4. Secondly, when a part of any complex idea is predicated of

the whole.

5. As part of the definition of the term defined.

6. Instance, man and palfry.

7. For this teaches but the signification of words.

8. But no real knowledge.

9. General propositions, concerning substances, are often
trifling.

10. And why.

11. Thirdly, using words variously, is trifling with them.

12. Marks of verbal propositions. First, predication in abstract.
13. Secondly, a part of the definition, predicated of any term.

SECT.

CHAPTER IX.

OF OUR KNOWLEDGE OF EXISTENCE.

1. General, certain propositions concern not existence.

2. A threefold knowledge of existence.

3. Our knowledge of our own existence is intuitive.

SECT.

CHAPTER X.

OF THE EXISTENCE OF A GOD.

1. We are capable of knowing certainly that there is a God.

2. Man knows that he himself is.

3. He knows also, that nothing cannot produce a being, there-

fore something eternal.

4. That eternal being must be most powerful.

5. And most knowing.

6. And therefore God.

7. Our idea of a most perfect being, not the sole proof of a God.

8. Something from eternity.

9. Two sorts of beings, cogitative and incogitative.

10. Incogitative being cannot produce a cogitative.

11, 12. Therefore there has been an eternal wisdom.

13. Whether material or no.

14. Not material, first, because every particle of matter is not

cogitative.

15. Secondly, one particle alone of matter cannot be cogitative.

16. Thirdly, a system of incogitative matter cannot be cogitative.

17. Whether in motion or at rest.

18, 19. Matter not co-eternal with an eternal mind.

CHAPTER XI.

OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER THINGS.

SECT.

1. Is to be had only by sensation.

2. Instance, whiteness of this paper.

3. This, though not so certain as demonstration, yet may be

called knowledge, and proves the existence of things

without us.

4. First, because we cannot have them but by the inlets of

the senses.

5. Secondly, because an idea from actual sensation, and an-

other from memory, are very distinct perceptions.

6. Thirdly, pleasure or pain, which accompanies actual sensa-

tion, accompanies not the returning of those ideas, with-

out the external objects.

7. Fourthly, our senses assist one another's testimony, of the

existence of outward things.

8. This certainty is as great as our condition needs.

9. But reaches no farther than actual sensation.

10. Folly to expect demonstration in every thing.

11. Past existence is known by memory.

12. The existence of spirits not knowable.

13. Particular propositions concerning existence, are knowable.

14. And general propositions concerning abstract ideas.

CHAPTER XII.

OF THE IMPROVEMENT OF OUR KNOWLEDGE.

SECT.

1. Knowledge is not from maxims.

2. (The occasion of that opinion.)

3. But from the comparing clear and distinct ideas.

4. Dangerous to build upon precarious principles.

5. This no certain way to truth.

6. But to compare clear, complete ideas under steady names.

7. The true method of advancing knowledge, is by considering

our abstract ideas.

8. By which, morality, also, may be made clearer.

9. But knowledge of bodies is to be improved only by ex-
perience.

10. This may procure us convenience, not science.

11. We are fitted for moral knowledge, and natural improve-

ments.

12. But must beware of hypotheses and wrong principles.

13. The true use of hypotheses.

14. Clear and distinct ideas, with settled names, and the find-

ing of those, which show their agreement or disagreement,

are the ways to enlarge our knowledge.

15. Mathematics an instance of it.

CHAPTER XIII.

SOME OTHER CONSIDERATIONS CONCERNING OUR KNOWLEDGE.

SECT.

1. Our knowledge partly necessary, partly voluntary.

2. The application voluntary; but we know as things are, not

as we please.

3. Instances in number, and in natural religion.

1. Our knowledge being short, we want something else.

2. What use to be made of this twilight estate.

3. Judgment supplies the want of knowledge.

4. Judgment is the presuming things to be so, without per
ceiving it.

1. Probability is the appearance of agreement, upon fallible
proofs.

2. It is to supply the want of knowledge.

3. Being that, which makes us presume things to be true,
before we know them to be so.

4. The grounds of probability are two; conformity with our

own experience, or the testimony of others' experience.

5. In this all the arguments, pro and con, ought to be examined,
before we come to a judgment.

6. They being capable of great variety.

SECT.

CHAPTER XVI.

OF THE DEGREES OF ASSENT.

1. Our assent ought to be regulated by the grounds of pro-
bability.

2. These cannot be always actually in view, and then we must

content ourselves with the remembrance, that we once

saw ground for such a degree of assent.

3. The ill consequence of this, if our former judgment were

not rightly made.

4. The right use of it, is mutual charity and forbearance.

5. Probability is either of matter of fact or speculation.

6. The concurrent experience of all other men with ours

produces assurance approaching to knowledge.

7. Unquestionable testimony and experience for the most part
produce confidence.

8. Fair testimony, and the nature of the thing indifferent, pro-

duces also confident belief.

9. Experience and testimony clashing, infinitely vary the de-

grees of probability.

10. Traditional testimonies, the farther removed, the less their
proof.

11. Yet history is of great use.

12. In things, which sense cannot discover, analogy is the
great rule of probability.

13. One case, where contrary experience lessens not the testi-
mony.

14. The bare testimony of revelation is the highest certainty.

1. Various significations of the word reason.

2. Wherein reasoning consists.

3. Its four parts.

4. Syllogism, not the great instrument of reason.

5. Helps little in demonstration, less in probability.

6. Serves not to increase our knowledge, but fence with it.

7. Other helps should be sought.

8. We reason about particulars.

9. First, reason fails us for want of ideas.

10. Secondly, because of obscure and imperfect ideas.

11. Thirdly, for want of intermediate ideas.

12. Fourthly, because of wrong principles.

13. Fifthly, because of doubtful terms.

14. Our highest degree of knowledge is intuitive, without

reasoning.

15. The next is demonstration by reasoning.

16. To supply the narrowness of this, we have nothing but

judgment upon probable reasoning.

17. Intuition, demonstration, judgment.

18. Consequences of words, and consequences of ideas.

19. Four sorts of arguments, first, ad verecundiam.

20. Secondly, ad ignorantiam.

21. Thirdly, ad hominem.

22. Fourthly, ad judicium.

23. Above, contrary, and according to reason.

24. Reason and faith not opposite.

CHAPTER XVIII.

OF FAITH AND REASON, AND THEIR DISTINCT PROVINCES.

SECT.

1. Necessary to know their boundaries.

2. Faith and reason what, as contra-distinguished.

3. No new simple idea can be conveyed by traditional revelation.

4. Traditional revelation may make us know propositions,

knowable also by reason, but not with the same certainty

that reason doth.

5. Revelation cannot be admitted, against the clear evidence

of reason.

6. Traditional revelation much less.

7. Things above reason.

8. Or not contrary to reason, if revealed, are matter of faith.

9. Revelation in matters where reason cannot judge, or but

probably, ought to be hearkened to.

10. In matters, where reason can afford certain knowledge,
that is to be hearkened to.

11. If the boundaries be not set between faith and reason, no
enthusiasm, or extravagancy in religion, can be con-
tradicted.

1. Love of truth necessary.

2. A forwardness to dictate, from whence.

3. Force of enthusiasm.

4. Reason and revelation.

5. Rise of enthusiasm.

6, 7. Enthusiasm..

8, 9. Enthusiasm mistaken for seeing and feeling.

10. Enthusiasm, how to be discovered.

11. Enthusiasm fails of evidence, that the proposition is from

God.

12. Firmness of persuasion, no proof that any proposition is

from God.

13. Light in the mind, what.

14. Revelation must be judged of by reason.

15, 16. Belief, no proof of revelation.

SECT.

CHAPTER XX.

OF WRONG ASSENT, OR error.

1. Causes of error.

2. First, want of proofs.

3. Obj. What shall become of those who want them, answered.

4. People hindered from inquiry.

5. Secondly, want of skill to use them.

6. Thirdly, want of will to use them.

7. Fourthly, wrong measures of probability; whereof,

8-10. First, doubtful propositions, taken from principles.

11. Secondly, received hypotheses.

12. Thirdly, predominant passions.

13. The means of evading probabilities, 1st, supposed fallacy.

14. 2dly, supposed arguments for the contrary.

15. What probabilities determine the assent.