entry of H. Davis before J. Davis, when J. Davis' loan was a month earlier? A. I do not understand your question." On page 54 he testifies that, when he started the little book he was testifying from, he destroyed the former little book. On page 57, when his attention is called to the fact that the loans were not entered in chronological order in the little book, he was asked the question: "Q. Is it not a fact you have entered A. Eisenstein, February 20, 1906, $500? Then you have a loan, L. Epstein, November 25, 1906, $150. Now, when that entry of Epstein was put here, you owed Eisenstein $500 or $650? A. I do not know. Q. Look at your book and see. A. Mr. Mayer, I do not know about the months. I forget. I do not know when September comes first, or when it comes exactly. Q. You do not mean to tell us you do not know whether November or May is earlier in the year? A. That I could not say." On page 78 I cite the following from the examination: By the referee: "Q. As I understand it, you borrowed about $4,000 for which you gave your notes. That is about right on these loans? A. Yes. Q. These loans were made to you by some ten different people? A. Yes. Q. Did they give you money in bank notes, or checks, and in what figures did they give you the money? A. Cash, paper money, and bank bills." A full account of the method of making the loan is given on pages 78 to 80. On page 85 it appears that some of the holders of notes received goods from the store that were not charged, in view of interest; that Eisenstein got some suits, and Sassman got some suits. It does not seem necessary to cite further from the testimony. I am of opinion that the vest pocket book, which in fact seems to have been copied from another vest pocket book, destroyed, which was not produced until the bankrupt was produced for examination before the referee, cannot be considered as a book of the firm. The transactions contained in this little book are of a very questionable character, and the motive for concealing these demand loans from any person who might possibly divulge them to the trade is obvious. Since the Ray amendment, the word "fraudulent" having been struck out from the clause in question, it is only necessary to show an intent to conceal. The conclusion is irresistible from the fact of these loans being omitted from the financial statement and from the regular books that they were secret transactions and intended to be withheld from the parties from whom they purchased, and therefore, the specifications of objection under clause 2, that the bankrupt, "with intent to conceal his financial condition, destroyed, concealed or failed to keep books of account or records from which such condition might be ascertained," is sustained. Charles H. Edmunds, for bankrupts. Clinton O. Mayer and Irwin L. Sessler, for objecting creditor. J. B. MCPHERSON, District Judge. It is not necessary to consider the question whether a materially false statement made by a debtor to a mercantile agency should be regarded as made to his creditors in general or to a specified creditor in particular, so as to fall within the class of false statements described in section 14b (3) of the bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898, c. 541, 30 Stat. 550 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427), as amended by Act Feb. 5, 1903, c. 487, § 4, 32 Stat. 797 (U. S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 1026), since in my opinion, the discharge was properly refused upon the other ground referred to in the specifications of objection. I have read and considered the voluminous testimony taken. by the referee, and agree that the facts found by him are well supported by the evidence, and that the discharge should be refused on the ground set forth in section 14b (2) namely, that the bankrupts, 168 F.-29 "with intent to conceal (their) financial condition, destroyed, concealed, or failed to keep, books of account of records from which such condition might be ascertained." For this reason the discharge is refused. O. G. HEMPSTEAD & SON v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court, E. D. Pennsylvania. March 8, 1909.) CUSTOMS DUTIES (§ 27*)—CLASSIFICATION-"FURNITURE of Wood." In Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule D, par. 208, 30 Stat. 168 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1647), providing for "furniture of wood, and manufactures of wood, or of which wood is the component material of chief value," the last clause as to chief value does not relate to the provision for furniture; and furniture whose framework and principal bulk are of wood is furniture "of wood," within the meaning of the paragraph, though decorative metal may be the component of chief value. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Customs Duties, Dec. Dig. § 27.*] On Application for Review of a Decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers. For decision below, see G. A. 6,626 (T. D. 28,255), in which the Board of General Appraisers affirmed the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of Philadelphia. Note Woodruff v. U. S. (C. C.) 168 Fed. 452. Comstock & Washburn (George J. Puckhafer, of counsel), for importers. Jasper Yeates Brinton, Asst. U. S. Atty. J. B. MCPHERSON, District Judge. It is agreed by counsel that the merchandise in question (which is known in the trade as "Buhl furniture") is fairly represented by a sample that was produced in court at the argument. This sample is undoubtedly a piece of house or cabinet furniture. It is a table, somewhat ornate in design, whose framework and principal bulk are of wood, while its decoration consists partly of paint, and partly of brass work either inlaid or affixed. The importers conceded that the brass work was the component material of chief value; and, apparently giving controlling weight to this concession, the Board of General Appraisers classified the merchandise under paragraph 193 of the tariff act of 1897 (Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C, 30 Stat. 167 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1645]), as an article "composed wholly or in part of metal, whether partly or wholly manufactured," and assessed the duty at 45 per cent. ad valorem. Undoubtedly the language just quoted is broad enough to include the table; but the paragraph contains a limiting phrase that needs preliminary attention before the merchandise can be safely assigned to its proper group. No article can be classified under paragraph 193 which is a catch-all provision-unless it is merchandise "not specially provided for in this act," and the importers contend * * * *For other cases see same topic & § NUMEER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes that paragraph 208 (Schedule D, 30 Stat. 168 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1647]) does specially provide for the furniture now in question, and imposes duty thereon at the rate of 35 per cent. ad valorem. This paragraph reads as follows: "House or cabinet furniture of wood, wholly or partly finished, and manufactures of wood, or of which wood is the component material of chief value, not specially provided for in this act." The merchandise under consideration is not specially provided for elsewhere, and is clearly included in "house or cabinet furniture of wood, wholly or partly finished," unless the generality of this phrase is restricted by the words that appear later in the paragraph, namely, "or of which wood is the component material of chief value." In my opinion, the phrase referred to is not so restricted. As it seems to me, paragraph 208 describes at least three, and perhaps four, classes of articles. Of these the first is house or cabinet furniture of wood, and the second is other manufactures of wood. If we pause there for a moment, it is clear, both from the testimony and from the evidence afforded by one's senses, that, if the paragraph described only one of these two classes, the table might be properly assigned to either. It is certainly an article of house or cabinet furniture, and with equal certainty it is also a manufacture of wood; but, as both these classes are used in the paragraph, upon familiar principles the merchandise is to be put into the more specific class, "house or cabinet furniture," rather than into the wider and vaguer class, "manufactures of wood." But what is to be done with the phrase "or of which wood is the component material of chief value"? Two constructions are possible: Either this phrase adds another to each of the first and second classes of paragraph 208, or it adds only to the class "manufactures of wood. If it adds to the latter class only, the result is that "manufactures of wood" means such articles strictly so called, while a new class is formed which is broad enough to include articles in which other materials may be also used, if wood continues to be the component material of chief value. Upon this construction the first class of the paragraph is "house or cabinet furniture of wood, wholly or partially finished," and into this class the table would unquestionably fall; the other two classes of the paragraph relating to "manufactures of wood." Upon the other construction-that the first class is also added to by the phrase "or of which wood is the component material of chief value"-the result is that the class comprising the articles commonly and commercially known as "house or cabinet furniture of wood" is left just as it was, but a new class is added there also, namely, house or cabinet furniture, which perhaps may not be described with precision as "of wood," because other materials have been also used in its manufacture, but in which wood is still the component material of chief value. If this construction is correct, the table continues to fall within the class "house or cabinet furniture of wood," but is not included within the additional class, "house or cabinet furniture of which wood is the component material of chief value." The question is narrow, and is conceded to be of the first impression. There are, perhaps, some analogous decisions, and reference may be made to United States v. Dudley, 174 U. S. 670, 19 Sup. Ct. 801, 43 L. Ed. 1129, and Gallenkamp v. Rachman (C. C.) 147 Fed. 769. But, in my opinion, if mere inspection does not lead to the conclusion that in common speech the table in question belongs to the class "house or cabinet furniture of wood"-a conclusion which is fortified by the testimony that was offered on behalf of the importers concerning its commercial designation-neither citation nor further argument is likely to be effective. The decision of the Board of General Appraisers must be reversed. A. J. WOODRUFF & CO. v. UNITED STATES. (Circuit Court, S. D. New York. March 15, 1909.) 1. CUSTOMS DUTIES (§ 27*)—CLASSIFICATION-“Furniture of Wood." 2. CUSTOMS DUTIES (§ 35*)—MANUFACTURES OF SILK AND WOOL-PROVISO. The proviso in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule L, par. 391, 30 Stat. 187 (U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1670), that manufactures in which wool is a component shall be classified as manufactures of wool, is re stricted at least to said schedule, and possibly to the paragraph in which it is found. Therefore the provision for furniture in another schedule is not subject to this proviso, though in part of wool. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Customs Duties, Cent. Dig. § 100; Dec. Dig. § 35.*] On Application for Review of a Decision by the Board of United States General Appraisers. The decision below affirmed the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York. B. A. Levett, for importers. D. Frank Lloyd, Asst. U. S. Atty. LACOMBE, Circuit Judge. The merchandise in question consists of a sofa and a set of chairs, the frames of which are composed of wood, upholstered with Aubusson tapestry. Said tapestry is composed of silk and wool, silk being the component material of chief value. Silk is also of chief value in the entire combination of wood, wool, silk, metal, etc. The appraiser classified it under paragraph 366 of the tariff act of 1897 (Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule K, 30 Stat. 184 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1666]), as being within the enumeration: "Cloths, knit fabrics, and all manufactures of every description made wholly or in part of wool, not specially provided for in this act." *For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes If this furniture is more specifically provided for in some other paragraph, it is manifestly not within paragraph 366. It is provided for in paragraph 208 (Schedule D, 30 Stat. 168 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1647]), which reads: "House or cabinet furniture, of wood, wholly or partly finished, and manufactures of wood, or of which wood is the component material of chief value.' -unless the chief value clause qualifies the category "house or cabinet furniture of wood." This is a close question; but, on the whole I am inclined to concur with Judge McPherson (Hempstead v. United States, 168 Fed. 450) in the conclusion that it does not. The government also relies on the last clause of paragraph 391, in the schedule of "Silk and Silk Goods" (Schedule L, 30 Stat. 187 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1670]), which reads: "Provided, that all manufactures, of which wool is a component material, shall be classified and assessed for duty as manufactures of wool." If this clause were in the wool schedule, the argument that it is of universal application would be more persuasive. Placed as it is, the more natural construction would restrict its application to the articles enumerated in the paragraph in which it appears, or possibly even to those enumerated in the silk schedule. The decision is reversed, with instructions to classify under paragraph 208. THE PATRICK MCGUIRL. (District Court, S. D. New York. November 12, 1908.) TOWAGE (15*)-SINKING OF Tow-NEGLIGENCE. Sinking of a lighter when in tow of a tug on a hawser. Held that there was no contract, as alleged, to take especial care of the lighter. Viewed from the point of negligent towage, no sufficient proof of negligence was given to establish liability on the tug's part. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Towage, Dec. Dig. § 15.*] (Syllabus by the Judge.) Wray & Callaghan, for libellant. James J. Macklin, for claimant. ADAMS, District Judge. This action was brought by Lester W. Beasley, the owner of the lighter Lizzie D. Beasley, against the tug Patrick McGuirl, and her owner, to recover the damages, said to amount to $2,400, sustained through the sinking of the Beasley and cargo of glue stock and lumber in the East River on the 25th of May, 1907, while in tow of the tug on a hawser of about 50 feet. It is alleged that the tug was sent by Patrick McGuirl, her owner, to perform a contract for the towage of the Beasley from pier 38, North River, to the foot of 92nd Street, East River. It is further alleged that the contract between the parties provided that McGuirl should furnish for the purpose a small tug and would not employ in the service one of his sea-going tugs for the reason that the lighter was a small one For other cases see same topic & § NUMBER in Dec. & Am. Digs. 1907 to date, & Rep'r Indexes |