[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

TRAINING OF THE PERSONNEL OF THE FLEET FOR BATTLE.

By REAR-ADMIRAL A. C. DILLINGHAM, U. S. Navy.

Success in battle is the ultimate object of our training, so that a progressive system is necessary, culminating in the greatest efficiency when engaged in battle. Our fleet is progressing, it is assuming more and more a military character with the fleet policy of to-day, when it seems possible to keep the fleet assembled for training, avoiding the demoralizing effects of long and unnecessary delays at navy yards, and frequent interruptions in using the fleet for other than military purposes. It is acknowledged that our present system of training recruits at training stations is giving good results, while the commander-in-chief of the battle fleet has instituted progressive training for the enlisted personnel in fleet, which is far in advance of anything ever undertaken before, and sure to give good results; the time spent at Guantanamo by the fleet, with the admirable routine for training, should advance the enlisted personnel in a general knowledge of its business. We must not forget that with 76 per cent of our men on their first enlistment, much more time must be occupied with training than would be the case if we had a larger continuous service force. Were 76 per cent of our men continuous service men the question of their training would be greatly simplified, for continuous service men should mean trained men. It would seem that we are doing the best possible for the enlisted personnel. Let us now consider the commissioned personnel.

With the routine for drills, etc., aboard ship the junior officers, having professional zeal, must progress. The battleship, scouts, destroyers, tropedo-boats, submarines and aeroplane, give to these officers the very best of training. The captains when in fleet are studying the tactical value of their ships, and with the experience

of frequently getting under way, coming to anchor, at target practice and in cruising in formation or separately, with frequent opportunities for handling their ships separately, they should be au fait in the school of the ship, while battle drills are preparing them for junior flag rank. All officers of command rank should have a course at the war college, and this, if possible, before taking a command afloat, and the captain who is eligible to flag rank in fleet should not have shore duty other than at the war college. With our present system of promotion there are many captains who have no possibilty of being in fleet with flag rank. It is from such captains that details for navy yards and other shore duty should be made. It would seem that there is every reason to expect efficiency from our officers up to flag rank, but there does not seem to have been made any effort to develop the efficient flag officer who should be the head, the brains to lead our fleet to battle. There must be a school in fleet for flag officers; they must have more training, must be given the opportunity, under as nearly as possible battle conditions, to get the necessary experience, and to develop whether or not they are actually capable of performing the service that may be required of them.

In our service, if one's health and morals are good, it is not difficult to reach flag rank, but have all who reach this position the natural capacity for the duty required? We must have the best, and this can only be assured by giving to flag officers the opportunity to develop what may or may not be in them. At present flag duty in fleet seems to be due to accident of birth, rather than tried efficiency. It is found at the war college that certain officers develop a keen faculty as tacticians, others have aptitude for strategetic work. Some officers in obtaining initial positions, for instance, can at once set the course and formation, while others are undecided, and fail to grasp the situation. The former will gain the advantage, while the latter may lose the opportunity for success. Some officers upon being given a problem, with the chart before them, can at once locate the position of strategic advantage, while others less keen find great difficulty in making a decision. The school for flag officers should develop the best, which are the ones we must have. So far the commander-in-chief has assumed a position which not only prevents him from having the experience which he should have in order to properly conduct the fleet in battle, but which deprives the junior flag officers of the training which they must have in order to become efficient. In

foreign services the greatest importance is attached to the training of flag officers; they are sent afloat for a year's training and relieved by others, so that the government, in time of peace, may be able to select the most efficient for the purposes of war.

Our division commanders have complained that they did practically nothing in fleet; that they were without responsibility or opportunity for practice; that they were learning nothing comparatively. This condition arises in a great measure from having the commander-in-chief in formation, in command of a division. There is no tactical reason why a commander-in-chief should be in formation. In time of peace there is every reason why he should not be in formation. It is understood that the Department contemplates placing a division commander for each division, with the commander-in-chief out of formation. This, with a proper system of training for flag officers in battle work, will supply a want that has been sadly needed in fleet, and should develop flag officers fit for service in time of war. In the school for flag officers the methods should pertain only to the actual conditions of battle. A flag officer should have the experience in the practical handling of his force under battle conditions, as for instance, with his force organized as for war and operating against another force, he should seek advantage in initial position, and so conduct his force that he shall maintain the advantage with the least possible change in the rate of change of range. How easy it is to write such a phrase, “Seek initial position and so conduct his force that he shall maintain the advantage with the least possible change in the rate of change of range."

This is battle tactics. This is the practical business of the flag officer. What a tremendous responsibility he has. Consider the approach of two modern fleets and try to realize the responsibility resting upon the commander-in-chief and the junior flag officers. Should an officer be allowed to accept such responsibility without having had the proper training? And when we consider that efficiency or inefficiency may mean success or defeat of our fleet, is it a wonder that our flag officers demand that they be given the opportunity for practical experience, that they may be able to make good when called upon. If we are to maintain a fleet upon the supposition that war may come at any moment, are we not bound to develop at once the efficient flag officer to conduct the fleet in battle? Let us suppose war within three or six months, we can depend upon our enlisted personnel, but where are the flag officers

who have had the training necessary to conduct our forces? We shall have to compete with flag officers who have had training as such. It would seem to be a serious and alarming condition, demanding immediate steps to be taken to secure proper battle training for our flag officers. Look over the list of flag officers available for war purposes, can we find one who has had training, one who has had the experience in battle work so absolutely necessary? The present commander-in-chief will soon reach the age limit, is it not a matter of regret that the exigencies of the service required his prospective successor to leave the fleet for shore duty, causing him to lose the practical training preparatory to assuming such responsibility.

This new commander-in-chief must now rid his mind as soon as possible of all thought of navy yard administration and assume the serious responsibilities of commander-in-chief without any preliminary battle training. In time of peace his is a difficult position. Can we imagine a more difficult position or a more serious one in the event of an early war, or one which might give the country greater anxiety? It would seem far better from a practical view point to continue the present commander-in-chief with his experience, regardless of his retirement, if he is taken out of formation, and the junior flag officers given the training in battle tactics, preparatory to a selection for commander-in-chief. Till lately, we have never been able to get beyond a preliminary stage in battle tactics. This has been due in the past to the frequent changes of commanders-in-chief, and the lack of any progressive system for training flag officers; and recently to the fact that the commander-in-chief has apparently assumed the duties of commander-in-chief, squadron and division commander. There has never been systematic training of junior flag officers, our squadrons have never been sufficiently exercised in actual battle practice. I do not criticize the commander-in-chief. No doubt conditions existed which prompted a different course. The fact that our division commanders have lately been pitted against each other shows his appreciation of the necessity for such training.

As the school for flag officers should be put in operation it is well to consider how best to conduct the school. Let the problem for the school for our flag officers be, war with the most probable enemy of to-day, and for the purpose of training our flag officers, instead of operating our squadrons or divisions against each other, let us make the other as nearly as is possible tactically equal to a

similar force of the most probable enemy of to-day. Bring to the fleet all the offensive auxiliaries, such as scouts, destroyers, torpedo-boats, submarines and aeroplanes. Put these forces out of touch, under the command alternately of the junior flag officers. Declare then a state of war, and require the junior flag officers to conduct their forces. We shall then have information, the approach, in touch and to battle. In getting probable results we could use the scores made by our own ships at their last battle practice, and for the most probable enemy's ships the information, positive or assumed, upon the subject. These exercises should be had as frequently as is possible and under all possible conditions of sea room and weather. The commander-in-chief should prescribe the conditions, and a report in detail of every movement and incident, from the declaration of war to the end of the exercises, should be submitted as a test of the capacity and efficiency. of the flag officers engaged. With the administration of the units. of the fleet, it would seem that the commander-in-chief need not be concerned further than to know when any unit of his fleet is not able to obey at once any signal he may make.

Let the responsibility for preparedness and efficiency be with the division commander, to the squadron commander and from the squadron commander to the commander-in-chief. Develop as soon as possible the individuality of the flag officer, his capacity and his talents, his general worth for assuming the great responsibility which must devolve upon him as commander-in-chief.

The practical business of the fleet is to capture or destroy the vessels of any enemy which it is its duty to encounter. Ideal conditions would exist, if the fleet were of such a composition, and in such a state of efficiency, as to meet the demands of any national policy, and able to compete, successfully, in battle, with all comers; but no such conditions exist, and to-day, during this era, the practical question is, how to use the force that is actually at our disposal, so as to be able to successfully compete with the force of the most probable enemy of to-day. We know exactly what force we have available, and what additions to this force are actually in sight and available for the immediate future, and, considering the political aspect of the world, we may decide which nation is the most probable enemy. Our whole business is to follow such a fleet policy as will prepare this force actually existing, to capture or destroy the vessels of this most probable enemy, and a consideration of any policy, exercise, drill or maneuver that has