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Infallible judge of controversies,
i. 66, § 12.

Inference, what, iii. 94, 95, § 2,
3, 4.
Infinite, why the idea of infinite
not applicable to other ideas
as well as those of quantity,
since they can be as often
repeated, i. 211, § 6.
The idea of infinity of space,
or number, and of space, or
number infinite, must be di-
stinguished, i. 212, § 7.
Our idea of infinite very ob-
scure, i. 213, § 8.
Number furnishes us with the
clearest ideas of infinite,
i. 214, § 9.

The idea of infinite, a growing

idea, i. 216, § 12.
Our idea of infinite, partly
positive, partly compara-
tive, partly negative, i. 217,
218, § 15.

Why some men think they

have an idea of infinite
duration, but not of infinite
space, i. 221, 222, § 20.
Why disputes about infinite
are usually perplexed, i.
223, § 21.

Our idea of infinity has its
original in sensation and
reflection, i. 224, § 22.
We have no positive idea of
infinite, i. 216, 217, § 13,
14: i. 219, § 16.
Infinity, why more commonly
allowed to duration than to
expansion, i. 194, § 4.
How applied to God by us,
i. 208, §.1.

How we get this idea, i. 209,
§ 2, 3.

The infinity of number, dura-
tion, and space, different
ways considered, i. 200,
201, § 10, 11.

Innate truths must be the first
known, i. 31, § 26.

Principles to no purpose, if
men can be ignorant or
doubtful of them, i. 46,
$13.
Principles of my lord Herbert
examined, i. 47, 48, § 15,
&c.

Moral rules to no purpose, if

effaceable, or alterable, i.
51, § 20.
Propositions must

must be di-
stinguished from others by
their clearness and useful-
ness, i. 75, 76, § 21,
The doctrine of innate prin-
ciples of ill consequence,
i. 79, § 24.

Instant, what, i, 178, 179, § 10.
And continual change, i. 180.
§ 13, 14, 15.
Intuitive knowledge, ii. 319, § 1.
Our highest certainty, iii. 131,
§ 14.
Invention, wherein it consists,
i. 141, § 8.
Joy, i. 233, § 7.

Iron, of what advantage to man-
kind, iii. 87, § 11.
Judgment, wrong judgments, in
reference to good and evil,
i. 276, § 58.

Right judgment, ii. 270, § 4.
One cause of wrong judgment,
iii. 102, § 3.

Wherein it consists, iii. 94, &c.

K.

Knowledge has a great con-
nexion with words, ii. 285,
§ 25.
The author's definition of it
explained and defended, ii.
314, note. How it differs
from faith, iii. 97, § 2, 3:
ii. 316, note.
What, ii. 308, § 2.
How much our knowledge de-
pends on our senses, ii. 302,
§ 23.

Actual, ii. 316, § 8.
Habitual, ibid. § 8.
Habitual, twofold, ii. 317, § 9.
Intuitive, ii. 319, § 1.
Intuitive, the clearest, ii. 320,
§ 1.

Intuitive, irresistible, ibid.
Demonstrative, ii. 321, § 2.
Of general truths, is all either
intuitive or demonstrative,
ii. 327, § 14.

Of particular existences, is
sensitive, ibid.

Clear ideas do not always pro-
duce clear knowledge, ii.
328, § 15.

What kind of knowledge we

have of nature, ii. 16, § 12.
Its beginning and progress, i.
152, § 15, 16, 17: i. 21, 22,
§ 15, 16.

Given us, in the faculties to

attain it, i. 67, 68, § 12.
Men's knowledge according to
the employment of their fa-
culties, i. 76, § 22.
To be got only by the applica-
tion of our own thought to
the contemplation of things,
i. 78, § 23.

Extent of human knowledge,
ii. 329.

Our knowledge goes not be-
yond our ideas, ibid. § 1.
Nor beyond the perception of
their agreement or disagree-
ment, ibid. § 2.

Reaches not to all our ideas,
ibid. § 3.

Much less to the reality of

things, ii. 330, § 6.
Yet very improveable if right
ways were taken, ibid. § 6.
Of co-existence very narrow,
ii. 362, 363, § 9, 10, 11.
And therefore, of substances
very narrow, ii. 364, &c. §
14, 15, 16.

Of other relations indetermina-
ble, ii. 368, § 18.
Of existence, ii. 372, § 21.
Certain and universal, where
to be had, ii. 380, § 29.
Ill use of words, a great hin-
derance of knowledge, ii.
381, § 30.
General, where to be got,
ii.
383, § 31.

Lies only in our thoughts, iii.
18, § 13.

Reality of our knowledge, ii,
384.

Of mathematical truths, how
real, ii. 387, § 6.
Of morality, real, ii. 387, § 7.
Of substances, how far real,
ii. 391, § 12.

What makes our knowledge
real, ii. 385, § 3 : ii. 388,
§ 8.
Considering things, and not
names, the way to know-
ledge, ii. 392, § 13.

Of substances, wherein it con-
sists, ii. 390, § 11.
What required to any tolerable
knowledge of substances,
iii. 19, § 14.
Self-evident, iii. 22, § 2.
Of identity, and diversity, as
large as our ideas, ii. 362,
§ 8: iii. 23, § 4.
Wherein it consists, ibid.
Of co-existence, very scanty,
iii. 25, § 5.

Of relations of modes, not so
scanty, iii. 26, § 6.

Of real existence none, ibid.
§ 7.

Begins in particulars, ibid. § 9.
Intuitive of our own existence,
iii. 54, § 3.

Demonstrative of a God, iii.
55, § 1.

Improvement of knowledge,
iii. 78.

Not improved by maxims, iii.
78, § 1.

Why so thought, iii. 79, § 2.
Knowledge improved, only by
perfecting and comparing
ideas, iii. 82, § 6: iii. 89,
§ 14.

And finding their relations,
iii. 83, § 7.

By intermediate ideas, iii. 89,
§ 14.

In substances, how to be im-
proved, iii. 84, § 9.
Partly necessary, partly vo-
luntary, iii. 91, § 1: iii. 92,
§ 2.

Why some, and so little, ibid.
§ 2.

How increased, iii. 105, § 6.

L.

Language, why it changes, i.
298, § 7.

Wherein it consists, ii. 158,
§ 1, 2, 3.

Its use, ii. 199, § 7.
Its imperfections, ii. 250, § 1.
Double use, ibid.

The use of language destroyed
by the subtilty of disput-
ing, ii. 271,272, § 6, 7, 8.
Ends of language, ii. 284, §
23.
Its imperfections, not easy to
be cured, ii. 289, § 2: ii.
290, 291, § 4, 5, 6.
The cure of them necessary

to philosophy, ii. 290, § 3.
To use no word without a
clear and distinct idea an-
nexed to it, is one remedy
of the imperfections of lan-
guage, ii. 293, 294, § 8, 9.
Propriety in the use of words,
another remedy, ii. 295, §

11.

Law of nature generally allowed,
i. 38, § 6.

There is, though not innate, i.
45, § 13.

Its inforcement, ii. 97, § 6.
Learning, the ill state of learn-
ing in these latter ages, ii.
250, &c.

Of the schools lies chiefly in
the abuse of words, ii. 256
&c. ii. 271.

Such learning of ill conse-
quence, ii. 273, § 10, &c.
Liberty, what, i. 240–243, § 8,

9, 10, 11, 12: i. 244, § 15.
Belongs not to the will, i. 243,
§ 14.

To be determined by the re-
sult of our own deliberation,
is no restraint of liberty, i.
268, § 48, 49, 50.
Founded in a power of sus-
pending our particular de-
sires, i. 267, § 47: i. 270,
271, § 51, 52.
Light, its absurd definitions, ii.
189, § 10.

Light in the mind, what, iii.
155, § 13.

Logic has introduced obscurity
into languages, ii. 271, 272,
§ 6, 7.

And hindered knowledge, ii.
272, § 7.
Love, i. 232, § 4.

M.

Madness, i. 150, § 13. Oppo-
sition to reason deserves
that name, ii. 149, § 4.
Magisterial, the most knowing
are least magisterial, iii.
104, § 4.

Making, ii. 43, § 2.
Man not the product of blind
chance, iii. 56, § 6.

The essence of man is placed

in his shape, ii. 395, § 16.
We know not his real essence,
ii. 208, § 3 : ii. 221, § 22 :
ii. 226, § 27.
The boundaries of the human
species not determined, ii.
226, § 27.

What makes the same indi-
vidual man, ii. 64, § 21:
ii. 71, § 29.

The same man may be different

persons, ii. 63, § 19.
Mathematics, their methods, iii.
83, § 7. Improvement, iii.
90, § 15.
Matter incomprehensible, both
in its cohesion and divisi-
bility, ii. 23, § 23: ii. 29,
30, § 30, 31.
What, ii. 276, § 15.
Whether it may think, is not

to be known, ii. 331. 358,
359, § 6 : ii. 341, &e.
Cannot produce motion, or any
thing else, iii. 60, § 10.
And motion cannot produce
thought, ibid.

Not eternal, iii. 65, § 18.
Maxims, iii. 22, &c.: iii. 37, §
12, 13, 14, 15.

Not alone self-evident, iii. 22,
§ 3.

Are not the truths first known,

iii. 26, § 9.

Not the foundation of our
knowledge, iii. 28, § 10.
Wherein their evidence con-
sists, iii. 29, § 10.
Their use, iii. 30-37, § 11,12:
Why the most general self-
evident propositions alone,
pass for maxims, iii. 37, §
11.

Are commonly proofs, only
where there is no need of
proofs, iii. 39, § 15.
Of little use, with clear terms,
iii. 41, § 19.

Of dangerous use, with doubt-

ful terms, iii. 37, &c. § 12 :
iii. 42, § 20.
When first known, i. 17, &c.
$9. 12, 13 i. 20, § 14, i.
22, § 16.

How they gain assent, i.26,27,
§ 21, 22.

Made from particular observa-
tions, ibid.

Not in the understanding before
they are actually known, i.
27, § 22.

Neither their terms nor ideas
innate, i. 27, 28, § 23.
Least known to children and
illiterate people, i. 31, 32,
§ 27.
Memory, i. 137, § 2.

Attention, pleasure, and pain,
settle ideas in the memory,
i. 138, § 3.

And repetition, ibid. § 4: i.
140, § 6.

Difference of memory, i. 138,
139, § 4, 5.

In remembrance, the mind
sometimes active, some-
times passive, i. 140, § 7.
Its necessity, i. 139, § 5: i.
141, § 8.

Defects, i. 141, 142, § 8, 9.
In brutes, i. 142, 143, § 10.
Metaphysics and school divinity

filled with uninstructive pro-
positions, iii. 51, § 9.
Method used in mathematics, iii.
83, § 7.

Mind, the quickness of its ac-
tions, i. 134, § 10.
Minutes, hours, days, not ne-
cessary to duration, i. 186,
§ 23.
Miracles, the ground of assent to
miracles, iii. 112, § 13.
Misery, what, i. 262, § 42.
Modes, mixed, i. 293, § 1.

Made by the mind, i. 294, § 2.
Sometimes got by the explica-
tion of their names, i. 295,

§ 3.

Whence a mixed mode has its

unity, i. 295, § 4.
Occasion of mixed modes, i.
296, § 5.

Mixed modes, their ideas, how
got, i. 298, § 9.
Modes simple and complex, i.
155, § 5.

Simple modes, i. 157, § 1.
Of motion, i. 225, § 2.
Moral good and evil, what, ii.
97, § 5.

Three rules, whereby men
judge of moral rectitude, ii.
98, § 7.

Beings, how founded on simple

ideas of sensation and re-
flection, ii. 104-106, § 14,
15.

Rules not self-evident, i. 37,
§ 4.
Variety of opinions, concern-
ing moral rules, whence, i.
37, 38, § 5, 6.
Rules, if innate, cannot with
public allowance be trans-
gressed, i. 42, &c. § 11, 12,
13.

Morality, capable of demonstra-
tion, ii. 368, § 18: iii. 84, § 8.
The proper study of mankind,
iii. 87, § 11.

Of actions, in their confor-
mity to a rule, ii. 106,
§ 15.

Mistakes in moral notions, owing
to names, ibid. § 16.
Discourses in morality, if not
clear, it is the fault of the
speaker, ii. 299, § 17.
Hinderances of demonstrative
treating of morality. 1.
Want of marks. 2. Com-
plexedness, ii. 369, § 19. 3.
Interest, ii. 371,372, § 20.
Change of names in morality,
changes not the nature of
things, ii. 389, § 9.
And mechanism, hard to be
reconciled, i. 47, § 14.

Secured amidst men's wrong
judgments, i. 286, 287, §
70.

Motion, slow or very swift, why
not perceived, i. 178, 179,
§ 7, 8, 9, 10, 11.
Voluntary, inexplicable, iii.
67, § 19.

Its absurd definitions, ii. 188,
§ 8, 9.

N.

Naming of ideas, i. 148, § 8.
Names moral, established by
law, are not to be varied
from, ii. 390, § 10.
Of substances, standing for
real essences, are not ca-
pable to convey certainty to
the understanding, iii. 10,
§ 5.
Standing for nominal essences,
will make some, though not
many certain propositions,
iii. 11, § 6.

Why men substitute names for
real essences, which they
know not, ii. 280, § 19.
Two false suppositions, in such
an use of names, ii. 281,
282, § 21.

A particular name to every
particular thing impossible,
ii. 166, § 2.

And useless, ii. 167, § 3.
Proper names, where used, ii.
167, § 4, 5.

Specific names are affixed to
the nominal essence, ii. 182,
§ 16.

Of simple ideas and substances,

refer to things, ii. 186, § 2.
What names stand for both

real and nominal essence,
ii. 186, § 3.

Of simple ideas not capable of
definitions, ibid. § 4.
Why, ii. 187, § 7.

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