How, furnishing "tactical plans." This calls for a knowledge of nava strategy, and for the solution of problems in battle-tactics-subjects which, heretofore, the navy has steadfastly ignored. or why, this change has been brought about it is unnecessary t: state. Suffice to say that it has come and the claims of the War College as an educational institution have been recognized at last. The object of this college is to enable officers to fit themselves to prepare these war plans. Till the time comes when a sufficient unmber of officers shall have qualified for this branch of their profession, this is obviously the only place where the work can be done. Thus the commanders-in-chief afloat and the officer who. under the Secretary of the Navy, is responsible for the conduct of war, will come to speak a common language. This gives the college fresh impetus. And it is for you, here and now, to avail yourselves of the turn of the tide. Let it be taken at the flood. Show that the confidence in your professional ability has not been misplaced. Do this and ultimate success is assured. It is pertinent to remark, however, that had this recognition come at the close of the Spanish War the Navy Department would have had, ere this, a War College of its own. That is to say, it would have had within its own organization, and as part of its machinery, a body of officers who have gone through a full course of study at the War College, and were competent to formulate plans of naval campaigns, and prepare tactical plans covering all possible cases likely to be needed by the Department -competent to perform, in short, all the duties of what is known in military language as a general staff, or, as already expressed, "commissioners for executing the office of commander-in-chief of the navy." But it is idle to dwell on what might have been. Let us look hopefully to the future. A brighter day has already dawned for the college. It has not only received long-delayed recognition, but that recognition has come in the most practical manner by assigning to the college the most important and congenial work along the highest professional lines. Nor is this all. The college welcomes to-day for the first time in its history officers who are here of their own choice for a term beyond the customary summer's conference-two officers who well represent the military branch of their profession. They were anticipated, however, by two officers of the marine corps who greatly to their credit came here a year ago on their own application. This alone argues well for the future. But better, far better, than all else is the presence here of the Hon. Secretary of the Navy. He has lifted the ban which has, during all these years, suppressed every attempt to develop this college to the utmost possibilities of good for the navy of the United States. Could his words of promise have been anticipated, this paper would not have been prepared-in its present form at least. It is hardly necessary to say that in my endeavor to show the relations between the War College and the line officers of the navy no reflection whatever is intended upon any one in office. It is the line officers of the navy as a body who are alluded to (with the exceptions noted), in their attitude towards higher professional education. U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. A REVIEW OF JAPANESE NAVAL FINANCIAL Translated from Marine Rundschau's article, "Flottenpolitik und By COMMODORE W. H. BEEHLER.' THE PERIOD BEFORE 1868. Commodore Perry's landing on July 14, 1853, convinced the Japanese that foreign demands could only be resisted by a navy. In 1854 the Shogun government decided to procure war-ships through the Dutch in Nagasaki, and the Daimios of the southern provinces were authorized to possess war-ships. In 1863 the government sent two officers to study in Holland, where the steam corvette Kagomaru was purchased. The greater part of the little navy was lost in 1868 by the insurrection of Admiral Enomoto, an adherent of the last of the Shoguns. THE FIRST NAVAL DEVELOPMENT PERIOD, 1868 TO 1894-95. The present imperial Japanese Navy was developed from the vessels remaining after the war of restoration of the Mikado with the war-ships of the Daimios of the southern provinces, Satsuma, Choshiu and Hizen. The building of the navy was delayed at first by the more urgent needs of the army to suppress internal disorders. 'The article published in the German semi-official naval organ is a thorough review of the measures taken by the Japanese to rapidly develop her navy, with great lack of financial resources, that seemed to make the task impossible. The financial problem was almost as difficult as the brilliant contests in battle. The translator has abridged the original article by omitting some details of minor importance. The navy was reorganized in 1872 on a plan substantially as at present. The expedition against the pirates in Formosa in 1874, Chinese interference there and in Korean relations, together with disorders in the island provinces, required rapid development of the navy. England served as a pattern and three armored corvettes were built there and delivered in 1877. Progress was slow until the war with China, 1894-95. Japan could not afford armored ships but procured cruisers and torpedo boats. The larger vessels were procured from Europe; smaller vessels were built in Japanese shipyards. The first government shipyard was laid out at Yokosuka in 1871. At the beginning of the war with China, 1894, Japan had a fleet of 32 war-ships and 23 torpedo-boats, with a total displacement of 65,582 tons and complement of 13,928 men. The annual cost of maintenance was 5,500,000 yen. The nucleus of the navy comprised: I Armored coast defence ship, Fuso, of 3800 tons. 2 Old armored gunboats, Kongo and Hi-Yei, each 2300 tons. I Newer armored gunboat, Chiyoda, of 2400 tons. 4 Protected cruisers, Itsukushima, Matsushima, Hashidate and Josino, each of 4200 tons. 4 Small cruisers, Naniwa, Takashio, Akitsushima and Suma, of from 2700 to 3700 tons. Suma still building. THE SECOND DEVELOPMENT PERIOD, 1895 TO 1902. In the war with China the Japanese captured 14 vessels of total displacement of about 15,600 tons, including one armored ship of 7300 tons, one armored gunboat of 2100 tons, and one protected cruiser of 2400 tons. China lost all interest in the navy, paid a large war indemnity, and China's naval progress was set back The value of the yen fluctuated during this period. From 1880 to 1884 the yen= In 1886 one yen..................... In 1889 one yen...... $0.90. = 0.785. In 1891 one yen. In 1893-94 one yen.. In 1895-96 one yen... = 0.74. = 0.62. = 0.5133. Since the adoption of the gold standard in 1897 the value of the yen has remained approximately at $0.505, gold. |