grow when it is employed habitually on no more important objects than yesterday's annoyances or to-morrow's pleasures. The moral faculties and religious affections are benumbed and withered like a limb cramped in one position for years. And the man is dwarfed into a creature, not of earth-not of fourscore years but of to-day, approaching as nearly as a human soul can, to annihilation.

We are responsible to God our Maker. This is the true centre from which to start-the true principle by which to decide what and how far amusements shall be sought. It is impossible to draw any line except this, between amusements that are innocent and those that are evil. The evil or innocence of most of those that exist when there is any thing like a correct tone of moral feeling, is likely to depend on the character of the individual-on the way in which they are pursued and enjoyed. The true rule is, always to live as an accountable being—as a dutiful and affectionate child under a parent's eye, for such is or ought to be man's relation to Godand then one will carry the law in his own heart which will decide for him what pleasures are innocent-what wronghow and how far to be sought and when to be avoided.

REASON AND REVELATION.

E. P.

[We have solicited permission to publish the following article, read before an association of ministers-because it embodies the clearly expressed convictions of an earnest mind on an important and interesting subject. As such, we think it cannot but be read with satisfaction. Those who agree with the author, will be gratified to see their own

thoughts lucidly and strongly set forth, and those who do not adopt his conclusions, will find it a useful exercise to observe wherein and why they differ from him.]

A question has been recently agitated amongst us which if we rightly understand its bearings upon vital religion and the authority of Revelation is of great importance. It is whether man has within himself all the elements of knowledge which are essential to his true understanding of all his relations and duties here, and his destiny hereafter, and whether those elements, even granting them to exist, are so developed as to enable their possessor to understand and comprehend all that they may be made capable of understanding and comprehending, or all the truth that exists in regard to man's relations and destiny, obligations and duties. In other words the new doctrine is, we mean new in this portion of the world, for it is as old as time, that man is not bound to be governed by evidence or authority any further than that evidence corroborates what his own understanding comprehends, or that authority commands what his own reason and conscience, without that command would have decided he should do. We wish to discuss this doctrine with all candor, to any who may entertain it. We would endeavor to treat our opponents as men having minds and hearts as well as ourselves—minds capable of understanding and hearts capable of loving the truth.

Before proceeding to a discussion of this important subject, however, we wish to say that we believe much of this error is attributable to the manner in which reason has been spoken of. We have had much and eloquent declamation upon the dignity of human nature, the god-like faculties of the soul-the depth of its affections, and the sweep of its understanding. And these expressions have not been often enough limited by a consideration of the superiority of God and older intelligent beings. We have dwelt much on the fact that man was made in God's image, but little lower than the angels, but we have heard but little of the incomprehensible ways of God, and the

folly of supposing that man has been his counsellor. We have heard much of what man has been able to accomplish, and but little of what he has failed of accomplishing. So much has been said of the power of reason that men have inferred that because they have some reason, therefore they cannot err. They have made no distinction between reason as they possess it, and pure reason and have inferred that because no truth can be contrary to pure reason, none can be contrary to their reason. We trace back the origin of this system to this source a belief in the omnipotence and omniscience of reason as possessed by man.

Another reason why this opinion has prevailed is, that natural religion has been exalted above its true station, been valued above its real worth. Surely nothing is more praiseworthy than the efforts which have been made the last half century to find confirmation and illustration of the truth of Revelation in the world around, and within us. It is pleasing to the inquisitive mind to notice the harmony that sounds through all God's works and ways and to observe his mercy and love in a flower as well as in the cross. But the evil has been, that many students have paused here-they have not extended their faith to any thing which did not correspond to something which they had observed in nature. They have erred in assuming that they understand all natural phenomena and arrangements which they can see, and that they actually behold and are conversant with all nature-two radical errors which will account for almost any shipwreck of truth which they might make.

We see then that the error to which we have alluded springs from two sources, either of which we should at a glance determine would be fruitful of error. The first is, that man possesses an infallible all comprehending reason and moral instinct, and second that he understands all nature, and thus is able to judge in every possible instance what is correspondent or contradictory to it—and hence decide whether Revelation is true or false irrespective of any other evidence. As God cannot contradict in a revelation what he has taught in nature, so if any thing in Revelation appears to contradict nature, it

cannot be true,—no evidence can prove it true;-for no evidence can prove a contradiction. Now the question is not ultimately whether God does in revelation actually contradict any of the teachings of nature, that, for this instant, we waive, but whether we so understand nature as to be able to decide that any thing which may appear to us to contradict nature actually does contradict it—and whether we are so sure of understanding all nature ourselves, that no one can know more of it, so that his declaration shall be sufficient to convince us that what appeared to us contrary to nature is actually in perfect correspondence with it. This is the immediate question in hand. But is it clear that God is bound ever to continue to teach us the same lesson? Who can decide that it is not proper for God in the infancy of the race to teach one lesson—at a more advanced period, another? Has he not actually made two revelations to man? And have not the best minds found many things in those two dispensations which are contradictory? Were not some things binding upon man to do under the law, from which he is now free? Take the whole code of sacrifices. It would have been sin for a Jew to omit offering them, but a better dispensation came and he is free. Moses taught that to please God men must sacrifice-Christ taught that they need. not do it to please him. If such a contradiction can be found between two confessed and accredited revelations, who will say that some things which are taught in nature's volume are not repealed by the voice from heaven. We do not say that this is the case; we only ask who is ready to say oracularly that it is not? Certainly as men have understood nature's teachings, revelation does pointedly contradict them, but man's understanding of them is all we know of them, except as interpreted by him who made them. There is, then, more than a presumption, that revelation may actually repeal some of the rules of life which nature has taught, or at least has been supposed to teach, and thus even the position which is assumed by the student of reason and nature alone, be fruitful of error when he comes to judge by them exclusively of the truth of Revelation.

Having thus considered the origin of this opinion, let us proceed to examine its character. And this we shall do, not by directly attempting to confute it, but by inquiring into the nature and office of Reason and Revelation; the capacity and the office of the former in deciding upon the evidences and teachings of the latter.

What then is reason? Reason is that faculty of the mind which judges of the truth or error of any principle, by comparing it with some known standard of truth. If the principle presented for judgment correspond to the established line of truth in the reason, then that principle is stamped as a true one, and is received by the mind among its store of truths. How many innate truths the mind may have which are tests of all other truths, we know not. It is not essential that it be decided, in order to forward our inquiry, much more depends upon understanding the character of the principle presented for approval or disapproval. But we may venture to say or think, without assuming more than will be granted us by our opponents, that there are but very few primary truths in the mind. Especially will it be granted to us that the reason can be improved and strengthened, so that in most cases of any practical importance the decision of reason will correspond to its amount of education; that is, any principle or thing will appear true or false, fit or unfit, possible or impossible, according to the degree in which the reason of the individual who decides upon them is cultivated. What would appear perfectly reasonable and fit to one, would seem equally unreasonable and unfit to another. The freezing of water was unreasonable to the king of Siam, and he declared that that alone was sufficient to convince him that he who averred it to be true was a liar. The revolution of the world was unreasonable to Bacon, giant as he was, and Galileo was made to swear that he had told a falsehood when he stated that the earth moved; yet this assertion is perfectly reasonable to a schoolboy of our own age and nation.

The statement of many philosophical principles is unreasonable, yea more, is contradictory to the reason of most individuals, and yet nothing is more reasonable to the mind of