Prussia will endeavour to prevent the execution.' It was certain that Austria and Germany would follow Prussia's example. Denmark, on the contrary, showed little readiness to fall in with Lord Russell's suggestion. She declared, indeed, that she would accept with pleasure the mediation of Great Britain.' But she added

The attitude which the Diet appears inclined to take with regard to the Treaty of London is such that the collective action of all the powers who signed that treaty will perhaps become necessary. Moreover, the King has already accepted the invitation to the congress, in which, according to the opinion of many powers interested, the Danish question will be discussed. The Danish Government must therefore call your Lordship's attention to the advisability in their opinion of reserving this question for the congress, or, if it should not take place, for a special conference of the powers who signed the Treaty of London. But, if there are obstacles to a collective action of these powers, the Danish Government will be happy to accept the mediation of Great Britain.'

While, then, Germany, speaking through Count Bismarck, was willing to accept the mediation of Great Britain, Denmark was only prepared to accept Lord Russell's proposal in the event of the failure of other projects. The same motives which had induced her statesmen to refuse the compromise which had been offered in September 1862, restrained them from accepting the proposed terms. As Lord Russell wrote in 1870

Had this compromise [the arrangement of 1862] been accepted the war might have been prevented, and the integrity of Denmark preserved. Austria and Prussia, in the most conciliatory manner, declared their willingness to accept the terms proposed. Denmark would likewise have accepted them had not a large portion of the English press, including the Times' and the Morning Post,' two powerful organs of public opinion friendly to the Government, inflamed the passions of the Danes, and induced them to think that they would be defended by the arms of England against even the most moderate demands of Germany, and against the well-founded complaints of the oppressed inhabitants of Schleswig. Thus excited, they refused the proposed terms."

1 Sir A. Paget to Earl Russell (telegraphic), November 20, 1863.

2 Speeches and Despatches, ii. 239. Lord Russell said the same thing in the interesting, though little known, essay on The Foreign Policy of England, 1570–

And, while Danish statesmen were refusing the expedient by which Lord Russell hoped to extricate Denmark from her embarrassment, they were simultaneously aggravating, by their own policy, the intensity of the crisis. Before the death of Frederick VII. the Rigsraad deliberately sanctioned a new constitution for Denmark and Schleswig. Except that it made the representation a little more liberal, the new constitution did nothing to remove the objections which Germany was urging to the separation of Holstein from Schleswig, and to the incorporation of Schleswig in Denmark. Yet the new constitution, prepared under Frederick VII., received the assent of Christian IX.; and, though Lord Russell was able to procure the repeal of the ordinance of March, he was unable to obtain the abrogation of the constitution till the German armies, fated to dismember the Danish Kingdom, were actually in motion. Nor was the untimely publication of a new constitution the only circumstance that intensified the crisis. The 1870. The British Government tried in various ways to conduct the lightning and carry off harmlessly the storm which they foresaw. An attempt at conciliation between Germany and Denmark had nearly proved successful. Founded on a concession to Schleswig of full autonomy, and a concert of the four parts of the Kingdom in making provision for extraordinary expenses, this plan obtained the assent of Austria and Prussia, and of such men as M. Quaade, the most calm and judicious of Danish statesmen. Denmark would thus have obtained the integrity of her dominions, which five great powers had declared to be desirable. France was ready to give her assent, and the Germans of Schleswig would have had spiritual ministrations for themselves and competent German teachers for their children. It pleased some English advisers of great influence to meddle in this affair ; they were successful in thwarting the British Government, and in the end, with the professed view, and perhaps the real intention, of helping Denmark, their friendship tended to deprive her of Holstein and Schleswig altogether' (p. 79). And in a manuscript memorandum headed Corrections,' which he left behind him, Lord Russell repeated the same complaint: "The contest between Germany and Denmark gave occasion to many instances of misconstruction. The Danish Government, or some of its members, imagined that England was bound at all events to defend the integrity of the Danish Monarchy. But, although the powers who signed Lord Malmesbury's treaty declared that the integrity of the territories of Denmark concerned the balance of power in Europe, they nowhere declared that its preservation was essential to the balance of power. . . . No course remained open to the Ministers of Great Britain but an endeavour to preserve the integrity of Denmark by conciliatory means. A plan for this purpose was drawn up which obtained the assent of Austria and Prussia. . . . But some very mischievous advisers inflamed the patriotic hopes of the Danish extreme party, and two self-constituted envoys, said to have been gentlemen of the British press, strongly urged the Danish Government to reject the British proposals.'

VOL. II.

6

C C

Prince of Augustenburg revived his claim to the Duchy of Holstein, which it had been the special object of the Treaty of 1852 to annul; and Count Bismarck, notwithstanding the treaty, declared the claim to be good. The embarrassment of a disputed succession, against which it had been the special object of diplomacy to provide, was thus superadded to the difficulties arising from the pretensions of Germany and the refusal of Denmark.

Such being the state of the case, Lord Russell decided on a new step of much significance. With the approval of the Cabinet, he sent Lord Wodehouse, who had been his UnderSecretary at the Foreign Office from 1859 to 1861, on a special mission to Copenhagen, nominally to congratulate the new King on his accession, but in reality to endeavour, in concert with Sir A. Paget, to arrange the dispute. Lord Wodehouse was instructed

The Treaty of 1852 is open to no question, and is clearly a part of the public law of Europe.

It has been contended, indeed, in Germany that some anterior arrangements concluded by the exchange of diplomatic notes between Austria and Prussia on the one hand, and Denmark on the other, in 1851-52, must be read in connection with the treaty. . . . The correctness of this last assertion her Majesty's Government cannot admit. They could not consent to make the validity of a positive and plain treaty depend on the execution of arrangements made at some other time by means of diplomatic despatches. . . .

But when, taking a different ground, the Cabinets of Berlin and of Vienna allege that the Government of the late and of the present King of Denmark have not kept faith with the German powers, and that all the engagements of Denmark towards Germany ought to be faithfully executed, her Majesty's Government declare themselves ready to examine that question fairly and impartially. Let Prussia and Austria prove that Denmark has failed, and does still fail, in her obligations towards them, and in such case her Majesty's Government will use all their influence at Copenhagen to induce the King of Denmark to comply faithfully with all the engagements of his crown.

Lord Russell explained the objects of the mission more concisely in a private note to Lord Wodehouse :

December 2, 1863.

My dear Wodehouse,-I have to propose to you in the name of the Queen a very important special mission. It is in name to con

gratulate the King of Denmark on his accession; but in fact to endeavour with Russia and with France to reconcile Denmark with Austria and Prussia, and if possible prevent a war.

You must be ready to start in a very few days.

I should like to see you to-morrow if possible at the Foreign Office, and you will have an audience of the Queen before you go. Your stay at Copenhagen will not, I think, exceed three weeks.— I remain, &c.,

RUSSELL.

Lord Wodehouse, on arriving at Copenhagen, urged, in concert with the representatives of Russia and France, the repeal of the Constitution of November; and suggested, in accordance with Lord Russell's views, that the King might be saved from the unpopularity of its repeal if the Rigsraad could be induced to take the initiative.

But the Danish Ministry would not give way; and Lord Russell thus announced to Sir A. Paget the consequence of its obstinacy:

P[embroke] L[odge]: December 22, 1863.

My dear Paget,-I don't feel sure that Wodehouse will be at Copenhagen when this letter arrives; but it is to him as well as to you if he is still there.

The refusal of the King to accept our proposition, involving as it did a loss of popularity and a change of Ministry, is not surprising.

But we cannot give active support to a Government which puts itself so manifestly in the wrong.

We must remain with our pockets buttoned and our arms piled till Germany puts herself still more in the wrong than Denmark.

The Germans are so hot in the matter that they may set aside all prudential motives and give up German unity for ever. . . .-Yours truly, RUSSELL.

Thus, till the close of 1863, Lord Russell, labouring for peace, was striving, though unsuccessfully, to induce Denmark to remove every grievance which Germany had against her. In the meanwhile, federal execution was taking place in Holstein; the Danes, to avoid collision with German troops, were retiring from the province; and Prince Frederick of Augustenburg was assuming the dukedom. Thenceforward Lord Russell laboured to separate the Holstein question from

the other questions affecting Schleswig. As he wrote to Lord Wodehouse on the 29th of December

At present I fear the Germans are going on in their old way, mixing federal right in Holstein, international promises in Schleswig, a common constitution, and the succession to the Crown all in one hash. They must be brought to specify their demands.

Or, as Lord Palmerston wrote to him on the 26th of December

I quite concur in the views you state, in your letter of yesterday, of the matters to which it relates.

Holstein is part of the German Confederation; and, if the Germans determine to commit therein an act of gross injustice and of diplomatic perfidy, we should content ourselves with a strong and indig nant protest. But Schleswig is no part of Germany, and its invasion by German troops would be an act of war against Denmark, which would in my clear opinion entitle Denmark to our active military and naval support. But you and I could not announce such a determination without the concurrence of the Cabinet and the consent of the Queen.'

It was, however, the double misfortune of Denmark in 1864 that, while self-appointed envoys undertook to assure her of British support in her extremity, Prussia and Austria had their own reasons for knowing that the armed interference of England was, in the last degree, improbable. Accordingly, on January 16, 1864, they issued an ultimatum demanding the withdrawal of the Constitution of November within two days. It was in vain that the Danish Foreign Minister replied that, as the Rigsraad was not in session, it was impossible for Denmark to comply with this demand. It was in vain that Lord Russell himself proposed that the representatives of the five great powers in London, as well as those of Sweden and Denmark, should sign a protocol, which should declare that the Danish Government should summon the Rigsraad at once,' and that

In this letter Lord Palmerston went on to speculate on the chances of a war, and he added, 'The Prussians are brave and make good soldiers; but all military men who have seen the Prussian army at its annual reviews of late years have unequivocally declared their opinion that the French would walk over it and get without difficulty to Berlin, so old-fashioned is it in organisation and formation and manœuvre.'

How little Lord Palmerston knew of the new forces which were rising in the Europe of his old age!