struction with the way in which boats "not used with motors" are made. These, he said, would simply collapse if one section deflates. The particular boat which he personally had used was the Inka. With a motor, he was able to operate it at a speed of from 8 to 10 knots. He believed, however, that he could not row a boat faster than 2 knots. On cross-examination, Mr. Bentley reiterated that the boats were imported without paddles or motors. He also stated that they are suitable for use with paddles and that there is a mount on the Poseidon which makes it suitable for use with a sail. He could not recall whether or not, at the time of importation, there was a motor mount on the Neptune and agreed that, without the mounting, it could not be a motorboat. The witness further admitted that boats are generally made from other substances than the rubber and cloth of which the instant boats are composed. It is the contention of plaintiffs that, under authority of the cases of A. W. Fenton Co. v. United States, 15 Cust. Ct. 200, C.D. 972, and Robert E. Landweer v. United States, 23 Cust. Ct. 171, Abstract 53576, the instant boats fall within the statutory definition of motorboats since, as imported, they are equipped to be operated as motorboats. It is further urged that since the statutory definition also embraces sailboats, it is of no consequence that the Poseidon is designed to have a sail attached, citing Ratsey Lapthorn, Inc. v. United States, 26 Cust. Ct. 84, C.D. 1304; and that the fact that outboard motors are not imported with the subject boats does not detract from their status as motorboats, since, under authority of William M. Barber et al. v. United States, 6 Cust. Ct. 340, C.D. 492, unfinished motorboats, unaccompanied by motors at the time of importation, are, nevertheless, motorboats. The gravamen of defendant's position is that the provision for motorboats in paragraph 370 of the tariff act, as originally enacted, contemplates boats which are normally or chiefly propelled by steam, sail, or motor, as the case may be, and that the fact that a boat simply possesses the capacity to be so operated does not entitle it to classification as a motorboat. It is counsel's contention that the instant record is inadequate to establish that the subject boats are chiefly used as motorboats. In any event, it is urged that there is no evidence to support the allegation that the Neptune II boat, illustrated as the "River" boat, as imported, is even equipped to accommodate a motor. As to this latter point, it seems clear that the record is deficient in the respect indicated. The "River," as depicted on plaintiffs' illustrative exhibit 1, is a kayak or canoe-type inflated boat. Its bow and stern are both pointed and do not appear to afford any space for the attachment of a motor. The exhibit shows no "motor mounts" for the insertion of the tubular steel motor braces, and the witness had no actual recollection that this model was, in fact, imported with motor mounts. As he himself agreed, "obviously, without the mounting, it could not be a motor boat." The claim as to the invoice item Neptune II with bag, H. No. 3213, is, therefore, overruled. As to the other items here involved, we are constrained to hold that under the authorities cited they must be considered to be motorboats, within the statutory definition, and that chief use with a motor is not necessarily a determining factor. Involved in the Fenton case, supra, was a wooden boat, measuring about 13 feet in length, 50 inches in width, and valued at about $75. The boat was equipped with oarlocks, but so constructed as to be straight across the back for the attachment of an outboard motor. Neither oars nor motor was imported with the boat, and the record showed simply that while the boat could be propelled by oars, it was more common to use an outboard motor. In concluding that the boats there in issue were motorboats, as provided for in paragraph 370 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the trade agreement with Canada, 74 Treas. Dec. 235, T.D. 49752, the court entered upon the following discussion: In a digest of information concerning products on which concessions were granted by the United States in the trade agreement with Canada, published by the United States Tariff Commission, the following appears in volume II, page 3-44, under the heading "Motor Boats": The pleasure craft covered by paragraph 370 range from sea-going vessels of 2,000 gross tons and more to tiny outboards and sail boats, 7 or 8 feet long. The entire range may be classified according to the method of propulsion, as follows: (3) Motor craft. This is the outstanding group covered by paragraph 370; it too includes a wide range of sizes, from large Diesel yachts to small skiffs or canoes driven by outboard motors. In United States v. Good Neighbor Imports, Inc., 33 C.C.P.A. 91, C.A.D. 321, decided November 5, 1945, our appellate court held that judicial notice may be taken of the information supplied in such digests of trade data published by the Tariff Commission, stating: It is obvious that the information supplied in the foregoing digests is pertinent to the issue here involved and that the court may take judicial knowledge thereof. Such information is not binding upon the court but it may be considered as bearing upon the identity of the merchandise under consideration. In United States v. Wepner, 32 C.C.P.A. 30, C.A.D. 282, our appellate court, in discussing paragraph 370, stated: It will be observed that in the paragraph Congress legislatively defined the term "motor boat," and broadened its definition beyond the ordinary dictionary definitions of the term, in that it provided for the inclusion of yachts or pleasure boats propelled by sail or steam, as well as those propelled by motor, within the definition. Also, it provided, in effect, that all the yachts or pleasure boats should be subject to the duty "regardless of length or tonnage." [Italics quoted.] It would seem clear that the boat in question falls within the comprehensive definition of "motor boat" contained in paragraph 370. We therefore hold it to be properly dutiable at 15 per centum ad valorem under said paragraph and the Canadian Trade Agreement, and the protest claim is sustained. A similar view was adopted in Robert E. Landweer v. United States, supra, with reference to molded plywood boats, 7 feet 10 inches or 9 feet long, used as dinghies for yachts. Predicated upon a record which established that those boats were manufactured with a "transom stern," that is flat across the back, strengthened, and braced so that an outboard motor could be attached and that the rake or slope of the stern from top to bottom was only about 111⁄2 inches, the court held the involved boats to be motorboats within said paragraph 370, as modified by the Canadian Trade Agreement, even though they were fitted with oarlocks and, as imported, were not equipped with motors. Thus, it would appear that the criterion for classifying pleasure boats within the broadened definition of the term in paragraph 370 of the Tariff Act of 1930 is their suitability for being propelled by sail, steam, or motor, and whether or not, after importation, they are chiefly so used is not necessarily determinative. The Poseidon and Inka boats here involved have been shown to satisfy that test. They are made in compartments to prevent deflation; there is an opening in the stern for the placement of a motor; and there are mounts on the sides to accommodate the motor supports. By reason of the foregoing, we hold the inflatable boats here in issue, invoiced as Inka with bag, H. No. 3212, and Poseidon-Super with bag, H. No. 3214, or Poseidon-Super boats, H. No. 3214, to be motorboats within the purview of paragraph 370 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the sixth protocol, supra, dutiable at the rate of 6 per centum ad valorem. In all other respects and as to all other merchandise, all other claims are overruled. Judgment will be entered accordingly. (C.D. 2463) ATKINSON, HASERICK & Co., INC. v. UNITED STATES Spindles Textile machinery-Vegetable fibers, Certain spindles, designed for use on twister and spinning frames employing the "Cotton System," were classified by the collector of customs as textile machinery for textile manufacturing or processing prior to the making of fabrics, other, and were assessed with duty at the rate of 20 per centum ad valorem. It appears that said spindles, although designed for use on the "Cotton System," were adaptable for use in the processing of synthetics as well as cotton, provided the synthetics were cut to the proper length. Held, said spindles are properly classifiable under the provision for textile machinery for textile man. ufacturing or processing prior to the making of fabrics, for manufacturing or processing vegetable fibers, and as such properly subject to duty at the rate of 10 per centum ad valorem. The mere fact that the imported spindles were sold to a company which uses them for the preparation of synthetic fibers is immaterial. It is not the use of the particular shipment but rather the use of the particular class or type of merchandise that is controlling. United States v. Spreckels Creameries, Inc., 17 CCPA 400, T.D. 43835. United States Customs Court, Second Division Protests 61/12130, 61/15879, and 61/17874 against the decision of [Judgment for plaintiff.] (Decided June 17, 1964) Hargraves, Karb, Wilcox & Galvani (Julian T. Hargraves of counsel); Barnes, Richardson & Colburn (Joseph Schwartz of counsel) associate counsel; for the plaintiff. John W. Douglas, Assistant Attorney General (Mollie Strum and Samuel D. Spector, trial attorneys), for the defendant. Before LAWRENCE, RAO, and FORD, Judges FORD, Judge: By this action, plaintiff seeks to recover a portion of the duty assessed by the collector of customs at Norfolk, Va., on certain spinning or twister spindles, which were classified under paragraph 372 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified by the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 82 Treas. Dec. 305, T.D. 51802, as parts of textile machinery for manufacturing or processing fibers other than vegetable fibers, which rate is 20 per centum ad valorem. The three suits listed in schedule "A," attached hereto and made a part hereof, were consolidated for the purpose of trial. Plaintiff claims said merchandise to be properly dutiable at only 10 per centum ad valorem under the same basic provision of paragraph 372, as modified, supra, and as further supplemented by Presidential proclamation, 83 Treas. Dec. 223, T.D. 51939, which provides for textile machinery for manufacturing or processing vegetable fibers. It is the position of plaintiff that said merchandise consists of parts of "Cotton System Machines" and, hence, falls within this portion of said paragraph, as modified, supra, even though they are also used on synthetic fibers. The pertinent text of paragraph 372 of the Tariff Act of 1930, as modified and supplemented, supra, reads as follows: Textile machinery, finished or unfinished, not specially provided for For textile manufacturing or processing prior to the making Other For manufacturing or processing vegetable fibers, ex- 10% ad val. 20% ad val. The record herein consists of the testimony of four witnesses called on behalf of plaintiff and six exhibits. Plaintiff's illustrative exhibit 1 was received in evidence as illustrative of spindles in general, and illustrative of the merchandise covered by protest 61/12130 in particular, and may be used for either spinning or twisting. Plaintiff's exhibit 2 is Department of Commerce Bulletin 196, entitled "Cotton Production and Distribution." Plaintiff's exhibits 3 and 4 are samples of 8-inch and 9-inch lift twister spindles, identical to the imported merchandise. Plaintiff's illustrative exhibits 5 and 6 are Department of Commerce Bulletins 197 and 198, respectively. Summarized, the record establishes that the imported spindles are parts of textile machinery for textile manufacturing or processing prior to the making of fabrics, which machines were designed some 30 or 40 years ago. The imported spindles are replacements for said equipment and are identical to the original parts, with the exception of the metal, which has been improved, and the use of ball bearings. Exhibit 1, representing the merchandise covered by protest 61/12130, by virtue of its size, may be used for either spinning or twisting, while exhibits 3 and 4 represent the balance of the merchandise covered by the protest under consideration and are twister spindles. The difference between plaintiff's exhibits 3 and 4 is dimensional and not functional. The spindle is placed on a spindle rail on either a spinning frame or a twister frame and is fastened there by means of a nut. The spindle is then driven to a band or a tape which causes it to revolve and carries the bobbin upon which the yarn is wound. Basically, the spinning process is the drafting of the fibers and the insertion of a twist therein to produce a yarn of a given size. Twisting is a process where additional twist is inserted into the yarns or two or more of said yarns are twisted together into a cord. The existing frames, twister or spinning, were originally designed some 30 or 40 years ago for the processing of cotton fibers under |