ment was to be made. This could not possibly be done, so long as Christ sustained the character of a servant and acted in a subordinate capacity. But whenever a sacrifice of atonement is offered to God, the character of those for whom the offering is made, and of him to whom the sacrifice is offered, are both concerned; and both to be, in some way, clearly expressed and brought to view; in order that the controversy may be clearly understood, and a reconciliation, honorable to the offended, and safe to the offender, may take place in consequence of the offering. It became the Saviour, therefore, when he was about to offer up himself as a sacrifice of atonement for sin, as much as was possible, to put himself in the place of the sinner. And it equally became the Sovereign of the universe to express, in a lively manner, his feelings to ward the sinner, and his righteous anger against him, in his treatment of the sacrifice. This idea of things is implied in the very institution of sacrifices for sin; and very naturally springs, even from the very appoint ment of a substitute for sinners.

THUS it evidently appears that there is no greater difficulty in accounting for the sufferings of Christ, on the present hypothesis, than on any other supposed ground whatever; nor any absurdity in supposing them to have been inexpressibly great. And what has been before observed respecting God's great end in the creation and government of the world, the original ground and necessity of an atonement, and the actual substitution of Christ in the place of the sinner; all concurs to strengthen and confirm these observations; and prove that the principal weight of Christ's sufferings arose from the deep impressions which were made upon his mind, of the awful anger, the sore dis pleasure of God against sinners.

CHAP. X.

Shewing in what sense atonement is made for the sins of the whole world.

IT has been the common belief of christians that the death of Christ is, in its own nature, a sufficient atonement for the sins of the whole human race. And the general offers and invitations of the gospel, seem evidently to countenance such an opinion. For if the atonement be not sufficient for the sins of all; it will be difficult to see how the offers of mercy may, consistently, be made to all. And if mercy through an atonement, may be consistently offered to all; it will be asked, why may it not, also, be consistently exercised toward all; and so all be finally saved?

WHETHER the doctrine of universal salvation be a natural and certain consequence of Christ's satisfaction, will depend upon the ideas that are entertained of the sufficiency of the atonement which is actually made for the sins of men.

IT is therefore to be observed,

I. THAT if by the sufficiency of Christ's atonement be meant such a display of divine righteousness as supersedes all use of punishment in the divine government; the atonement made by Christ is not sufficient for the recovery of all. It is plain that all the valuable ends of punishment were not answered by the sufferings of Christ. For both reason and revelation assure us that the evils brought on mankind, in the present state, are fruits of divine anger. And if universal peace and happiness in the future world, may certainly be inferred from the sufferings of Christ ; it will be difficult to give a reason why so many evils

take place in the present. If divine anger has been so abundantly displayed in the atonement, as to render all future punishment unnecessary; it is hard to conceive the reason why so many evils are inflicted on the human race, in the present world. The present sufferings of mankind are an unanswerable proof that, however perfect the atonement be, in the divine view, all the valuable ends of punishment are not actually answered by it. For if it would be inconsistent with full atonement, for God to bring evils on men, in the future world; it would be equally inconsistent, for him to bring evils on them, in the present. If on account of the atonement, justice demands an exemption from all punishment in the next world; it equally demands it in this. It is therfore evident, from fact, whatever displays of divine righteousness and anger were made in the sufferings of Christ; that all the purposes of divine benevolence cannot be answered without a display of the same glorious attributes in at variety of evils brought upon men. And if it may subserve the purposes of divine benevolence to bring evils on men in this world; we can by no means be certain that it will not subserve the same glorious purposes, to inflict evils on them in the next. If temporary evils may answer valauble ends in the government of God, we cannot be certain that eternal ones. may not also. If evils are necessary to the fullest display of the divine glory; we have no sufficient au thority from the atonement to deny that they always will be necessary. If atonement doth not prevent their present necessity and use; we have no evidence that it will their future.

"BUT" says the objector, "the evils which are "brought on mankind, in the present state, are only "designed to form and raise the subject to higher de"grees of felicity in the next world;, And therefore are so far from manifesting divine anger, that they

"are but the natural expressions of God's kindness to "the sufferer. Consequently, all the displays of pu"nitive justice that ever are to be made, were in fact "made in the sufferings of Christ."

BESIDES the express declarations of the word of God which abundantly prove that the evils brought upon the world, are fruits of divine anger; it is to be observed that this objection goes on a ground which denies the necessity of an atonement, or of any exercise of punitive justice: And therefore cannot consistently infer universal salvation from the atonement. The objection supposeth that the evils which God brings on the human race, are no evidence of divine anger: Consequently, universal salvation cannot be inferred from a display of divine anger in the sufferings of Christ. The objection supposes that the evils brought on men are only designed to beget in them a higher relish of happiness; and therefore, that instead of testifying anger, they express nothing but kindness; and will certainly issue in higher degrees of felicity.

To the objection, considered in this light, it may be replied,

1. THAT it is far from being evident that merely a sense of misery, on the whole, increases happiness. In order to take away the force of the argument for future punishment, which would naturally arise from the evils of the present state; it must be supposed that pain and misery heighten pleasures; and are necessary to increase the relish of the good which it is supposed is laid up for men in the next world. And, therefore, that there is no evidence, from the evils of the present state, that God is angry; or that he has not the highest good of every subject really at heart. Thus it is said, it is well known that losses sweeten enjoyments:

pain, pleasure; and sickness, health. But that this argument may have weight, it must be supposed that men may consistently choose to lose some of their present comforts, in order to sweeten the enjoyment of those that remain-choose pain to heighten pleasure; and sickness in order to enjoy health. But would any man, in his senses, make such a choice? would any man be glad of pain and sickness, that he might know the pleasure of health-choose to have his house consumed by fire, that he might enjoy the escape of his wife and children or lose one child, that he might take greater comfort in the rest? Common sense, and the very feelings of mankind revolt from the supposition. And yet all this must be supposed, before the sentiment that present evils are no testimonies of divine anger, can be admissible. For if natural evils brought upon us in this world, are no testimonies of divine anger, there is no evidence that the favor and friendship of God will secure us against them, in the next. If they are a necessary mean of encreasing felicity in the present state; where is the evidence that they will not be so in the future? And to what a height God may, in his kindness, raise them in the next world, it will be impossible for us with any kind of certainty, to determine. The objection before us rests on the supposition that our pleasures will be but feeble, and our enjoyments soon languish; unless enlivened by a sense of pain. And if so, there can be no evidence that we shall ever arrive at a happier state of existence, than the present; or be in a situation where the intermixture of good and evil will on the whole, be more favorable to felicity. But if, on the other hand, notwithstanding the atonement, divine anger be manifested in bringing evils on men in this world; it can with no certainty be inferred from this doctrine that the wisdom of God will hot see it to be necessaty to bring evils on mankind, in the world to come.