594 The sectio the sh way. The a viole the gi Rel wear this. The the lo plug. Rig bendir The The e limits greate Cur (maxi sure d The powde Fig. Compi being been a tial ex curve. As velocit the pr Knc gun, t be obtained. The lower pressure curve (energy of the projectile) shows such pressures. Since the projectile is not only given velocity of translation, but also is given rotation, and the frictional and other losses must be allowed for, the ordinates of the lower curve are increased by 12%. With these increased ordinates a new curve is plotted called the curve of "maximum powder pressures." Now, if at A, the highest point on the curve, a tangent be drawn parallel to the base line, as shown, then this tangent shows the maximum powder pressures to the left of A and the curve the same to the right of A. In no case should 1.4 times the maximum powder pressure exceed the elastic strength for circumferential extens. Problems. 2 I. Given R,6.0", R1 = 10.3, R2=15.0", R, 17.7", 0, 17.5 tons, 0,22.0, 0,22.0, find the Max. 6 of p, and the corresponding S, and S2. Ans.: Max. of po=21.79; S1 = .0296"; S2 = .040". 2. R。=4.75′′, R1=7.50′′, R2=11.375", R=14.375", 0,= 16 tons, 417, 0,22.2. Find Max. of Po, and corresponding S, and Ө Ans. Max. of p=20.68 tons, S1 = .0149", S2=.0327". 3. R1=6.0", R1=11.0", R2=17.0′′, R2=21.0", 0,= 18 tons, 19.0, 6, 21. Construct the equation diagram; find max. 0 Po and the corresponding shrinkages; find F, and the allowable , from equation (44). of = Ans.: 1 Max. of po=23.82 tons, S1 =.0287", S2=.0476′′, 2 3 4. At Section IV of the 8-inch gun of Fig. 15, R=5.5", R1=8.0", R2 = 11.875", R1 = 16.75", 0=55,000 lbs., 0,60,000 lbs., 65,000 lbs. Find the elastic limit for circumferential extension and the corresponding S, and S, (the gun as actually constructed has Max. of p。=68,840 lbs., S1 = .021" and S2=.037′′). 2 5. Construct the equation diagram in the case of problem 4. DISCUSSION. Prize Essay. (SEE No. 137.) COMMANDER A. B. HOFF, U. S. Navy.-The point of view of the expert accountant on the absorbing and constantly developing subject of navy yard economy is a most valuable and interesting one. The relation of accounting to navy yard economy is a clear one, and one of vital importance. It is, however, a more constricted question than that of navy yard economy, which is a broad gauge affair, having many phases. If a ship or shop is inefficient or uneconomical, a card index will sometimes help to locate the trouble, but it takes sound practice working on sound principles to cure it. This I believe to be the universally accepted axiom in the industrial world. The way I read the essay, Paymaster Conard emphasizes the fact (sic) that if you have the right persons running a business it doesn't make much difference how your business is organized. Now I believe this to be all wrong, and in explanation of such belief will touch on several places in the essay to explain my position. Those that have had actual experience in navy yard work know that many of the things that look delightfully simple on paper are full of difficulties. I believe a number of points made in the essay give the impression that in certain channels of administration things are not practically or efficiently managed. While I am not capable of holding the brief for navy yards, either in the accounting or industrial departments, I do not believe conditions are as I, personally, seem to gather from the essay as a whole. Not only have a large proportion of the essayist's suggestions been going on at navy yards for some years, under directions from the different bureaus, but the methods are being improved all the time, under the stimulus of zeal and the desire to work together. Although all men are human, I do not believe that this desire to work together is absent from the officers of navy yards, as one might be led to infer after reading pages 52, 53, and 54. The thorough and interesting discussion of accounting and its possible relations to a system of navy yard work is the most comprehensive and invaluable addition to this subject that has yet appeared. This we might rightly expect from the essayist. From a discussion of the matter with officers actually at navy yards now, what we really seem to want at a yard is an accounting system that will give the detailed statements of (I) the actual cost against an appropriation of every industrial job order; (II) comparative cost, on a similar system, with other navy yards. This is not easy, and I understand has not yet been satisfactorily developed. Let us take those portions of the essay where a different opinion is held from the essayist. INTRODUCTION. The essay reads, "Readjustment of navy yard organization, and new distributions of authority over component parts will never of themselves produce great economies. . . . . Unless a constant incentive urges us forward not only do we fail to progress, but we fall back." The essayist is here, I believe, in controversy with probably all employers of labor and administrators of industries in every part of the world. It is usually claimed that what he says does not produce economy, is, în the contrary, exactly what does produce it. As to incentives in the navy, those that have hitherto furnished its progress, will continue to do so. These I take to be personal pride, an interest in one's work, and the esteem of one's brother officers. We cannot in the service substitute any others. They have and are carrying us well at present. I submit that the organization of navy yards is the foremost essential to economy, and in this organization a sound cost and accounting system has its vital place. However, this system is of chief use to the Navy Department, not in primarily showing the quasi-industrial cost, but in showing the comparative cost at different yards of similar work. The results of the accounting and cost systems are for the benefit of the industrial heads at the navy yards, so that they may find waste by another method than the ones employed by them in the administration of their shops, etc. If the accounting system does not do this, it has not yet reached its ultimate development. When it does do this, I claim further information is supererogatory, and hence an unnecessary complication and administrative cost. As the essayist states, the separation of the military and the industrial costs in a navy yard is necessary. Otherwise it would be impossible to compare industrial costs at different yards. The difficulties are great but the system can be made uniform for the different yards. Unfortunately the essayist gives no suggestions as to this. Conference and agreement between the yards, with departmental approval of the result, should solve this problem. Sound navy yard economy lies somewhere between the ideas of the extreme military party and the extreme industrial party. And let it be noted that economy and cost are different things-both in civil and naval establishments. There is only one way to start in to arrive at economy. That is by first considering sound principles and then sound practice. "Principles" is organization; "practice" is administration. It must be considered what are the industrial reasons a navy yard exists for military purposes, and what are the military reasons a navy yard exists as an industrial plant. It is respectfully submitted that the principles on which the present navy yard organization is laid down are the solution of the problem. In other words referring to the quotation from the essay at the beginning of these remarks, I claim the essayist is entirely in error. Again, the essayist lays down on page 5, the “Difficulties in the Way of Economy." They are indeed as he has written them. |