irregulars at Ruwandiz, in Southern Kurdistan, well within the pre-war frontiers of 'Iraq, and the concentration of Turkish regular troops at Nisibin and Jazira-ibn-'Umar, to the north of Mosul, had spread unrest along the frontier, and especially in the Sulaimaniya division, where the religious leader, Shaikh Mahmud, brought back from exile in the previous year, was agitating for an independent Kurdistan and intriguing with the Turks for support. The hesitations of British policy in the face of this Kurdish nationalist programme had filled the minds of the young Arabs with suspicion of our intentions, and it was widely believed that we contemplated the creation of a Kurdish belt, under permanent British control, which would perpetually dominate, from the mountains, the Arab population of 'Iraq. The same suspicion was felt in regard to the aspirations of the Assyrians for independence. The leading Persian divines of the Shi'ah sacred cities in 'Iraq had taken advantage of this general atmosphere of suspicion and unrest, and had promulgated decrees forbidding the participation in the elections for the Constituent Assembly of the Shi'ahs, who form a little more than a half of the inhabitants, on the ground that the Assembly would be forced to accept, in the name of the nation, a puppet Government subject to foreign domination. In consequence, the elections, which had started in October, 1922, had hung fire and had been allowed to collapse, and the Constituent Assembly had not been able, as had been intended, to meet in January, 1923, for the purpose of ratifying the treaty of alliance between Great Britain and 'Iraq and laying down the lines of the future constitution. There was, in fact, a serious danger of perpetual deadlock. At the same time the transfer of the command of the British military forces in 'Iraq to the Air Officer Commanding had only recently been carried out, and it was still doubtful whether the increased and reorganised Air Force, supported by a reduced garrison of "ground troops,' would be able to deal with the menace on the northern frontiers and the secular insubordination of the Arab tribes on the Euphrates. Among these tribes a powerful party had arisen which had set itself in opposition to the government of King Faisal and pretended, for its own purposes, to desire a return of direct British rule. This was a factor most embarrassing to the British representative in ‘Iraq, since, on the one hand, the adoption by us of a severe attitude towards the malcontents was alleged to be tantamount to the abandonment of our special adherents, whilst, on the other hand, any tenderness towards them was misinterpreted as encouragement of sedition against the 'Iraq Government, with the object of maintaining British influence in the country.

Effect of the Administrative Inspectors Law.

The first necessity of this situation was to convince the politically-minded part of the 'Iraq people of the disinterested attitude of Great Britain and to disabuse them of the suspicion

that she was aiming at the perpetual domination of 'Iraq. The Administrative Inspectors Law, which had been promulgated in January, 1923, went a long way towards achieving this end. It made it clear that the whole executive of the country was to be in the hands of 'Iraq officials and that British officers would enjoy only powers of inspection and advice. The law was warmly received by the Arabic press, and it has during the past year secured the most harmonious relations between 'Iraqi and British officials. Its effect was reinforced by the publication of the protocol to the treaty.

Retirement of Sir Percy Cox.

Sir Percy Cox had come back from his conference with His Majesty's Government in London on 31st March, 1923. He took leave on 4th May and relinquished his office as High Commissioner on 15th September, 1923, up to which date it fell to Sir Henry Dobbs to act for him. When he resigned, Sir Henry was appointed to succeed him. During the month of April, although he was actually present in Baghdad, he took no active part in affairs except those connected with the acceptance by the 'Iraq Government of the protocol. It was signed on 30th April, 1923, by Sir Percy Cox, on behalf of the British Government and by the Prime Minister, 'Abdul Muhsin Beg al Sa'dun, on the part of the 'Iraq. The official announcement of its conclusion was made on 3rd May, the day before Sir Percy Cox took ship from Mohammerah. King Faisal's message to his people appeared on 5th May and the farewell message from Sir Percy Cox was telegraphed from Basra and published on 6th May.

The withdrawal from 'Iraq of one who from the outbreak of the war with Turkey had followed, and for the greater part of nine years had guided, the fortunes of the country, was the occasion of spontaneous demonstrations of affection and regret. More significant than official banquets and municipal presentations were the simple entertainments offered by private persons who had learnt during the years of his residence in the country to count on his personal friendship, and to rely on the firm hand which had supported the State. His name, which even during the first years. in Basra had passed into a household word, will ever be associated with the birth of the 'Iraq Kingdom under the sheltering care of the Government which he represented and served.

Effect of the Protocol.

The purpose of the protocol was to cut down the period of the treaty between Great Britain and 'Iraq from twenty years to four. It is true that the more far-sighted people feared that the period was too short to enable 'Iraq to stand upon her own feet, and that the so-called pro-British sections of the population, especially some of the Euphrates tribes, the inhabitants of Basra and the Assyrians of Mosul, professed to regard this decision as a betrayal

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of their interests. But the politicians of Baghdad and Mosul, whose influence upon the country people is far more powerful than is generally admitted, welcomed it with great enthusiasm, and even King Faisal and his Ministers, while expressing constant gratitude for the support and favours received in the past, were undisguisedly delighted that a near term had been put to authoritative control by Great Britain of their affairs. The way was now cleared for genuine co-operation between the British and 'Iraqi officials, and it only remained to convince the people that Great Britain was prepared to follow a policy not merely of abstention from undue interference, but also of active support and friendship.

Steps taken to counter the Turkish Threat.

The next step was the restoration of general confidence in face of the threat implied by the concentration of Turkish troops on the northern frontier. For this purpose a force, composed partly of British and partly of 'Iraq troops had moved up to Mosul in January, 1923, as related in the previous annual report ; His Highness the Amir Zaid, brother of King Faisal, had taken up his residence there and had superintended the formation of a force of Arab irregulars. This demonstration, combined with the firm stand taken up by the British representative at Lausanne against Turkish pretensions, had had an immediate effect over the whole country, and telegrams and addresses had poured in from all parts expressing the determination of the people to resist any Turkish encroachment. The military preparations served their purpose and the threatening movements of Turkish troops near the northern frontier ceased, but Turkish irregulars remained at Ruwandiz and the capture of their commander's correspondence revealed immediate plans for a Kurdish rising with the co-operation of Shaikh Mahmud of Sulaimaniya. To forestall such a combination, Shaikh Mahmud's headquarters had been bombed from the air and he had taken to the mountains. It was now time to complete the pacification of the frontier by the re-occupation of Ruwandiz. Two columns of troops advanced on the town which the Turkish irregulars and their leader, Euz Demir, evacuated without fighting on 22nd April, 1923, two days before the second conference of Lausanne began its sittings.

Effect on Mosul.

In the north, where the population, intimidated by the presence of Turkish forces near the frontier, had shown a natural tendency to keep a foot in both camps, this series of events solved what difficulties had lain in the path of the Government in the matter of holding elections. On 21st May, King Faisal paid a state visit of three days to Mosul, where the Amir Zaid was still in residence. His Majesty was received, as on former occasions, with a welcome of the most loyal character; the town was

decorated by day and illuminated by night and from all sides he was given assurance of the determination of the inhabitants to hold to their union with the 'Iraq. At a farewell banquet given to him by the notables, His Majesty, in a speech of great eloquence, thanked them for their devotion to the throne and, while expressing his hope that the Arabs might live in friendly neighbourship with the Turks, he vigorously denied the claims of the latter to any part of 'Iraq territory. He went on to urge the necessity for summoning the Constituent Assembly, and he ended with the expression of his thanks to Great Britain for the help extended to the Arab State.

Re-Issue of the Fatwahs Condemning Elections.

So favourably had His Majesty been impressed by the spirit of the Northern Division that on his return to Baghdad he gave it as his opinion that elections could be held there at once with every hope of success. The next step was to put an end to the agitation of the reactionary Shi'ah divines. The mujtahids reissued early in June their decree forbidding participation in the election of the Constituent Assembly and the King found himself unable to induce either the 'ulama or the Shi'ah notables of the middle Euphrates to pledge their assistance to Government. That the attitude of the Shi'ah divines was closely linked with Turkish propaganda was abundantly proved by a fatwah, which had been posted in the mosque of Kadhimain on 12th April, bearing the signatures of three principal mujtahids, Mirza Husain al Nayini, Shaikh Hasan al Ispahani and Shaikh Mahdi al Khalisi. prohibited the defence of 'Iraq against the Turks, but it fell unheard in the reverberation of the Ruwandiz operations.

It

The policy of the 'ulama was no doubt directed to an object no different from that which they had ever had in view in Turkish times. A strong central government is abhorrent to a priesthood whose ambition it is to establish their authority as final in temporal as well as in spiritual affairs. Persians by birth and nationality, though resident in 'Iraq, they regard the subservience of the civil arm to the religious leaders in their native country as the ideal to be aimed at in the land of their adoption. With intent to embarrass the 'Iraq Government, envenomed reports were put about by their followers. On the one hand it was hinted that the 'ulama wished to eliminate the King in favour of a republic, or even of a return to direct British control; on the other it was indignantly whispered that the country was still groaning under martial law and that the freedom necessary for the holding of elections was denied. Preposterous as the latter statement was, it was so frequently the subject of subtle insinuations in the vernacular press that the High Commissioner found himself constrained to issue an official dementi, pointing out that at no time since the establishment of the provisional national government, in November, 1920, had any form of martial law prevailed

in 'Iraq, that courts constituted by law had administered the law of the land without interference from, or subjection to, the military authorities, and that the ordinary course of civil administration had never suffered interruption.

King Faisal's Visit to Southern 'Iraq.

On 18th June, His Majesty the King left Baghdad to tour the southern Divisions. He proceeded to Basra by the Tigris, stopping at Kut and at 'Amara. Everywhere he was received with enthusiasm, and at Basra the demonstrations of welcome. were truly splendid. He returned by Nasiriya, Diwaniya and Hilla, and was warmly greeted in all places. On every occasion, public and private, he represented to his subjects the danger of further delay in carrying out elections. He also directed his efforts to obliterating from the mind of the tribesmen the impression that the present 'Iraq Government was a government of effendis, hostile to tribal interests, and he paid special attention to the importance of maintaining the existing system of deciding tribal disputes by tribal arbitration. He returned to Baghdad on 29th June.

During his absence the anticipated crisis had been reached and safely weathered.

Banishment of Shaikh Mahdi al Khalisi.

On 21st June, a young saiyid, nephew of Shaikh Mahdi al Khalisi, the notorious mujtahid of Kadhimain, was arrested while attempting to post a copy of the latest anti-election fatwah on the door of the Kadhimain mosque. Thereupon, a small crowd gathered and endeavoured to secure his release by force; sufficient resistance was offered to necessitate the despatch of other constables to the assistance of those who had made the arrest before the saiyid could be taken to the police station. While he was being examined there, a report was received that a son of Shaikh Mahdi had attempted to post on the mosque door another copy of the fatwah, and that the police who tried to arrest him had at his instigation been assaulted by the populace and severely handled. The Assistant Commandant of Police, an Arab officer, then took out a body of constables and dispersed the crowd which had assembled in and round the mosque. Later, the two sons of Shaikh Mahdi were arrested, together with another saiyid who had played a prominent part in the incident. On 23rd June, Shaikh Mahdi directed that the bazaar in Baghdad should be closed as a protest against the arrest of his sons, but the order was obeyed by a few shopkeepers only and no demonstrations took place.

Although no serious breach of the peace had occurred, the incident, falling as it did while the King was actually engaged in an election campaign in the provinces, brought the authority of Government into definite and open conflict with the influence of