Supreme Court of the United States. BLANCO V. HUBBARD, UNITED STATES MARSHAL FOR PORTO RICO. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico. (220 U. S., 233.) No 111. Argued March 17, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911. SYLLABUS. A demurrer in this case having been sustained, and the bill which sought to enjoin the defendant sheriff from selling under execution issued in Perez v. Fernandez, ante, p. 681, dismissed, on the same grounds on which the same court refused to allow defendants in that suit, who were grantors of the plaintiffs in th s suit, to come in and defend, and this court having reversed the judgment in Perez v. Fernandez, and it appearing that the two cases were so inseparably united in the mind of the court below that the error in the one controlled its action in the other, held that the judgment in this case be also reversed. Opinion by White, C. J. No dissenting opinion. The decree is therefore reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. This record involves the bill filed by Perfecto Blanco in the lower court to enjoin the sale of property under execution in the case of Perez v. Fernandez. It concerns, therefore, the proceedings in the equity cause and the right to reopen the decree entered in the same. Supreme Court of the United States. ENRIQUEZ v. GO-TIONGCO. Appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. No. 95. Argued March 13, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911. SYLLABUS. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands having held that on the death of the wife the husband, if surviving, is entitled to settle the affairs of the community, and on his subsequent death his executor is the proper administrator of the same; and on the facts as found by both courts below, held that in this case the community estate is liable for services rendered with knowledge and consent of all parties in interest in connection with sale of property belonging to it after both husband and wife had died, and that the proper method of collection was by suit against the husband's representative in his capacities of excutor and administrator. Opinion by Holmes, J. No dissenting opinion. This is an appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands, affirming the judgment of the court of first instance for the city of Manila, which dismissed this suit. The action was brought to set aside a judgment sale of land in Manila, known as the Old Theatre, formerly the community property of Antonio Enriquez and his wife, Ciriaca Villanueva. The plaintiffs and appellants are the administrators of the estate of Antonio, including the interest of Ciriaca Villanueva, and all of the heirs of the two, except Francisco Enriquez, one of the defendants. The other defendants now before the court are the purchaser at the sale and a subsequent purchaser from him. Ciriaca Villanueva died intestate in 1882. Thereafter her husband administered the community property until his death in 1884. By a codicil to his will, as stated by the supreme court, he provided "that the inventory, valuation, and partition of this estate be made extrajudicially, and by virtue of the power which the law grants him he forbids any judicial interference in the settlement thereof, conferring upon his executors the necessary authority therefor, without any restriction whatever, and extending their term of office for such period as may be required for this purpose. The defendant, Francisco Enriquez, was the executor, and in April, 1886, was appointed the general administrator of the estate, including the interest of Ciriaca Villanueva, with directions to proceed in accordance with the codicil, which he did until March, 1901, except for a short time in May, 1900. There were no testamentary or other proceedings in court, and could not be, by Spanish law, in view of the codicil, but it lay with Francisco Enriquez to carry out the trust. There were differences among the heirs, and they made an agreement in August, 1897, for an extrajudicial partition, subject to the provisions of the will, in which José Moreno Lacalle was to act as an arbitrator. The partition fell through, but Lacalle rendered services to the two estates, as both courts have found, and on October 23, 1897, it was agreed by Francisco Enriquez, the defendant, and Rafael Enriquez, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the land question should be sold, for the purpose, among others, of paying Lacalle. No sale was made, however, and in 1898 Lacalle sued Francisco Enriquez as executor and administrator, as aforesaid. The defendant admitted the debt, stated that he had no money, and pointed out this land for execution. On September 10, 1899, the land was sold for more than the appraised value to the defendant Go-Tiongco, who bought in good faith, and without notice of any claim unless notice is implied by law. Supreme Court of the United States. GAVIERES v. UNITED STATES. Error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. No. 102. Submitted March 13, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911. SYLLABUS. Protection against double jeopardy was by section 5 of the act of July 1, 1902 (c. 1369, 32 Stat., 691), carried to the Philippine Islands in the sense and in the meaning which it had obtained under the Constitution and laws of the United States. (Kepner v. United States, 195, U. S., 100.) The protection intended and specifically given is against second jeopardy for the same offense, and where separate offenses arise from the same transaction the protection does not apply. A single act may be an offense against two statutes, and if each statute requires proof of an additional fact which the other does not, an acquittal or conviction under either statute does not exempt the defendant from prosecution or conviction under the other. (Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U. S., 367.) In this case, held, that one convicted and punished under an ordinance prohibiting drunkenness and rude and boisterous language was not put in second jeopardy by being subsequently tried under another ordinance for insulting a public officer although the latter charge was based on the same conduct and language as the former. They were separate offenses and required separate proof to convict. (Grafton v. United States, 206 U. S., 333, distinguished.) Opinion by Day, J. Harlan, J., dissenting. Judgment of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands affirmed. The facts involve the construction of the provisions in the Philippine Island act of July 1, 1902, as to second jeopardy. This case presents the single question whether the plaintiff in error, by reason of the proceedings, hereinafter stated, has been twice in jeopardy for the same offense. Gavieres, plaintiff in error, was charged, convicted, and sentenced in the court of first instance of the city of Manila, P. I., of a violation of article 257 of the Penal Code of the Philippine Islands, which provides: "The penalty of arresto mayor shall also be imposed on those who outrage, insult, or threaten, by deed or word, public officials or agents of the authorities, in their presence, or in a writing addressed to them." Gavieres was charged under this article with the crime of calumniating, outraging, and insulting a public official in the exercise of his office by word of mouth and in his presence. Upon conviction he was sentenced to four months of arresto mayor and to pay the cost of the prosecution. He had been previously convicted, because of the same words and conduct, under article 28, paragraph 2, of the ordinance of the city of Manila, which provides: 'No person shall be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any public place open to public view; or be drunk or intoxicated or behave in a drunken, boisterous, rude, or indecent manner in any place or premises to the annoyance of another person." Section 5 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902 (32 Stat., c. 1369, 691), provides: "No person, for the same offense, shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment." In the case at bar the offense of insult to a public official, covered by the section of the Philippine code, was not within the terms of the offense or prosecution under the ordinance. While it is true that the conduct of the accused was one and the same, two offenses resulted, each of which had an element not embraced in the other. The Supreme Court of the United States. VILAS v. CITY OF MANILA. TRIGAS V. SAME. AGUADO v. SAME. Error to and appeals from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. (220 U. S., 345.) Nos. 53, 54, 207. Argued February 24, 27, 1911. Decided April 3, 1911. SYLLABUS. Even if there is no remedy adequate to the collection of a claim against a governmental subdivision when reduced to judgment, a plaintiff having a valid claim is entitled to maintain an action thereon and reduce it to judgment. Where the case turned below on the consequence of a change in sovereignty by reason of the cession of the Philippine Islands, the construction of the treaty with Spain of 1898 is involved, and this court has jurisdiction of an appeal from the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands under section 10 of the act of July 1, 1902 (c. 1369, 32 Stat., 691, 695). While military occupation or territorial cession may work a suspension of the governmental functions of municipal corporations, such occupation or cession does not result in their dissolution. While there is a total abrogation of the former political relations of inhabitants of ceded territory and an abrogation of laws in conflict with the political character of the substituted sovereign, the great body of municipal law regulating private and domestic rights continues in force until abrogated or changed by the new ruler. Although the United States might have extinguished every municipality in the territory ceded by Spain under the treaty of 1898, it will not, in view of the practice of nations to the contrary, be presumed to have done so. The legal entity of the city of Manila survived both its military occupation by, and its cession to, the United States; and, as in law, the present city as the successor of the former city, is entitled to the property rights of its predecessor, it is also subject to its liabilities. The cession in the treaty of 1898 of all the public property of Spain in the Philippine Islands did not include property belonging to municipalities, and the agreement against impairment of property and private property rights in that treaty applied to the property of municipalities and claims against municipalities. One supplying goods to a municipality does so, in the absence of specific provision, on its general faith and credit, and not as against special funds in its possession; and even if such goods are supplied for a purpose for which the special funds are held no specific lien is created thereon. Opinion by Lurton, J. No dissenting opinion. Our conclusion is that the decree in the Aguado case must be reversed and the case remanded, with direction to render judgment and such other relief as may seem in conformity with law. The judgments in the Trigas and Vilas cases will be reversed and the cases remanded with direction to overrule the respective demurrers and for such other action as may be consistent with law and consistent with this opinion. The facts involve the liability of the present city of Manila in the Philippine Islands for claims against the city of Manila as it existed prior to the cession under the treaty of 1898. The plaintiffs in error, who were plaintiffs below, are creditors of the city of Manila as it existed before the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States by the treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898. Upon the theory that the city under its present charter from the Government of the Philippine Islands is the same juristic person and liable upon the obligations of the old city, these actions were brought against it. The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands denied relief, holding that the present municipality is a totally different corporate entity, and in no way liable for the debts of the Spanish municipality. The fundamental question is whether, notwithstanding the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States, followed by a reincorporation of the city, the present municipality is liable for the obligations of the city incurred prior to the cession to the United States. 28872°-S. Doc. 306, 62—2————46 Supreme Court of the United States. DOWDELL V. UNITED STATES. Error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands. No. 131. Argued April 20, 1911. Decided May 15, 1911. SYLLABUS. Under section 5 of the act of July 1, 1902 (c. 1369, 32 Stat., 691), unless action taken by the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to supply omissions in the record violates the Constitution or a statute of the United States, this court can not disturb the judgment. There is no valid objection based on the Constitution of the United States to the practice of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands adopted in this case for determining in what form it will accept the record of the court below. The provision in section 5 of the Philippine act of July 1, 1902 (c. 1369, 32 Stat., 691), that in all criminal prosecutions the accused shall meet the witnesses face to face is substantially the provision of the sixth amendment; is intended thereby that the charge shall be proved only by such witnesses as meet the accused at the trial face to face and give him an opportunity for cross-examination. It prevents conviction by ex parte affidavits. The "face to face" provision of the Philippine bill of rights does not prevent the judge and clerk of the trial court from certifying as additional record to the appellate court what transpired on the trial of one convicted of a crime without the accused being present when the order was made. Although due process of law requires the accused to be present at every stage of the trial, it does not require accused to be present in an appellate court where he is represented by counsel and where the only function of the court is to determine whether there was prejudicial error below. Objections as to form and verification of pleading must be taken by accused before pleading general issue. The bill of rights of the Philippine Islands does not require convictions to be based on indictment; nor does due process of law require presentment of an indictment. (Hurtado v. California, 110 U. S., 516.) In the absence of legislation by Congress, there is no right in the Philippine Islands to require trial by jury in criminal cases. (Dorr v. United States, 195 U. S., 138.) 11 Philippine Islands, 4, affirmed. Opinion by Day, J. Harlan, J., dissenting. Affirmed. This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands to review a proceeding in which the plaintiffs in error, Louis A. Dowdell and Wilson W. Harn, together with one Charles H. MacIlvaine, were convicted in the court of first instance of the Philippine Islands upon an amended complaint which charged that the three persons named, as inspectors and lieutenants of the Philippine Constabulary, in the Province of Samar, Philippine Islands, conspired together to abstract, steal, and convert to their own use certain public funds in the custody and control of Dowdell as supply officer, and guarded by Harn as officer of the day; that in pursuance of the conspiracy the three defendants, with the intent and purpose of stealing and converting the same to their own use, unlawfully, feloniously, and willfully removed the same from the office of the Philippine Constabulary to the resi-· dence of the said Harn in Catbalogan in said province, and did there conceal the same, and during the night, in pursuance of said conspiracy, and for the purpose of concealing the evidence of their crime and of deceiving their superior officers concerning the disappearance |