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LONDON:
PRINTED BY THOMAS DAVISON, WHITEFRIARS.
CONTENTS
OF
VOLUME III.
Essay on Human Understanding, book iv. ch. 5, &c.
Page
1
A Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning Personal Identity 177
Appendix to the Defence of Mr. Locke's Opinion concerning
Personal Identity
199
- 203
Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman 291
Elements of Natural Philosophy
A New Method of a Common-Place-Book
-
301
- 331
Index to the Essay concerning Human Understanding
Index to the Additional Pieces in this Volume
2. A right joining or separating of signs; i. e. ideas or words.
3. Which make mental or verbal propositions.
4. Mental propositions are very hard to be treated of.
5. Being nothing but joining or separating ideas, without
words.
6. When mental propositions contain real truth, and when
verbal.
7. Objection against verbal truth, that thus it may be all
chimerical.
8. Answered, real truth is about ideas agreeing to things.
9. Falsehood is the joining of names, otherwise than their
ideas agree.
10. General propositions to be treated of more at large.
11. Moral and metaphysical truth.
CHAPTER VI.
OF UNIVERSAL PROPOSITIONS, THEIR TRUTH AND CERTAINTY.
SECT.
1. Treating of words, necessary to knowledge.
2. General truths hardly to be understood, but in verbal pro- positions.
3. Certainty two-fold, of truth, and of knowledge.
4. No proposition can be known to be true, where the essence of each species mentioned is not known.
5. This more particularly concerns substances.
6. The truth of few universal propositions concerning sub-
stances is to be known.
7. Because co-existence of ideas in few cases is to be known.
8, 9. Instance in gold.
10. As far as any such co-existence can be known, so far
universal propositions may be certain. But this will go
but a little way, because,
11, 12. The qualities, which make our complex ideas of substances,
depend mostly on external, remote, and unperceived
causes.
13. Judgment may reach farther, but that is not knowledge.
14. What is requisite for our knowledge of substances.
15. Whilst our ideas of substances contain not their real con-
stitutions, we can make but few general, certain pro-
positions concerning them.
16. Wherein lies the general certainty of propositions.
CHAPTER VII.
OF MAXIMS.
They are self-evident.
2. Wherein that self-evidence consists.
3. Self-evidence not peculiar to received axioms.
4. First, as to identity and diversity, all propositions are
equally self-evident.
5. Secondly, in co-existence, we have few self-evident pro-
positions.
6. Thirdly, in other relations we may have.
7. Fourthly, concerning real existence, we have none.
8. These axioms do not much influence our other knowledge.
9. Because they are not the truths the first known.
10. Because on them the other parts of our knowledge do not
depend.
11. What use these general maxims have.
12. Maxims, if care be not taken in the use of words, may
prove contradictions.
13. Instance in vacuum.
14. They prove not the existence of things without us.
15. Their application dangerous about complex ideas.
16-18. Instance in man.
19. Little use of these maxims, in proofs, where we have clear
and distinct ideas.
20. Their use dangerous, where our ideas are confused.
CHAPTER VIII.
OF TRIFLING PROPOSITIONS.
1. Some propositions bring no increase to our knowledge.
2, 3. As, first, identical propositions.