"The objects of the said Society are (1) the formation of the nucleus of a Universal Brotherhood of Humanity without distinction of race, creed, sex, caste or colour. (2) The promotion of the study of Aryan and other Eastern Literatures, Religious Philosophies and Sciences. (3) The investigation of unexplained laws of Nature and the psychical powers of man. In connection with the above mentioned objects the objects of the Society shall also include (4) the examination of religious systems from an unsectarian standpoint for the purpose of demonstrating the substantial identity subsisting beneath their apparent diversity. (5) The revival of research connected with occult science and esoteric philosophy. The objects of the Society shall also include the establishment, taking over, carrying on, reconstitution or reestablishment of any Subsociety, Club or other Body with objects similar to or connected with those of the Society, or generally having objects of a philanthropic, benevolent or charitable nature, and shall include the carrying on of any manufactory, trade or business for the purpose of assisting the operation of the Society in printing and disseminating literature, or otherwise calculated to promote or assist the objects of the Society hereinbefore declared." From all the sources of information to which the answer guides, including common knowledge, and the trust deed, the court cannot find that the Theosophical Society is a completely organized compact body having a head and members subject to discipline and capable of acting as an independent entity. On the contrary, it appears to be merely a voluntary association of a few persons as the nucleus of a hoped-for universal brotherhood; its branches are detached voluntary associations and clubs, and in its entirety it comprehends all freethinkers and anti-sectarians interested in the study of ancient religions, astrology, mysticism, and occult science, having an infusion of charitable sentiments and stimulated by generous impulses, constituting an aggregation of independent individuals related to the nucleus association by sympathy, but not bound to it by any obligation, financial or moral. The deed of trust confers upon the trustees latitudinarian powers in the use of whatever property or money may come into their hands, including power to accept voluntary contributions, gifts, legacies, and loans, and to expend or invest the same, and provides that they may set apart any gift or legacy for any special or particular purpose which may be indicated by the donor; and it provides for the succession of members so as to perpetuate the trusteeship, and further provides that, if at any time the objects of said society should altogether fail, so that for a space of five years successively no money shall have been paid or applied by the said trustees for or towards the objects. and purposes of the society, the trustees for the time being are to use, apply, and deal with the funds vested in them "in such manner and for such purposes either religious, philanthropic, charitable or civil, not being in any way for their own personal benefit, as the majority of the trustees for the time being shall resolve and determine, and to lease, convey, assign, or dispose of the same accordingly." As set out in the answer, the deed contains no evidence of its enrollment anywhere, but does contain the following indorsement: "Registered as No. 2940 of Book 1 Vol. 102 Pages 231-238 22nd December, 1892. Fee Paid No. 5. L. C. Remknent, Registrar." To ascertain the true basis upon which the decision must rest, it is necessary to construe the third paragraph of the will in accordance with the intentions of the testator as indicated by the words and phrases which he used in making a bequest of the cash proceeds of the residue of his estate. In this connection it is first to be observed that the will provides that the money is to be paid to individuals in trust for a specified purpose. They cannot, consistently with the terms of the will, appropriate any of the money for their personal benefit, nor make a testamentary disposition of it; and their heirs. and personal representatives cannot acquire any interest in the fund by inheritance; they are to take the fund in their official character as a board of trustees of the so-called "Theosophical Society," and expend it for a specified object, if that be possible, and, in case of impossibility, there is no use to which the money can be applied in accordance with the testator's directions. It is next to be observed that, although the will expresses the idea that the Theosophical Society is to be the beneficiary of the bequest, nevertheless no authority is given to pay any of the money to the society, nor to expend it for the general purposes of the society. As contemplated by the testator, the benefit to the society was to be through the expenditure of the money in making translations of Hieratic Scriptures. To execute the will, it is necessary to pay the money to the trustees designated, if they can be found and identified. The will does not name the individuals to receive the legacy, nor indicate the number of them, nor the place where they reside, but refers to a certain document in which they are designated which is described as a deed of trust, of which the Theosophical Society at Adyar is the cestui que trust, the grantor is not named, no property or thing granted, or object of the trust is mentioned, and no place is referred to where the document may be found. The identifying features to be looked for are the trust character of the document, the name of the cestui que trust, its date, and its enrollment. Any deed of trust to the Theosophical Society dated the 14th day of December, A. D. 1892, executed by any person or number of persons or corporation to any grantee or grantees, made anywhere and enrolled anywhere, will meet all the specifications of the will. The description of the trust deed being thus meager, and considering the ease with which a spurious document might be formulated, rigid strictness is required in the application of the descriptive words of the will in any attempt to identify a document represented to be the trust deed referred to. It is next to be observed that there is no limitation whatever of time within which the trust is to be executed or the money expended. If the trustees to whom the legacy is to be paid are a self-perpetuating permanent body, they may hold the money indefinitely waiting for the discovery of Hieratic Scriptures to be translated, and, so long as they hold the money for that purpose, they cannot be accused of disregarding the directions of the testator or of a breach of trust. The will provides that the legacy is "to be used for the purpose, as far as possible, in obtaining translations into English of ancient Hieratic Scriptures, believed to exist in India or elsewhere." All that can be assumed with any degree of certainty with respect to the writings or engravings or prints to be translated, is that they are ancient, in a language other than English, and Hieratic; that is, sacred or priestly, or Egyptian, or difficult to be deciphered. The necessary deduction from the foregoing analysis is that the third paragraph of the will must be construed as follows: The defendants are required to convert the whole residue of the estate into money, the money is bequeathed in trust to an official board, the members of which are designated in an enrolled deed of trust which cannot be identified with certainty, for a use which cannot be defined with certainty, and for the benefit of a cestui que trust, which is merely an aggregation of people in all parts of the world and not an organized entity, and there is no prescribed limitation of time. within which the trust is to be executed or the fund expended. In this view, it is as impossible to control or execute the trust according to the intentions of the testator as it would be if he had made a bequest of money to be expended in obtaining translations into English of hieroglyphics for the use of all mankind. The practical difficulties in the way of carrying into effect the provisions of the will, in so far as it attempts to dispose of the residue of the estate, have not been overcome, but rather augmented, by the averments of the answer. The deed of trust which it sets forth appears to have been registered, but that is not equivalent to enrollment. The word “enrolled" signifies the faithful copying of the entire document into a record; registration may be the copying of the document in extenso, or merely the recording of particular facts as to the time of its presentation to, and inspection by, the custodian of the record and a summary of its contents. The answer presents for consideration a deed of trust, the existence and contents of which are alleged to have been known to the testator, and which contains the names of grantor and grantees, and which was registered but not enrolled, as being the identical deed to which his will refers. If he did have knowledge of this deed, the omission of the names of the parties and the variance in referring to an enrolled deed raises a strong natural presumption that it is not the document containing the names of the trustees whom he selected to receive and handle the bequest. The answer introduces additional uncertainty as to the use of the fund by averring that there is at Adyar a library containing voluminous manuscripts and priestly writings, and that Hieratic Scriptures. have been discovered elsewhere, all of which are in languages other than English. It is manifest, therefore, that expenditure of the funds to obtain translations of any of these manuscripts or writings or scriptures involves necessarily a selection from a mass of material containing wide diversity of ideas, theories, and dogmas, and such use of the money would be according to the preferences of strangers to the testator, rather than according to his will. The answer in no wise meets the objection to the will on the ground that it does not create a right of property to become vested in beneficiaries within a period of 21 years after the termination of lives in being at the time of the testator's death. The bequest is under the ban of the rule forbidding the creation of an estate in perpetuity, and is therefore void. This conclusion determines the case in favor of the complainant, and a decree will be entered accordingly. LEHIGH VALLEY R. CO. v. PROVIDENCE-WASHINGTON INS. CO. (District Court, S. D. New York. October 10, 1908.) 1. INSURANCE (§ 336*)—MARINE INSURANCE-POLICY PROVISIONS-CONSTRUCTION "EXISTING INSURANCE.' 99 Where a carrier's marine policy provided that it did not cover or apply to any goods or merchandise on which there should be any existing insurance by or on account of the owners thereof, the term "existing insurance" included any other insurance during the continuance of the risk, which was valid and enforceable, and was not limited to insurance by the owner existing at the time the carrier's policy attached. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 856; Dec. Dig. § 336.*] 2. INSURANCE (§ 622*)-MARINE INSURANCE-ACTION-CONTRACT-LIMITATION. Where a carrier's marine policy contained a contract limitation of actions thereon of one year, and suit was not brought by the carrier for the loss sustained until after the year had expired, the action was barred, though defendant had agreed to bear part of the loss and had not refused to pay under such clause, and the amount of the carrier's liability to the owner of the property was not adjudicated until after the year expired. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Insurance, Cent. Dig. § 1544; Dec. Dig. § 622.*] In Admiralty. Robinson, Biddle & Benedict, for libellant. ADAMS, District Judge. This action was brought by the Lehigh Valley Railroad Company against the Providence-Washington Insurance Company to recover its loss under an open policy of insurance, made and issued by the respondent to the libellant on or about the 15th of November, 1902. The policy insured the libellant as owner, freighter, forwarder, bailee or common carrier on all kinds of grain and flax seed on board of barge or other vessel. During the month. of December, 1902, and January, 1903, certain wheat was loaded and stored by the libellant, acting as common carrier, on the canal boat A. J. Dean and on the 23rd day of January the said boat was taken in tow by the steamtug Mercedes, owned by the libellant, to be taken to the Prince Line steamer Trojan Prince, then lying at the foot of 42nd Street, Brooklyn. Shortly after being delivered at her destination the boat sank, owing to a hole having been knocked in her by ice during the towage, whereby the wheat sustained serious damage. Shortly afterward an action was brought in this court by Herbert Bradley, as assignee of the owner of the wheat, against the libellant herein to recover the damages sustained by him through the sinking. In September, 1904, the libellant served a notice on the respondent For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes calling upon it to defend if it wished, and that if it should be found that the damage was caused by any of the perils insured against, the libellant would look to the respondent for such sum as might be due under the policy, together with the costs and expenses incident to the defence of the action. The respondent, on the 16th of May, 1904, advised the libellant that it had no interest in the action or its results, and the libellant defended with the result that Bradley obtained a decree here, by reason of the tug's negligence. Bradley v. Lehigh Valley R. Co. (D. C.) 145 Fed. 569. The case was appealed and affirmed, but upon other grounds of liability than those found in this court. Id., 153 Fed. 350, 82 C. C. A. 426. A final decree was entered in the action, which required the libellant to pay the sum of $3,490.65, with interest thereon amounting to $6.98. The aggregate of these sums was paid by the libellant. In addition thereto, certain expenses were alleged to have been incurred, making a total claim of $4,322.53 with interest thereon from April 22, 1907. The foregoing are the allegations of the libellant, supplemented by a stipulation between the parties, entered into herein May 16, 1908. The respondent, in addition to admitting or denying the principal allegations of the libel, alleged as follows: "Eighth: Respondent further answering alleges that by the terms of the policy of insurance referred to in the libel it was therein provided that said policy should not cover or apply to any goods or merchandise upon which there should be any existing insurance by or on account of the owners thereof; and upon information and belief that at the time of the alleged disaster and loss there was then outstanding and in force existing insurance upon the cargo upon the said boat A. J. Dean referred to in the libel, by or on account of the owners of said cargo, by reason whereof the said policy became void and of no force or effect as respects the cargo on said boat A. J. Dean referred to in the libel herein and the respondent was not liable for any loss upon the said cargo. Eleventh: Respondent further answering alleges, that in and by the terms of the policy referred to in the libel it was expressly provided, "That no suit or action against said company for the recovery of any claim upon, under or by virtue of this Policy shall be sustainable in any Court of law or chancery, unless such suit or action shall be commenced within the time of twelve months next after the disaster causing such loss or damage shall occur; and in case any such suit or action shall be commenced against said Company after the expiration of twelve months next after the disaster causing such loss or damage shall have occurred. the lapse of time shall be taken and deemed as conclusive evidence against the validity of the claim thereby attempted to be enforced.' That the libel herein was not filed and this action was not begun until more than twelve months after the disaster causing the alleged loss or damage had occurred by reason whereof the respondent is not liable to the libellant herein." 1. The contract provided: 66 # * * Nor does this Policy cover or apply to any goods or merchandise upon which there shall be any existing insurance, by or on account of the owners thereof." Before the loss occurred, the respondent claims that the owners of the grain, which was the subject of insurance, had effected insurance upon all of it excepting one car load, upon which the respondent promptly paid the insurance, but denied liability as to the remainder, upon which the owner had previously taken out insurance. The libellant contends that the insurance in question took effect when the |