employed on constructing the line. The interest on the loan could be easily provided for. The way in which I think we might do this, and to which to my surprise even Wood, with all his hatred of expense and of new taxes, seemed inclined to agree, is to borrow 5,000,000l. for the purpose (it would be wanted in about three years), charging the interest upon a duty to be imposed upon colonial timber, and looking to the sale of land on the line for a sinking fund. Our timber duties are the last remaining example of a system of the very worst Protection, and I have some curious evidence of the extreme injury instead of benefit which they have done to New Brunswick. There were, of course, two fatal objections to this scheme. In the first place, if the differential duties on timber were to be got rid of, it was not clear why the British people, instead of the Canadian colonists, should not derive the benefit from the change; and, in the next place, the men who had withstood Lord George Bentinck's scheme in 1847, on the ground that most of the expenditure in constructing railways conferred a benefit on skilled rather than on unskilled labour, were incapacitated from contending that the construction of railways in Canada would absorb Irish labour. Influenced by such considerations as these, Lord John himself drew up an alternative, and less complex, scheme for the promotion of emigration. EMIGRATION. 1. A tax on property rated to the relief of the poor to the amount of 6d. in the pound in Ireland, and of 3d. in the pound in England and Scotland. 2. The proceeds of this tax to be placed in the hands of commissioners to be named by the Crown-or by Parliament. 3. The commissioners to have power to raise money by loan, not exceeding one million in any one year, nor five millions in the whole, on the credit of the State. The interest to be paid in the first instance out of the proceeds of the emigration tax. 4. The proceeds of the emigration tax in England to be applied to English emigration, and the same as to Ireland and Scotland. 5. When the poor rate of any electoral district in Ireland shall exceed 35. in the pound the union to make a rate in aid. When the rate of the whole union shall amount to 5s. in the pound, the union shall be empowered at their discretion to offer to the able-bodied and their families to defray the charge of emigration in lieu of the workhouse or outdoor relief. 6. The unions in Ireland to have the same power as the parishes in England to borrow money for the purposes of emigration. 7. The Commissioners of Emigration to have power to advance sums not exceeding 27. a head for each member of a family desirous to emigrate, and which shall not be able to defray the expenses of emigration [? in unions where the rate is equal to 5s. in the pound]. 8. The unions and parishes to remain liable to their present obligations to relieve the destitute until the commissioners certify that the necessary sums for emigration have been furnished to the destitute poor person to whom according to the provisions of this Act emigration has been offered. 9. The commissioners to certify that each person assisted by public funds is a fit and proper subject for emigration. 10. The commissioners for the purpose of this Act to be four unpaid and three paid commissioners. Thus, at the close of 1848, the Cabinet had before it two proposals-one that of Lord Grey, the other that of Lord John-for promoting emigration. The former, it was plain, among other disadvantages, would not answer the main purpose of removing a redundant population from the soil of Ireland; to the latter a section in the Cabinet was stoutly opposed. It so happened, moreover, that at this particular conjuncture the weight of Lord Grey in the Council Chamber was increased by the sudden death of Lord Auckland and the appointment of Sir F. Baring as his successor. Sir Francis was the fervent advocate of economy, and through his first wife he was the cousin of Lord Grey, of Lady M. Wood, the wife of Sir C. Wood, and the brother-in-law of Sir George Grey. Thenceforward, out of a Cabinet of fourteen members, four were united by ties of closest relationship. They formed a compact family party within the Cabinet, and their opinions had almost necessarily to be studied on every occasion.2 Writing to Lord Grey on January 12, before he had been asked to join the Cabinet, Sir Francis had urged strongly that no new expense should be incurred. 2 Oddly enough the Cabinet-so it seems from an undated memorandum of Lord John's-at first agreed by nine votes to five that some scheme for emigration should be adopted, and in the division Sir G. Grey and Sir F. Baring voted with Lord John had the mortification to find that he could not carry his own proposal for emigration in the reconstructed Cabinet; and he wrote to Lord Clarendon and expressed his determination to throw up the Government if he met with resistance on the measures which he thought right for Ireland. Replying on January 18, 1849, Lord Clarendon said that, if Lord John resigned, he should gladly conform to his decision, but that he did not think that the rejection of the emigration scheme was in itself a sufficient reason to justify resignation, as emigration, though useful, was not absolutely indispensable, and was not likely to prove a complete remedy for the evils. of Ireland. It was, of course, impossible for Lord John to carry out his intention of resigning when Lord Clarendon was himself of opinion that the case did not warrant such a course. But, in fact, though Prime Minister and Viceroy were agreed on the measures which it was desirable to take, Lord John attached chief importance to remedial legislation, and Lord Clarendon to machinery for preserving order. And thus, while Lord John was ready to resign office rather than part with a large scheme of emigration, Lord Clarendon was ready to go on if the Habeas Corpus Act were suspended for a further period. Lord Clarendon, indeed, if he could have dictated legislation, would have invested himself with still. larger powers. In the previous September he had told Lord John that the time for martial law seemed rapidly approaching; and, though he could not overlook the great fact that the country had since become more tranquil, he declared in January that the tranquillity was 'the tranquillity of disaffection subdued by fear.' Holding these opinions, he wished that the Habeas Corpus Suspension Act, which expired in March, should be continued for another twelve months, and he did not hesitate to express his regret that Lord John should have limited its continuance to the succeeding six months. Lord John, however, would not have consented to meet Parliament with no other measure for Ireland than the Suspension of the Habeas Corpus Act. He had long felt that Lord John. The scheme, however, thus agreed to in the abstract must have been subsequently lost when its details were examined. VOL. II. G permanent improvement could best be sought by a firm administration of a well-considered Poor Law; and he accordingly desired, whatever other measures were taken, to make that law efficient. In many of the poorer unions of Southern and Western Ireland, the collection of a rate was impossible : for, while its nominal amount in some cases exceeded 20s. in the pound, the whole population was reduced to a penury which made it impracticable to extort from them as many pence. Nothing then but extraneous help stood between these people and famine; and England and Scotland were tired of voting large sums of money for the support of a redundant population. There was everywhere a general consensus of opinion that Ireland must be compelled to maintain its own poor. Ireland, moreover, so the English argued, was already under a peculiar advantage. She was exempted from income duty; and, if that tax were extended to her, its proceeds would be amply sufficient to feed the famine-stricken people. It was answered, however, that the emergency of Ireland required immediate treatment; and that an income tax could not be collected without some preliminary assessment of the incomes of the people. Instead, therefore, of extending the income duty to Ireland, the Cabinet decided to levy a rate on the whole country, and to make its proceeds applicable to the relief of distress in the more destitute unions. The scheme as it was ultimately formulated was evidently founded on the suggestions which Lord John had already made in his memorandum on Emigration. When the poor rate in any electoral division of a union exceeded 5s. in the pound it was proposed that the union should be rated in aid of the division; and when the rate in the union exceeded 7s. it was proposed that the union should be assisted out of a rate levied over the whole country. Even this decision very nearly broke up the Government. Lord Lansdowne desired to resign; and, though he reluctantly gave way, he wrote To a measure so unjust as that of taxing the land, and the land exclusively, throughout one part of the kingdom, towards the relief of the poor in particular districts with which it is unconnected, ... I can reconcile myself only by considering the absolute urgency of fixing some maximum without delay to the amount of local taxation in particular districts, without which all capital and industry will cease to exist there, and by the assurance that this anomalous and exceptional measure will be defended on no other grounds, that the amount will be strictly limited to 6d. in the pound (the probable amount of an income tax) for each of two years to come, . . and that the most distinct pledge will be given, as far as Government can give it, that no attempt will be made to prolong it. Thus limited, a temporary measure, imposing a rate in aid -as it was called--of 6d. for a limited period of two years, was passed through all its stages and became law; while the Bill for permanently amending the Poor Law, and fixing a maximum for the rates both in electoral divisions and in unions, was passed through all its stages in the Commons and sent to the Lords. The Lords, however, struck out the maximum rate, which formed the leading feature in the measure as it left the Commons. Their action in doing so raised a curious issue. An amendment which struck out the maximum which the Commons had imposed undoubtedly enabled additional taxation to be levied. It was therefore inconsistent with the privilege, which the Commons have for two centuries claimed, that the Lords should not initiate taxation or introduce amendments into money bills. Lord John, under ordinary circumstances, would not probably have tolerated such an amendment, but would have insisted on the privileges of the Commons. For the second time, however, his hands were forced by Lord Lansdowne. Writing on the 16th of May, Lord Lansdowne said- After what passed yesterday in the Cabinet on the subject of the rating clause in the Irish Poor Law Bill, I think it right, as I ought to conceal nothing from you, and least of all to take you by surprise, [to state] that, having once defended and voted for it as it stood, opposed to a decisive majority of the House, and supported chiefly by the reluctant votes of friends who saw the objections to it as strongly as I did, I should feel it next to impossible to propose to the House of Lords to reconsider their decision on the subject. Lord Lansdowne's letter practically forced Lord John to determine whether he would ask the Commons to waive their |