Office of Naval Intelligence and the Board of Inspection and Survey." (Chap. 1, Sec. 2, par. 5). This provision of the regulations effects a complete change in the character of the college. It diverts it from its original purpose as an educational institution; converts it into a part of the organization of the Navy Department, and imperils the plan for the higher education of officers which was the main object in the establishment of the college.

23. To sum up: it is quite clear from the foregoing that the true function of the Naval War College is educational, not executive. It is not a war board, nor a naval general staff. It forms no part of the working organization of the Navy Department, but supplies the material wherewith to construct such an organization. It devotes itself to the study of naval history, naval strategy and tactics, the law of nations, and academic discussions of all conceivable types of naval problems of war; it supplies the alumni from which to select officers competent to command our fleets as well as those able to solve correctly the actual problems with which a naval general staff is bound to be confronted, a duty generally of a nature so confidential as to prevent its being delegated elsewhere, and which should be the sole function of a board sufficiently strong and able to constitute, both in peace and in war, the backbone of the Department of the Navy.

[COPYRIGHTED.]

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD.

THE FIGHTING EDGE

A TRACT FOR THE TIMES.

By LIEUT.-COMMANDER W. P. CRONAN, U. S. Navy.

"Of all these, the Belgae are the bravest, because they are farthest from the civilization and refinement of our Province, and merchants least frepently resort to them, and import those things which tend to effeminate the mind; . . . ." Cæsar's Commentaries, Book I.

"History repeats itself" is an axiom which is particularly true military and naval annals; had Cæsar been an admiral he might well have complained of the enervating influences of protracted stays in the Roman navy yards where his crews would doubtless have been pestered by those itinerant vendors of whom we find the modern prototypes in Sands Street and in the Great White Wav.

Let us take well to heart the lessons of naval history, ancient and modern, as well as those which are analogous in campaigns on land, for the ethics of all fighting are the same, and what was true in 1812 and 1861-65 is true to-day as far as personnel is concerned.

In these days of high living and luxury, cold storage and ice, ve may well ask ourselves if the fighting men of to-day have sept pace in themselves with the development of the equipment for war at their disposal.

I make a plea for the predominance of military ideals in all our modern naval training, rejecting, without sentimentality, all that has become obsolete.

Times change, and the improvements in the arts and sciences far exceed any corresponding improvement which can be noted n the fitness for war of the human being.

Were John Paul Jones alive to-morrow, it may be assumed hat with only a superficial training in the general features of Todern equipment, he would make a first class commander-in

chief of a modern fleet; he possessed the fighting edge, the power and ability to place military ideals and aims above all else.

We are told that Collingwood was a finer seaman than was Nelson-but there seems to be no doubt in the minds of students of naval warfare that Nelson was the better naval officer.

Seamanship is an art, and a most attractive and necessary one; but the best seamen are born, not made, whereas organized naval warfare is a science, the attentive study of which is the paramount duty of every naval officer.

In 1865 the navy of the United States was, to all intents and purposes, 20 years ahead of its time; it comprised a military fleet, of heavily armed and armored ships, of which we may say one at last, the New Ironsides, was a logical precursor of the modern all big gun ship.

Yet it was not a fleet in the true sense, because it was not homogeneous in type, nor did the exigencies of the service require it to be handled as a co-ordinate whole against an enemy's fleet. But our navy was on the right track-it was military and its ideals were those which beget success in war.

The writer, while at the War College in attendance upon the conference of the summer of 1909, was much impressed by the remarks of Rear Admiral Sperry upon this subject, in relation to the necessity of maintaining a military fleet as the backbone of a navy; as well as I remember, that learned officer referred to anything else as "a mob of ships."

If we had a mob of ships in 1865, what, in all charity, can we call that heterogeneous collection of naval antiques which in 1885 were inferior in military effectiveness to their predecessors of more warlike days?

A long period of enervating peace during which the only naval event of importance, to judge from written records, seems to have been the visit of the frigate Congress to the Centennial Exposition in 1876, succeeded the civil war; the traces of the Collingwood ideals engendered in this period are still with us.

The dignified and stately rites attendant upon post-prandial crossings of top-gallant and royal yards, to the querulous and fitful piping of multitudinous boatswain's mates, I fear were held in higher favor than the perfunctory performance of less spectacular duties with the obsolete batteries: this within the memory of many who have not yet dined in solitary state, “cribbed, cabined and confined."

There are those of us who have served in modern fighting ships, the atmosphere of which was perhaps not military; where the celerity with which all boats were cleared away and stood off under sail equalled that which we are told obtained in the days of the "Swatara "—" O sepulchra sacra."

"

A splendid thing-a pretty thing;-but the time and attention devoted to the high degree of perfection attained in boat sailing was being used by another ship in painstaking training in the minute details inseparable from success in elementary gunnery, the results of which were apparent at the next target practice.

It is a pretty sight indeed to see a well-trained gig's crew of six good men and true pulling three miles against a leeward ebb on an official visit, but in these days of efficient gas engines, tended by one man, the gig, if engined, might get there and back much sooner and the other five men be kept at more important tasks.

It is nothing but maudlin sentiment which makes us retain a single drill or evolution or custom of the past which detracts from the efficiency of the present.

The greatest room for the employment of skill on the part of a naval officer of the line is in the training and development of the personnel; ours is fortunately of the best type; our men are young and their minds are plastic; the high degree of efficiency which can be attained within a short time, during short enlistments, is best evidenced by the notable strides which have been made in

gunnery.

Since 1902, which marks the advent of what the writer chooses to call the Renaissance, there has been a steady and marked improvement in the efficiency and tone of the service, due to a solid and firm adherence to military ideals, as indicated by the constant mprovement in gunnery, the development of which has reacted favorably upon the whole service.

If any division officer of the fleet be asked what men of his Evision give him the least cause for concern and need the least supervision in regard to neatness and personal appearance it is undoubtedly true that he will name the men who hold the most responsible military positions, as gun pointers, gun captains, istmen, plugmen, etc.

They have received the preponderance of military training, and has reacted favorably upon their bearing as man-of-warsmen.

Attention to detail in the uniform, and above all else, to the manner in which it is worn, is the soul of discipline on board ship.

In a stroll through the streets of a foreign town during the visit of our fleet on the cruise of 1908, it would need no more than the casual glance of a practiced eye to separate the men of the U. S. S. Efficient from those of the U. S. S. Mediocre without so much as a glance at a cap ribbon-(save to see that the ends were taut).

It is not enough that our modern man-of-warsman should shoot straight-he will do that with enthusiasm, but prefers to do it in dungarees, and that tendency can only be overcome by a rigid insistence upon exactness in uniform and military bearing; the one can and should go hand in hand with the other.

As a general rule, the smartest men at muster are the gun pointers; the reason why, because they carry the mark which shows their skill, and perhaps, also, that gift of the gods, the "E" which denotes supremacy.

It is not without good purpose that the All-wise Creator put curly feathers in the game cock's tail.

It is not necessary to be dirty to be efficient-let us strive to make smartness in uniform and bearing the result of military efficiency and prowess. One cannot blame the crew of the U. S. S. Efficient for being cocky because their ship excels in gunnery— for it is more than probable that she also leads in the steaming competition; has the best race-boat's crew and baseball and football teams. If, then, her men are the more apt to keep their neckerchiefs tied aright and cuffs turned down far from the piercing eye of the master-at-arms, may we not say that we have come into our own?

It may be asked what relation careful attention to the petty details of uniform and bearing have to the military efficiency of the fleet-in the writer's opinion it has a great and far-reaching influence.

The long period of training through which the British fleet passed under the iron rule of Jervis prepared its personnel to gain the triumphs which followed the supreme tests under Nelson's leadership-without that training and consequent esprit de corps, Nelson's genius would have been of no avail.

In keeping our helmet strings taut, it is not too much to ask that they be knotted properly and in the right place.