A Discourse Concerning the Being and Attributes of God, the Obligations of ... - Samuel Clarke - Google-kirjat

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for any one to recommend his own performance by endeavouring to discover the imperfections of others who are engaged in the same design with himself, of promoting the interest of true religion and virtue. But every man ought to use such arguments only as appear to him to be clear and strong, and the readers must judge whether they truly prove the conclusion.

THE CONTENTS.

The Introduction, concerning the causes of Atheism.

PROP. I. That Something has existed from Eternity

Of the difficulty of conceiving Eternity

That Difficulties arising merely from the Nature of Eternity, are not to be
regarded, because equal in all Suppositions

ibid.

PROP. II. That there has existed from Eternity some one Immutable and

Independent Being

Of the Absolute Impossibility of an eternal Succession of dependent Beings,

existing without any original independent cause at all

PROP. III. That that Immutable and Independent Being, which has existed

from Eternity, without any external cause of its Existence, must be

Self-existent, that is, Necessarily-existing

Of the true Idea of Self-existence; That it is the idea of a Being, the

Supposition of whose Non-Existence is an express Contradiction

That every Man may be more certain of the Being of a Supreme Indepen-

dent Cause, than he can be of any thing else besides his own Existence 18

Of the Idea of God, including Self-Existence

That the Material World cannot possibly be the first, original, and inde-

The Form of the World not necessary

Mr Toland's pernicious opinion of Motion being essential to Matter, con-
futed

ibid.

The Matter of the World not necessarily existing

A Confutation of Spinoza's opinion concerning one only Substance

Concerning the Eternity of the World, and that the opinion of the best An-

cient Philosophers in that Matter did not at all favour the Sentiments

of Modern Atheists

PROP. IV. What the Substance or Essence of that Being, which is Self-ex.

istent or Necessarily-existing, is, we have no idea, neither is it at all pos-

sible for us to comprehend it

Of Infinite Space

Of the Vanity of explaining things by such School-terms as have really
no Signification at all

87

PROP. V. That though the Substance or Essence of the Self-existent Being

is itself absolutely incomprehensible to us, yet many of the Essential At-

tributes of his Nature are strictly demonstrable, as well as his existence ;

as, in the first place, that he must of necessity be Eternal

of the manner of our conceiving the Eternity of God with respect to succes.
sion

ibid.

PROP. VI. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be Infinite and

85

Of the Simplicity, Unchangeableness, Incorruptibility, &c. of his Nature 41

Of the Manner of our conceiving the Immensity of God

PROP. VII. That the Self-existent Being must of necessity be but One

Of the Blessed Trinity

Of the Absolute Impossibility of two different Self-existent Independent

Principles, such as God and Matter

The Error of Spinoza concerning one Uniform Substance

ibid.

PROP. VIII. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things, must

be an Intelligent Being

This the main Question between us and the Atheists

Not easily proved a priori

But demonstrably proved, a posteriori, from the variety and degrees of per-

fection in things, and the order of Causes and Effects

From the Intelligence that created Beings are confessedly indued with 48

That, if Intelligence be a real distinct Quality or Perfection, and not a

mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent Figure and Motion, then

Beings indued with Intelligence can never possibly have arisen purely

out of that which itself had no such Perfection

That Intelligence is such a real distinct Perfection, and not possible to be a

mere Effect or Composition of Unintelligent figure and motion

Mr Hobbes forced to recur to that prodigiously absurd Opinion, that all

Matter, as Matter, is indued with Thought

The Proposition demonstrated further from the Beauty, Order, and Final

Cause of Things

From the Original of Motion

That the Material World cannot possibly have been Self-existent

PROP. IX. That the Self-existent and Original Cause of all Things is not a
Necessary Agent, but a Being indued with Liberty and Choice

ibid.

This Proposition a necessary consequent of the foregoing

Proved further from the Arbitrary Disposition of Things in the World, with

a full answer to Spinoza's arguments for the necessity of all things 58

Also from Final Causes

And from the Finiteness of Created Beings

And from the Impossibility of an Infinite Succession of Causes

That Liberty is not in itself an Impossible and contradictory Notion 66

PROP. X. That the Self-existing Being, the Supreme cause of all things,

must of necessity have Infinite Power

Of working Contradictions, and Natural or Moral Evil

Of the Power of creating Matter

Of the Power of creating immaterial Cogitative Substances, and those in-

dued with Liberty of Will or Choice

Of the Immateriality of Human Souls

That the Power of Perception is not confined to Bodily Senses

Of the Possibility of Communicating to a Creature the Power of beginning

of the Possibility of induing a Creature with Freedom of Will

An Answer to Spinoza's and Mr Hobbes's arguments against the Possibility

That there must be somewhere a Beginning of Operation

ibid.

That Thinking and Willing, neither are, nor can possibly be Qualities or

Affections of Matter

That, supposing they were Affections of Matter, yet even that most absurd

supposition would not at all affect the question about the possibility of

A shameful Fallacy in Mr Hobbes and his Followers arguing, who, when

they would prove the Soul to be mere Matter, then they suppose Matter

to be a substance capable, not only of Figure and Motion, but also of

other unknown properties ; and when they would prove the will and all

other Operations of the Soul to be necessary, then they divest Matter of

all its unknown properties, and make it mere Solidity indued only with

Figure and Motion again

Of the Necessity of the Will's being determined by the last Judgment of

the Understanding

Of the Certainty of Divine Fore-knowledge, not repugnant to the Liberty

Of the Original of Evil

PROP. XI. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all Things must of ne-

cessity be Infinitely Wise

Proved a priori

And a posteriori, from the Wisdom and Perfection of the Works of God,

evidenced more illustriously in the late discoveries in Astronomy and Na-

tural Philosophy

PROP. XII. That the Supreme Cause and Author of all things must of ne-

cessity be a Being of Infinite Goodness, Justice, and Truth, and all other

Moral Perfections, such as become the Supreme Governor and Judge of

The Necessity of God's Moral Attributes, consistent with perfect Liberty ibid.

Of the Necessity of God's doing always what is Best and Fittest in the

Of the Impossibility of his doing Evil

That Liberty is not in itself an Imperfection, but a Perfection

That the highest moral Perfection of Rational Creatures does not exclude

Natural Liberty

That the Grounds of all Moral Obligations are Eternal and Necessary, and
depend not on any Laws

ibid.

THE EVIDENCES OF NATURAL AND REVEALED

The INTRODUCTION

Of the Several sorts of Deists

The first sort of Deists, and of Providence

Human Affairs not beneath the Regard of Providence

The second sort of Deists

Profane and debauched Deists not capable of being argued with

The Third sort of Deists

The Fourth sort of Deists

That there is now no consistent scheme of Deism in the World

PROP. I. That, from the Eternal and Necessary Differences of Things, there

naturally and necessarily arise certain Moral Obligations, which are of

themselves incumbent on all Rational Creatures, antecedent to all positive

Institution and to all expectation of Reward or Punishment

That there are Eternal and necessary Differences of Things

The absurdity of those who deny the eternal and Necessary Difference of

An Answer to the Objection drawn from the variety of Opinions of the learned

Men, and the Laws of different Nations, concerning Right and Wrong 163

That the will of God always determines itself to act according to the Eter-

nal Reason of Things

That all Rational Creatures are obliged to govern themselves in all their ac-

tions by the same Eternal Rule of Reason

Proved from the Original Nature of Things

And from the Sense that all, even wicked Men, unavoidably have of their

being under such an Obligation

And from the Judgment of Men's Consciences upon their own past actions 171

Of that Natural Knowledge which Plato thought to be Reminiscence ibid.

The most profligate of Men not utterly insensible of the difference of Good

Men's Natural sense of Eternal Moral Obligations proved further from the

Judgment they all pass upon the actions of others

An Answer to the Objection drawn from the Total Ignorance of some Bar-

barous Nations in Matters of Morality

Of the Principal Moral Obligations in particular

Of Piety, or Men's Duty towards God

Of Righteousness, or the duty of Men one towards another

of Justice and Equity

Of Universal Mutual Benevolence

Of Sobriety, or Men's Duty towards themselves, and of the Unlawfulness of

The Law of Nature Eternal, Universal, and Absolutely Unchangeable 191

Eternal Moral Obligations antecedent, in some respect, even to this con-

sideration, of their being the Will or Command of God himself

The Law of Nature Obligatory, antecedent to all consideration of particular

Rewards and Punishments

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