During the engagement the Wyoming was under fire from three ships, and, at one time or another, of eight batteries and either one or two gun redoubts. Before she got through she sank two of the ships, made a lame duck of the third: she went aground and worked off again without aid, she disabled at least one of the batteries and silenced several of the others. She carried only six guns herself, but had opposed to her no less than ninety-two guns, some of which were heavy ordnance.

When shall her glory fade?

Think, think of the wild fight she waged!

For this little "episode" the United States collected $12,000, part of which went to the owners of the S. S. Pembroke.

On entering the harbor of Yokohama the following day, the Wyoming was greeted with ringing cheers from the Conqueror and other British war vessels as well as those of other nations then at anchor, and Admiral Kuper made haste to congratulate Commander McDougal. Very shortly afterwards, having made good her damages, the Wyoming, in compliance with orders she had received prior to coming to Japan at the urgent request of the U. S. Minister, left the East for home waters. She had the hearty good wishes of all who remained behind, and dozens of people lined the Bund to see her steam out. The writer, too, felt that he had lost a friend as she turned the point and sank from sight, but there has always been a lingering memory and pleasant recollections in his heart for as kind and good natured a friend as ever he had in his life in the person of David McDougal.

[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A UNIFORM TYPE IN BATTLESHIPS.

By REAR-ADMIRAL CASPAR F. GOODRICH, L. S. Navy,

A battleship may be called upon to fight a single-hip actions she may fight an action as one it in the feet. If we could be certain in advance which of these tiles the is destined to f would this knowledge exert any mated whexe mst. design? In seeking the answer to the dice 1 an 180*

onclusion in the affirmative.

When acting alone, it is not to be doined the the for? * powerful as possible in offense and defensive qua

ore guns and armor we can give her me e ng Reasonable speed. Unde temelopment of me amanet van acteristic can only be secured at the serie & cre

he cost of excessive placement vile the to sing whEI s of little value unless teatral

the results of careful study in the car of tought ́s and spa stent men are to be accepted dus #franca must than 25 per cent; indeed, some fe en

d that this figure should be wearer 5 ser var

It seems to me that the ty ng IT THce ate

ore

e formidable than its possible tombent e

the idea of the singles in

cy on the part of the nation

resents this unmistakanie rat.

denied, and with triti, so far as

cally, erronecusi and against te z formity in batter command and es, goes unrecognized, he smodn es and not a homogeneous t

During the engagement the Wyoming was under fire from three ships, and, at one time or another, of eight batteries and either one or two gun redoubts. Before she got through she sank two of the ships, made a lame duck of the third: she went aground and worked off again without aid, she disabled at least one of the batteries and silenced several of the others. She carried only six guns herself, but had opposed to her no less than ninety-two guns, some of which were heavy ordnance.

When shall her glory fade?

Think, think of the wild fight she waged!

For this little "episode" the United States collected $12,000, part of which went to the owners of the S. S. Pembroke.

On entering the harbor of Yokohama the following day, the Wyoming was greeted with ringing cheers from the Conqueror and other British war vessels as well as those of other nations then at anchor, and Admiral Kuper made haste to congratulate Commander McDougal. Very shortly afterwards, having made good her damages, the Wyoming, in compliance with orders she had received prior to coming to Japan at the urgent request of the U. S. Minister, left the East for home waters. She had the hearty good wishes of all who remained behind, and dozens of people lined the Bund to see her steam out. The writer, too, felt that he had lost a friend as she turned the point and sank from sight, but there has always been a lingering memory and pleasant recollections in his heart for as kind and good natured a friend. as ever he had in his life in the person of David McDougal.

[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

ON THE DESIRABILITY OF A UNIFORM TYPE IN BATTLESHIPS.

By REAR-ADMIRAL CASPAR F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy.

A battleship may be called upon to fight a single-ship action; or she may fight an action as one unit in the fleet. If we could be certain in advance which of these rôles she is destined to fill, would this knowledge exert any material influence upon her design? In seeking the answer to this question I am led to a conclusion in the affirmative.

When acting alone, it is not to be doubted that she should be as powerful as possible in offensive and defensive qualities. The more guns and armor we can give her the better, together with a reasonable speed. Undue development of the last-named characteristic can only be secured at the sacrifice of protection or at the cost of excessive displacement; while the resulting superiority is of little value unless relatively so great as to appear abnormal. If the results of careful study on the part of thoughtful and competent men are to be accepted, this difference must not be less than 25 per cent; indeed, some of those best qualified to speak hold that this figure should be nearer 50 per cent.

It seems to me that the striving to produce battleships, each more formidable than its possible competitors, is a distinct adoption of the idea of the single-ship action as the keynote of naval policy on the part of the nation whose ship-building programme presents this unmistakable trait. This adoption will doubtless. be denied, and with truth, so far as intent is concerned, but, practically, erroneously and against the logic of facts. The value of uniformity in battery command and in tactical properties, in such cases, goes unrecognized; the product is a collection of diverse types and not a homogeneous fleet. Such is our case to-day.

Everything in the mechanical world is a compromise. And this truism is especially applicable to ships' designs. As we cannot have all we want on a limited displacement, would it not be well to make up our minds to accept this disheartening and inexorable condition and take the broad view that to what the fleet needs the individual vessel should be subordinated? Here, again, I say "Yes"—although I am well aware that an opposite view may be strongly held, viz., that the strongest individual units must of necessity combine to make the strongest fleet. To this I am, of course, entirely ready to agree, provided these units be uniform in their attributes of offence, defence and maneuver-or if not absolutely uniform then fairly so. I do not care to impose too exacting conditions.

Again, if assured that the units of his fleet were reasonably alike in their ability to deliver and receive hostile blows, would not a commander-in-chief feel more confidence in his conduct of a battle when these units possessed identical maneuvering qualities than when they presented these qualities in quite discordant array? While I may be mistaken on this point, I hold, with considerable pertinacity, the view that homogeneity is what he would gladly have if not obliged to give up too much of the combatant powers offence and defence.

The most important feature in a battleship's design is, unquestionably, the arrangement of the battery. After many experiments the axial line has come to be recognized as offering the maximum of advantages. To that disposition we are now, I had almost said irrevocably, committed. Holding fast to this basic idea, we have placed the third and succeeding turrets also along the ship's axis, and to secure unrestricted gun command the third and fourth turrets are installed on a somewhat higher plane than the others. All this is so reasonable that this, which may justly be termed the American scheme, has been adopted by other powers. If we place the fifth and sixth turrets in accordance with this principle, they will operate in a plane of their own, and we shall see our guns in three stories, as it were. That development we have not reached, doubtless for reasons of stability. Theoretically, it is the only proper way of mounting our battery-practically, we are forbidden to do so, and thus are driven to expedients which, in the cases of the North Dakota and the Minas Geraes, deprive some of the guns of their full value. To me it appears