CHAPTER XII THE PROSPECT Causes controlling the future of the Far East-Civilisation bound to THE future of the Far East is governed by so many and such various sets of circumstances, that an attempt at forecasting its probable outcome must be preceded by an examination of the different factors at work. The interest in the politics of further Asia has always centred in China, which in a sense is the dominant element in the whole, and China is at the moment in a state of flux which may have results startling in its ultimate consequences. Although, by a mutual understanding among the Powers, the existing developments in the celestial empire are not regarded as constituting a state of war, the situation during the siege of the Legations can only be summarised as an attempt on the part of the Chinese to rid themselves once and for all of the presence of the hated foreigner, and far from being on friendly terms with the rest of humanity, China may be said to be at war with civilisation. The ultimate outcome of this condition of things is, of course, clear. Civilisation, by dint of its superior force and resources, must triumph, and revolting barbarism is destined to lie at the mercy of the nations it has flouted. But while the eventual result is foredoomed, its attainment must be largely governed by the attitude assumed by the various Powers concerned. And the means employed carry with them vast possibilities to each. A careful analysis of the policies of Europe must convince the logical reasoner that any satisfactory solution of the whole question by dint of a mutual understanding is impossible. And, further than this, it must be evident that those various subterfuges by which certain nations seek to protect their interests without increasing their responsibilities must invariably fail, and in the end necessitate either the abandonment of the aim sought, or entail far greater expenditure of blood and treasure than would have been necessary if the needful steps had been taken at the outset. Of all countries, Britain is the worst offender in this respect. She has ever refused to be forewarned, and no single emergency in her historic record has yet found her prepared. Like the trader whose business has developed out of proportion to his capital, she is placed metaphorically on her beam ends at the first set back; and while her marvellous resources, aided by the wonderful energy of her people, has so far invariably served to right her, and enable her to emerge more or less unscathed from her peril, it would be extremely dangerous to make a precedent of her successful struggles, which should never have been entailed, or to rely on a continuation of her past extraordinary luck in the future. It is the custom to place the discredit of our lack of preparation for emergencies on the shoulders of the government for the time being. This is not just. However shortsighted a government may be, it is in the hands of the country, and with the country rests the power, to insist on the carrying out of its behests. But the nation will not concern itself in matters of the utmost interest to its prosperity and existence. To take but one example; one only has to look at the War Office, an establishment OF THE UNIVERSITY OF IGNORANCE, INCOMPETENCE AND NEGLECT 239 which has consistently proved itself incompetent, has on more than one occasion imperilled the very existence of the empire, and is a monument of arrogant incompetence and self-sufficiency. On the outbreak of the Transvaal war the War Office made the country the laughing-stock of Europe. By its ignorance, unpreparedness, and neglect, it sacrificed hundreds of lives, wasted millions of money, and enabled the rebel Boers to all but succeed in their attempts to drive the British in South Africa into the sea. The result was an outcry from one end of the country to the other. "The War Office must go" was the cry; corruption and society influence must be abolished; the system must be reformed; and similar expressions of opinion were heard on all sides. And what has been effected? Nothing! No attempt has ever been made to obtain a fair and full inquiry into the maladministration during the present campaign, and nothing will be done, for the disgrace of 1899 is already forgotten; and in the event of our becoming plunged in a fresh war, the same scandals would as likely as not be repeated. So long as the British public remains content to retain incompetence at the helm of state, so long will the ship of empire be mismanaged. And there are more serious possibilities for the country than a campaign against a body of 40,000 rebellious Boers. It is a custom among a certain class of people to regard the utterance of any unpleasant truth as the act of an alarmist, an alarmist in the sense of a person who talks nonsense which may be safely disregarded. If a publicist draws attention to an unfriendly act on the part of Russia, he is branded as a "Russophobe," and as such treated with disdain. If he ventures to query the proclaimed superiority of our fleet, his question, instead of being answered, is pointed at in derision. An indication of possible danger to the empire, because it supplies unpleasant reading, is viewed as an offence; and so repeated warnings are disregarded, and their authors sneered at. Aware of all this, I still have no hesitation in pointing out that British interests in the Far East are gravely im perilled. That our fortunes in Eastern Asia are close on a turning point. That a great crisis is at hand, and that we are utterly unprepared to cope with it. The policy of England in Asia has for years past been that which is prompted by the gambler's instinct. We have staked much without effecting any insurance; and for the security of our capital we have relied on luck. In the result, I admit that we have hitherto not been disappointed. We have been far luckier than we deserved. But luck is fickle, and has a knack of turning at times, and it would be the utmost folly to continue such an impotent course. During the whole of the passing century Britain has been expanding her empire, which now reaches to the uttermost ends of the earth. She has, during this period, made no attempt to increase her defences proportionately to her liabilities. It needs no disquisition on my part to prove to demonstration, that in face of the current international honesty and state of political parties, a possession can only be regarded as secure so long as its owner is in a position to retain it against any attack which may be directed against it. And I assert that, despite the much boasted strength of the British fleet, and the undoubtedly splendid material of the British army, England is not in a position to defend her interests in the Far East, and that she will lose them, unless she is prepared to replace her past indolence by a hastened activity, and provide those means for defence which she at present lacks. The entire normal British garrison in the Far East, where our interests predominate over the total of those possessed by all the other Powers, is under 3,000 men! Our usual fleet in Eastern waters has long been unequal to the combined strength of our enemies. To deal with any sudden trouble in that quarter we rely on the despatch of reserve vessels from home, and troops from India. But the time necessary for the despatch of a squadron from home, or even from the Mediterranean, is crucial to the issue, and the strength of our army in India is never all that is desirable. At any moment that our attention |