CONCLUSION.

The writer has endeavored to make it clear that economy in navy yards can be generally introduced only by the installation of a thorough system of accounts which will cover absolutely all classes of expenditures, throw into relief the major extravagances, and block off or circumscribe the channels through which money flows in such a way that no part may escape into that indefinite region lying between "Military Expenses" and "Cost of Production." Every cent must go into one or the other, and be clearly tagged with its character.

It is, of course, possible to produce economies without reference to such an accounting system. As a matter of fact, an accounting system does not of itself produce any economies at all. It merely points out where the loss is going on, in order that better methods may be instituted. But the attempt to produce economy without the use of proper accounts is bound to be unsatisfactory. First because attention is confined only to obvious extravagances, which may be cured without realization of the effect on other parts of the plant. Second, because it is never easy, and sometimes impossible, to prove that better methods effect a saving. Third, because the efforts of a few reformers only are utilized on certain specific details.

On the other hand, economic results are obtained more easily after the introduction of good accounting methods. First, because extravagancies are shown up all along the line at the same time, and the changes in methods in one place are instantly felt in all other places affected. Second, the proof of economy produced is found in the resultant figures, which take account of everything. Third, because all departments of the plant have their extravagances brought home to them at the same time, and all minds are using their inventive faculties to better the results in local sections.

For the above reasons the writer considers that the most crying need in our navy yards at present is for sound accounting methods. These in effect, the modern shop planning systems, the time studies, the betterment of methods and the actual production of economies can go forward with full assurance of proof being available, step by step, that they are good. In the course of time there is every reason to believe that naval plants, instead of being at the bottom of the ladder of industrial efficiency, may be at the top, and serve as models for private plants to pattern by.

[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

HONORABLE MENTION.

WANTED-A FIRST AID.

By COMMANDER C. C. MARSH, U. S. Navy.
Motto: Bricks Without Straw.

"Fenced by your careful fathers, ringed by your leaden seas,

Long did ye wake in quiet and long lie down at ease;

Till ye said of Strife, 'What is it?' of the Sword, 'It is far from our

ken';

Till ye made a sport of your shrunken hosts and a toy of your armed

men."

As bricks cannot be made without straw, neither can ships be fought without men. Two elements are required for this naval success-ships and men; and the goal should be that we have the best of each. A great navy is the demand of many; an adequate navy is the demand of practically all the people. But ask the man in the legislative hall, the man in the club, the man in the street, what he means by a great navy, and he will answer— battleships. Observe the newspapers, the conversation of intelligent men after the adjournment of Congress, and so far as interest in the navy is concerned, all are happy or depressed in proportion to the number of battleships Congress has added to the navy. The navy is battleships in the popular mind. Now there is an obligation on the part of the legislators and the professional men of the navy towards the people that is analogous to that of the family physician to his patrons. And the people will hold them to the same severe accounting that the physician should be held to, who, having observed disease in the body of a member of a family, failed to give notice of its existence and offer a remedy. All that pertains to the material branch of the navy is well understood, because it is exploited daily. The public understands that with larger ships must come docks large enough to dock

them, the necessity for reserve power, guns, great reserve coaling bases, and large sums are being expended for these purposes.

But towards the personnel, the attitude has been the dangerous one of "laissez faire." In the gradual increase of the navy, the personnel has never been considered as an indispensable part of each new unit added to the material of the navy. Along with the battleships, with her armament, equipments, etc., has never been added a clause in the appropriation bill providing for 50 officers and 850 men. A certain number of years elapses; a certain number of new units are added to the navy, and then by a strong request from the Navy Department, more men are added to the navy. This very method of procedure shows some sort of a lack of appreciation of the true relations of the matériel and the personnel in the upbuilding of the navy. To avoid platitudes, yet to attempt to place the personnel and the matériel in the correct position of their relative importance, let us cite Napoleon who is quoted as saying:

that in every military campaign the personnel element counts threefourths; all other elements one-fourth.

Or Farragut, who said:

In conclusion on this point permit me to say that I think the world is sadly mistaken when it supposes that battles are won by this or that kind of gun or vessel. In my humble opinion the Kearsarge would have captured or sunk the Alabama as often as they might have met under the same organization and officers. The best gun and the best vessel should certainly be chosen, but the victory three times out of four depends upon those who fight them. (Flagship Hartford, Mobile Bay, November 8, 1864.)

As a part of the duty of its military advisors to the people, is that of dispelling such illusions as are harmful. Of such is the Fourth-of-July oration that we can "lick the world." Even a cursory reading of history will show that we have never licked any one except where we were better trained for the specific purpose than our enemies. Other phrases, equally dangerous, are to the effect that "the Civil War was won by the private soldier," or the sense of security that seems to possess the people at the mention of the phrase" the man behind the gun." Now, the man behind the gun is a part of the great naval establishment -he is not an. It is harmful to suppose he is. Between him and success lies the dragon he must master-training. For, by the

man behind the gun is here meant the great number of young and very intelligent men in whom the people place the safety of the country. It is our imperative duty to show the country that a trained personnel is as important as are battleships; that a trained reserve personnel is as important as the battleships in reserve. It is necessary that it be understood that it was recruits that fought the first battle of Bull Run, and trained men who marched through Georgia to the sea. The same source supplied the men who fought with Villeneuve at Trafalgar, and with Suffren in the Indian Seas. It is the personnel that counts; it is the leader that ounts, because the trained man is what the leader makes him.

A TRAINED NAVAL RESERVE.

The problem of a trained naval reserve is one that we must solve for ourselves. A study of the methods employed abroad will assist us but little. In fact, the path followed by the other powers is more likely to be to us what the frontiersman calls a "blind trail." For, in the first place, all great powers, except Great Britain, have compulsory military service. This alone places us in a class apart. In the second place, the powers that concern us most-England, Germany, Japan, France-have a large, and in some cases, rapidly growing merchant marine. They also have certain shipping subsidies, and a governmental control over both ships and personnel that will probably never be realized here. There are still other conditions that differentiate us from them. But in brief, the causes that force upon us the solution of our problem are:

a. The form of our government.

b. The character of our people. c. Geographical conditions.

Causes (a) and (b) are closely bound together, the one being a reflex of the other. We are confronted with the two facts; first, the indisposition of our people to "in time of peace, prepare for war "; and second, that all military service, either in time of peace or war is voluntary. An effort will be made throughout this paper to emphasize the importance of ever keeping in mind the human element.

Cause (c) will be taken up in connection with the subject of organized and unorganized reserves.

DEFINITE REQUIREMENTS.

But to get from general to specific conditions, it is believed that the situation will be this:

A. That in the near future the navy will have in active commission twenty-one battleships, with cruisers, destroyers, submarines and miscellaneous vessels.

B. That there will be in "Commission in Reserve," with partial crews, twenty battleships, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. C. That it will be imperative to complete to its full strength the first or battleship line.

D. That for this purpose there must be available, subject to the call of the President, 1000 officers and 15,000 men.

E. This reserve force must be organized, equipped and trained; must be mustered into the service without examination, or delays; must be able to reach the distant sea coasts in thirty-six hours. How and where is such a force to be found?

By developing the present naval militia.

It is, of course, very clear that the personnel of the all-big-gun battleship of 1910 differs radically from that of the battleship of fifty years ago. But to make clearer this difference, there are given below the complements of the U. S. S. Delaware (1910), and the U. S. S. Minnesota (1863):