There is evidence sufficient to show that Mr. Snyder was the general manager of appellant, the railway company; but direct evidence that as general manager he had authority to bind the company by such a contract, is wanting. The fact that the druggist, physician and one of the nurses were paid by the company, is some evidence of his authority as to the contracts with them, but it is hardly suffi Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company v. McVay. cient, of itself, upon which to base a recovery in favor of appellee. As there is no direct evidence of such authority having been delegated to the general manager by the corporation, so there is no direct evidence as to what his duties as general manager were, from which his authority might be inferred. Can we presume, from the title "general manager," that the duties and powers of the general manager were sufficiently comprehensive to include contracts for the nursing of a person wounded upon appellant's road? The term "general manager" of a corporation, according to the ordinary meaning of the term, indicates one who has the general direction and control of the affairs of the corporation, as contradistinguished from one who may have the management of some particular branch of the business. There is no class of business of any thing like the magnitude of the railroad business of to-day, that is so open to common observation, and of which the general public know so much. The terms road-master, section boss, conductor, station agent, superintendent and general manager, are terms familiar to the whole people, and the public has, in the main, a correct understanding of the ordinary duties of these several classes of officers, agents and employees, and that their duties and powers are limited to the keeping up of the road, rolling stock, etc., and operating the road in the transportation of freight and passengers. We should have to shut our eyes to the most common observation to hold that the courts will not presume that the “ general manager of a railway has authority to bind the corporation by contracts for medical and other services to an injured employee, passenger, or other person wounded on the road by any agency of the company. Different section bosses or road-masters may have different duties imposed upon them, and be clothed with different powers, by different corporations. The same, probably, may be said of superintendents. Possibly the same may be said of "general managers," but this term indicates a general control and direction of all matters connected with the operation of the road, and until the contrary is shown, the presumption ought to be indulged by the courts that such an officer has authority to care for the wounded persons above mentioned. In many cases it would be difficult to have action by the board of directors; and in many cases, if prompt and efficient measures were not adopted, the corporation might be subjected to additional damages. It has been held that the courts will take notice of the duties and powers of cashiers of banks. Farmers, etc., Bank v. Troy City Bank, 1 Doug. (Mich.) 457. Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company v. McVay. In the case of Sturges v. Bank of Circleville, 11 Ohio St. 153, the court said: It is not claimed that the respective duties of the board of directors, president and cashier, in the exercise of the franchises of the bank, are prescribed by the charter. So far therefore as the limitation of the appropriate duties of the cashier depend upon his office, we can only have respect to the ordinary and well understood duties of that officer in determining his powers. A cashier is defined to be one who has charge of money, or who superintends the books, payments and receipts of a bank or moneyed institution. His actual powers and duties, like those of all other agents, may be more or less qualified, restricted or enlarged by the corporation, institution or party for whom he acts. But in this case, there being nothing to show any restriction or qualification of his powers in that regard, the duties of the cashier may reasonably be understood to extend to the buying and selling, and negotiating bills of exchange, checks and promissory notes, as well as to that of borrowing money, as the agent of the bank," etc. These cases were cited approvingly in the case of Tousey v. Taw, 19 Ind. 212. If the courts may thus take notice of the duties and powers of cashiers of banks, we can think of no reason why they should not presume, from the title, that general managers of railways have power and authority to bind the corporation by a contract such as that under discussion. In the case of New Albany, etc., R. Co. v. Haskell, 11 Ind. 301, it was held that the corporation was liable upon a contract for fencing the road, made by a general superintendent of the corporation. There seems to have been no evidence of his duties other than could be inferred from the title "general superintendent." The court said: "He was the general superintendent of the road, and of course the general agent of the company, and as such, it may be fairly presumed that he was clothed with authority to bind his principal in contracts relative to the safe and effective operations of the road. Railroad companies, in all cases, contract through their agents. The law makes it their interest to fence their track. * And upon whom, more than such general agent, would the duty of making a contract similar to the one in suit appropriately rest? In the absence of conflicting evidence, we are not allowed to avoid the conclusion, that the agent, in this instance, acted within the scope of his authority." We have many cases of what may be presumed by the courts, and of what they will take notice without proof. VOL. XLIX — 98 Louisville, Evansville and St. Louis Railway Company v. McVay. The following are not directly in point upon the exact question under examination, but they are analogous, and serve to throw light upon it: Carmon v. State, 18 Ind. 450; Ward v. Colyhan, 30 id. 395; Manning v. Gasharie, 27 id. 399; Hipes v. Cochran, 13 id. 175; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Stephens, 28 id. 429; Indianapolis, etc., R. Co. v. Case, 15 id. 42; Ross v. Boswell, 60 id. 235; Abshire v. Mather, 27 id. 381; Abel v. Alexander, 45 id. 523; s. c., 15 Am. Rep. 270; Eagan v. State, 53 Ind. 162; Schlicht v. State, 56 id. 173; Wiles v. State, 33 id. 206; State v. Swift, 69 id. 505; Board, etc., v. May, 67 id. 562; United States Ex. Co. v. Keefer, 59 id. 263; Buell v. State, 72 id. 523; Terre Haute, etc., R. Co. v. Pierce, 95 id. 496; Stout v. State, 96 id. 407; Myers v. State, 93 id. 251. In the case of Atlantic, etc., R. Co. v. Reisner, supra, without proof of the duties and powers of the general agent, the company was held liable upon his contract with a hotel keeper for board and attendance to a brakeman, injured while working for the company. It was said: "In the case of a general agency, the principal holds out the agent to the public as having unlimited authority as to all his business. When the witness testified that Hyde was the general agent of the road at Atchison, he thereby gave evidence that the railroad company held out to the public such person as its agent in all its business and employment. In other words, the general agent of the company is virtually the corporation itself. General manager and general agent are synonymous terms." The same doctrine was held in the case of Atchison, etc., R. Co. v. Reecher, supra. * The case of Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Rodrigues, supra, was an action to recover for nursing an injured employee. The nurse was employed by the local station agent, who by letter notified the general superintendent of the road of the employment. To this letter there was no answer nor was the employment otherwise disapproved. When the bill was presented the general superintendent said that he would pay reasonable charges, and based his objection only upon the amount of the bill. It was held that this amounted to a ratification of the contract by the agent and bound the company. In speaking of the general superintendent the court said: "As his title implies, he has a general superintendence of the business affairs of the road and we deem it but a reasonable inference to conclude that this was within the scope of these powers and that when |