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that such a peace would be nothing more than an armed truce. The answer to this objection, which I felt as strongly as any one, is that war begets hostilities, animosities, and violence, while a state of peace produces forbearance, conciliation, and mutual concession. The league of Austria with England and France to resist aggression upon Turkey would have been a powerful restraint upon any monarch less ambitious of military glory than Charles XII. or Napoleon. After all, the security of the Porte is not with England a vital question like the independence of Belgium or of Portugal. It is a European object, to attain which Great Britain is bound to contribute her full share, but no more. To call upon this country to carry on war 3,000 miles off, at an immense cost, and with a yearly drain of her best blood, would be on the part of her Government a lavish waste of her resources and an improvident application of her mighty powers. With these views, therefore, I stated to Count Buol that I should be prepared to recommend to my Government the acceptance of the Austrian proposals to send her alternative to Petersburg, and make the continuance of an Austrian mission at that Court contingent upon its favourable reception. But I told him at the same time that I did not expect my Government would approve of the plan proposed.

It is evident from this memorandum that, while Lord John thought the new proposal was of inferior convenience to the original project for limitation, he concluded that, with Austrian aid, it might afford adequate security for the integrity of Turkey. Austria, in his judgment, held the key of the situation ; and he remained consistent in his desire—whether peace or war prevailed—to bring Austria into active co-operation with the allies. Thus thinking, he forwarded to Lord Clarendon the heads of the new proposal, and added—

Should the Government of her Majesty, in concert with that of France, be of opinion that such a peace can be accepted, they will instruct Lord Westmorland accordingly. If not, I hope to be allowed to be heard personally before a final decision is made.

And leaving Vienna on the 24th, he set out for London.
Two days before he started, M. Drouyn de Lhuys wrote—

Particulière] Vienne : le 22 April, 1855. 8 heures du soir. My dear Lord John, Je reçois votre billet daté d'aujourd'hui 4 heures 4o, et je vous en remercie.

Je vous envoie la rédaction du projet dont nous avons parléce matin. Ainsi que nous en étions convenus, j'ai vu le Comte Buol : il gouta fort ce projet que je lui ai remis confidentiellement, et il croit que l'Empereur François Joseph y donnera son assentiment. Comme Plénipotentiaire et d'après mes instructions actuelles, je ne puis nile proposer, ni l'accepter, nile discuter officiellement, mais je puis le recommander a ma Cour, et c'est ce que je vais faire. Je me place au méme point de vue que vous, et je dis, “If Russia is a standing danger, an alliance with Austria must be a standing guarantee.’—Yours very sincerely, DROUYN DE LHUYs. Vienna: April 24, 1855. Dear Lord John, Monsieur Drouyn de Lhuys has just been with me. He has received an answer from his Government to the messages of the day before yesterday, which is against his project. He is now more convinced than he was before of the value of this project, and he consequently leaves Vienna to-morrow morning for Paris that he may personally support it. He will try to see you on his journey : but he earnestly requests you will telegraph to London your own views, desiring that, if they make a favourable impression on our Government, a telegraph to that effect may be sent to the French Government so as to meet him (D. de Lhuys) on his arrival at Paris. He is anxious you should reach London as early as possible in order to give your personal support to his project with your colleagues. I send the messenger Haviland with this letter to catch you at Leipzig, and he will then go straight on to London, so that you may send by him any communication which you wish should reach London before yourself....—Believe me, dear Lord John, yours most sincerely, WESTMORLAND.

Lord John arrived in London on Sunday, April 29. His own memorandum will supply the continuation to the story.

I found that neither Lord Palmerston nor Lord Clarendon considered the plan of counterpoise, together with the defensive treaty of alliance between France, Great Britain, and Austria, would furnish a sufficient security for the independence and integrity of Turkey. . . . The opinion of the Emperor of the French, accepting the principle of the Austrian proposal, but not the details," was communicated to * Lord John, in this respect, understated his case. The Empercrimodified

the details of the arrangement, but agreed to its details as modified. Here is

M. Drouyn de Lhuys's account:

Particulière et considentielle]
Mon cher Co-Plénipotentiaire, Je maudirais l’interruption des conférences, si

elle me privait du droit et du plaisir de m'entretenir directement avec vous. J'ai eu ce matin avec l’Empereur une conversation de trois heures. Voici une rédaction modifiée que j'ai faite sous ses yeux et qui a son entière approbation. Sous cette forme Sa Majesté est prête à accepter l'arrangement. Cette nouvelle forme conserve toutes les garanties officielles, évite la désagréable mention du statu quo ante bellum, et consacre l'alliance perpetuelle de l'Autriche, pour défendre la Turquie contre les aggressions par terre ou par mer. Je ne prévois pas d'ailleurs d'objection sérieuse de la part de l'Autriche, dont cette rédaction ménage les scrupules. Je suis plus que jamais dans les idées que je vous exprimais à Vienne, et dans lesquelles je vous voyais vous-même me marquer la voie. Je compte avec une ferme confiance sur votre puissante action pour les faire prévaloir. Créer à l'ambition russe un éternel ennemi, n'est-ce donc rien !—Yours very sincerely, DROUYN DE LHUYs, Paris : 1ère Mai, 1855.

LordClarendon by Count Walewksiand tome by M. Drouyn de Lhuys. Lord Palmerston, however, thought that further reference should be made to the Emperor for his final views on the proposal before us. What happened in the interval which then ensued I am not able precisely to say." I know that Lord Cowley used his utmost efforts to induce the Emperor not to adopt the advice of his Minister. It is said that Lord Palmerston employed very strong language through Count Walewski to the same purpose. What I know is that on Friday morning I heard from Count Walewski the contents of a telegraphic despatch from M. Drouyn de Lhuys informing the Ambassador that the Emperor refused to accept the Austrian propositions, and recurred to the conditions communicated to Russia at the Conferences of Vienna.

M. Drouyn de Lhuys at once tendered his resignation to the Emperor, and thus announced it to Lord John :

My dear Lord John,—Ce n'est plus comme votre collègue que je reçois la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'écrire hier, but as a private individual, car j'ai donné ce matin ma démission à l'Empereur. J'espère que vous me permettrez, sous ce nouveau titre, de continuer à vous exprimer quelque fois mes sentimens de haute considération et d'attachement sincère.

DROUYN DE LHUYs. Paris : 5 Mai, 1855.

Lord John thereupon wrote to Lord Clarendon—

J'envoie à Walewski cette nouvelle rédaction. Je vous laisse juger de la mesure dans laquelle vous croirez convenable de parler de la conmmunication confidentielle que je vous fais.

Lord John's answer to this letter has been published by Mr. Kinglake in Hist. of Crimean JVar, vol. viii. p. 345.

" The curious on this point may satisfy their curiosity by referring to Mr. Kinglake's account, Hist. of Crimean War, vol. viii. p. 346, seq.

Pembroke Lodge : May 6, 1855. My dear Clarendon, I was at Panmure's when your box arrived here, and did not get back till past eight. I am very much concerned at the removal or resignation of Drouyn. I cannot separate myself from him ; and, having taken at Vienna the same view which he did, his resignation entails mine. I am very sorry for this, and wished to avoid it. But I have in some measure got Drouyn into this scrape, for at first he was disposed to advise the Emperor to insist on a limitation of ships, and I induced him not to give any advice at all to the Emperor. Afterwards we agreed very much ; and, if he had stayed in office there, I might have gulped, though with difficulty, the rejection of my advice here. However, I shall wait till Colloredo has made a definite proposal, and then make the opinion I shall give upon it in the Cabinet a vital question with me. It is painful to me to leave a second Cabinet, and will injure my reputation—perhaps irretrievably. But I see no other course. Do as you please about communicating to Palmerston what I have written. I fear I must leave to you and Hammond to judge of the papers to be given. . . . But I hope you will not tie your hands or those of the Government by giving arguments against what the nation may ultimately accept. I hold that a simple provision, by which the Sultan would reserve the power to admit the vessels of powers not having establishments in the Black Sea, through the Straits at his own pleasure at all times, . . . and a general treaty of European alliance to defend Turkey against Russia, would be a good security for peace. If the Emperor of the French were to declare that he could not accept such a peace, of course we must stick by him, but that does not prevent our declaring to him our opinion. Walewski spoke to me very strongly at the Palace in favour of the Austrian plan, but I suppose he has now made up his mind against it.-I remain, yours truly,


Lord Clarendon replied—

G[rosvenor) C[rescent] : May 7, 1855. My dear Lord John, . . . I am very sorry you did not come in just now, as I wanted most particularly to see you. I now write this earnestly to entreat that you will say nothing to anybody at present about your intended resignation. The public interests and your own position are so involved in the question, and so much harm of every kind may be done by a hasty decision, however honourable and high-minded the motives may be, that I do beg of you well to weigh as the points of the case ; and let me frankly add that you will not act with fairness, and as I am sure you must wish to act, towards your

colleagues, if you do not hear what some of them may have to say.

As you allowed me to do as I pleased about informing Palmerston, I did not think it right to leave him in the dark upon a matter which seems to me of vital importance. I need not tell you that your intention causes him the deepest regret, and he feels as I do how essential it is that nothing should be known of it at present. We are not even in possession of the facts that led to Drouyn's resignation.—Yours sincerely, CLARENDON.

Moved by this appeal, and by Lord Palmerston's personal entreaties, thrice repeated, Lord John withdrew his resignation. Its withdrawal, however convenient it may have seemed to the Government at the time, was one of the most unfortunate circumstances in Lord John's political career. It directly led to misunderstandings and to obloquy, such as few public men

have ever encountered. It was obvious, in fact, that Lord John could only continue in the Cabinet by surrendering his own opinions. As he himself wrote— I was ready to incur the responsibility of advising the acceptance of the terms proposed in conjunction with the French Government. But I was not prepared to advise that we should depart from or even hazard our alliance with France for the chance of a peace on terms which I could not consider entirely satisfactory. . . . Moreover, it was impossible for me to know the full weight of the motives which might have swayed the Emperor. The immediate result of our acceptance of the Austrian terms might have been the instant acquiescence of Russia, and the consequent evacuation of the Crimea. How would the French army have borne a retreat from before Sebastopol, relinquishing a siege which had cost so much blood and so much suffering? Might not the discontent of the army have disturbed the internal tranquillity of France, and even menaced the throne of the Emperor? The Emperor of the French had been to us the most faithful ally who had ever wielded the sceptre or ruled the destinies of France. Was it possible for the English Government to leave the Emperor of the French to fight unaided the battle of Europe, or to force him to join us in a peace which would have sunk his reputation with his army and his people? This consideration struck me with such conviction that I ceased at once from urging Lord Palmerston and Lord Clarendon or the Cabinet to accept the Austrian terms. Lord Clarendon's reply rejecting those conditions was agreed to and despatched.

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