of territory. From a French point of view there was much in the Emperor's contention. When, indeed, he was embarking on the war, M. Thiers had said of him, 'Ce fou va établir une autre Prusse au-delà des Alpes;' and in the spring of the year 1860 the new Prussia was firmly organised. Napoleon, therefore, again began to talk of the necessity of annexation; or, as he put it on the 1st of March to his Chambers, 'de réclamer les versants Français des montagnes.' Twenty years later he would probably have used another phrase, and dwelt on the need of a 'scientific frontier' for France. The Emperor's intention created a ferment in this country; and Lord John, writing to Sir James Hudson on the last day of January, said—

What presses at this moment is Savoy. . . . Our position here will be seriously damaged, and Austria will rally all Germany to her side, if such a beginning of natural frontiers is made. I hope Cavour is under no engagement. If Venetia was the condition of any such engagement, that engagement has not been fulfilled on the part of France. If the King sells his inheritance of Savoy to obtain Tuscany, he will be disgraced in the eyes of Europe, and we shall not hesitate to affix to his conduct the fitting epithets.

Sir James Hudson replied

With regard to Savoy I thought it best to read your despatches to Cavour. I told him I knew the King had received on the 1st inst. a private letter from Louis Napoleon begging him not to thwart the Savoyards in their desire for annexation to France in case that desire existed. I also read to him the passage in your private letter on that matter. Cavour said emphatically, 'I declare to you that at this moment no engagement exists between us and France for the cession of Savoy. If the Savoyards, by a great numerical majority, petition Parliament for separation, the question will be treated parliamentarily. But I tell you frankly that the best way to meet this question is openly and frankly, and in no other way will I ever consent to meet it. I agree with Lord John,' said he, 'that the King would be disgraced were he to céder, troquer, ou vendre la Savoie.'

It was not difficult to detect the true meaning of these words. When great Ministers talk of ceding provinces whose inhabitants petition, by numerical majorities, for separation, the cession itself is not distant. On the 1st of March the

Emperor announced the 'revendication d'une territoire' to his Chambers. On the 25th of March the treaty for the annexation of Savoy and Nice to France was signed.

Lord John vigorously protested against this policy When his protest fell unheeded he declared that the districts of Chablais and Faucigny, which had been neutralised by the Treaty of Vienna, should be added to Switzerland. But his protest, from its very nature, was unavailing. For in this matter England stood alone. Count Cavour almost openly defended the annexation, on the ground that it made Napoleon a party to the arrangement by which Piedmont had been raised to the status of an Italian power. Austria declared that she could see no distinction between the cession of Tuscany to Piedmont, and that of Savoy to France. Russia regarded it as an international transaction which did not affect the balance of power; and in which she had therefore no concern. Prussia declined to do anything; and, as the people themselves voted in favour of annexation, Lord John had no alternative but to submit to a redistribution of territory which it was impossible for him to avert. In submitting, however, to the arrangement, Lord John did not attempt to conceal the feelings with which he regarded it. He said. publicly in the House of Commons

It is obvious that the course he [the Emperor] has taken has already produced a great deal of distrust . . . I believe it will produce great distrust all over Europe. . . . Sir, my opinion, as I declared it in July and January, I have no objection to repeat, that such an act as the annexation of Savoy will lead a nation so warlike as the French to call upon its Government from time to time to commit other acts of aggression; and therefore I do feel that, however we may wish to live on the most friendly terms with the French Government . . . we ought not to keep ourselves apart from the other nations of Europe, but that . . . we should be ready to act with others and to declare . . . that the powers of Europe, if they wish to maintain peace, must respect each other's rights, must respect each other's limits, and above all restore, and not disturb, that commercial confidence which is the result of peace, which tends to peace, and which ultimately forms the happiness of nations.

Lord John was not unaware of the effect which his lan

guage was likely to produce. Writing immediately to Lord Cowley, he said

March 26, 1860.

My dear Cowley,-I have just spoken a speech which may rebound in France. I hope the effect may be to rescue Chablais and Faucigny. We cannot see Swiss independence threatened without emotion. Yours, J. RUSSELL.

And the sensation was certainly great. Count Persigny, the French Ambassador, who was in the House at the time, exclaimed, 'Quel langage! Faut-il entendre de pareilles choses contre mon maître?' France, indeed, for the moment consoled itself with reflecting that Lord John had spoken without preparation, and without consulting his colleagues. Lord Palmerston soon made it plain that, if the Foreign Secretary had spoken without authority, the Prime Minister shared his opinions. General Flahault, as he was about to start for Paris, asked [him] whether he had any message for the Emperor Napoleon. Lord Palmerston answered, "Repeat to your Emperor Lord John Russell's speech, and tell him it expresses my own opinions." "Mais c'est la guerre!" said the peace-loving General. Lord Palmerston shrugged his shoulders and replied, "Eh bien! si c'est la guerre c'est la guerre. Que voulez-vous? Nous sommes préparés, et nous l'attendons de pied ferme." Such language was too late to prevent the annexation of Savoy and Nice; but such language, followed up as it was afterwards, checked the disposition to project further annexations.1

One chance, indeed, of obtaining the combined resistance of Europe to the Emperor Napoleon's policy still remained. Late in April Count Rechberg authorised Count Apponyi to assure Lord John confidentially that, though Austria could not support the proposals of England respecting Savoy, she considered the safety of Europe to depend on the faithful observance of treaties; and that she was ready to enter into an arrangement with Great Britain to resist all further encroach

1 Lord Malmesbury's Memoirs of an ex-Minister, p. 518; Reminiscences of Count Vitzthum, ii. 77. But cf. Lord Palmerston's account in Ashley's Palmerston, ii. 392.

VOL. II.

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ments. But the proposal only brought out the wide difference of opinion between Count Rechberg and Lord John: for Lord John at once assured Count Apponyi that, though they might agree as to the necessity of defending Belgium, or of defending Germany,

in Italy the question of territorial circumscription is mixed up with questions of internal government, . . . and neither the Government, nor the Parliament, nor the people of Great Britain would ever sanction a war to support the authority of the King of the Two Sicilies against the just discontent of his subjects.

This declaration would have been important at any time; it derived additional significance from the condition of Southern Italy. Insurrection had again broken out in Sicily; and, on the 6th of May, General Garibaldi, with a few hundred men, embarked on two vessels at Genoa, and sailed to Sicily to aid the insurgents. Lord John saw the new movement without surprise.. Almost from the first moment of entering upon office, he had warned the Neapolitan Government of the consequences of misrule. Thus he wrote on the 1st of July, 1859, to his brother-in-law, Mr. Elliot, the British Minister at Naples

You will press strongly on the Minister the necessity for abolishing as soon as possible the despotism of the police. Men may differ about the merits of representative institutions, but there can be no difference of opinion among enlightened men about the necessity of a due, impartial, and speedy administration of justice.

And again on the 7th of July, 1859:—

Her Majesty's Government concur in the opinion you express of the importance of the King's deciding at once to adopt a liberal system of internal policy as the only chance of averting a political convulsion and of maintaining himself and his dynasty on the throne. . . . It appears to her Majesty's Government that the King has now to choose between the ruin of his evil counsellors and his own. If he supports and upholds them, and places himself under their guidance, it requires not much foresight to predict that the Bourbon dynasty will cease to reign at Naples, by whatever combination— Royal or Republican-it may be replaced.

But, if Lord John saw the new revolution without surprise,

he viewed it with some regret. He thought that both Italy and Sardinia required rest, and he feared that any fresh addition to the territory of Piedmont would be made an excuse for fresh annexations by France. He consequently urged on Count Cavour a policy of patience, and begged him to sanction no act of aggression on either Naples or Austria. However wise such advice may have been when it was originally given, the progress of events soon made it inapplicable. The mere presence of General Garibaldi in Sicily proved sufficient to effect the expulsion of the Bourbon dynasty. Even religion proved incapable of supporting the King.

The other day [so Mr. Odo Russell wrote to his uncle on June 7] the young King of Naples was seized with such a panic that he telegraphed five times in twenty-four hours for the Pope's blessing. Cardinal Antonelli, through whom the application had to be made, telegraphed the three last blessings without reference to his Holiness, saying that he was duly authorised to do so. The convents are awfully scandalised at this proceeding.

And a time had come when the Bourbon dynasty required stronger support than it could derive from an old man's blessings sent by telegraph with or without his knowledge. By the beginning of July, the Sicilians had evidently made up their minds for annexation to Piedmont, and before the end of the month the King had ordered his army to evacuate the whole island. So striking a spectacle filled men's minds with apprehension. It was feared that the work which had begun in Sicily might be extended to Naples; that Southern Italy, freed from the Bourbons, might join with Piedmont in attacking Venetia. Nor was this all. His brother-in-law, Mr. Elliot, forwarded Lord John from Naples a document, purporting to be a treaty between France and Sardinia, under which France agreed to the annexation of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies and the Marches of Umbria to Piedmont, on condition of the cession of Liguria and the island of Sardinia to France. Though Lord John professed to believe that the document was a forgery, the rumour of such an arrangement had reached him from so many quarters that he used it as a pretext for declaring to Lord Cowley