CHAP. the difficulties and the peril which environed

VL

1776.

Sept. 4, 5.

6.

Washington.

On the fourth and fifth, congress debated the message of Lord Howe, which Witherspoon, with a very great majority of the members, looked upon as an insult. "We have lost a battle and a small island," said Rush, "but we have not lost a state; why then should we be discouraged? Or why should we be discouraged, even if we had lost a state? If there were but one state left, still that one should peril all for independence." George Ross sustained his colleague. "The panic may seize whom it will," wrote John Adams; "it shall not seize me;" and like Rush and Witherspoon, he spoke vehemently against the proposed conference. On the other hand, Edward Rutledge favored it, as a means of procrastination; and at last New Hampshire, Connecticut, and even Virginia gave way for the sake of quieting the people. Sullivan was directed to deliver to Lord Howe a written "resolve, that the congress, being the representatives of the free and independent states of America, could not send their members to confer with him in their private characters; but, ever desirous of peace on reasonable terms, they would send a committee of their body to learn whether he had any authority to treat with persons authorized by them, what that authority was, and to hear his propositions." On the sixth, the committee was elected by ballot, and the choice fell on Franklin, John Adams, and Edward Rutledge. For the future, it was ordered that no proposals for

VI.

peace between Great Britain and the United States CHAP. should be received, unless they should be made in writing, and should recognise the authority of the states in congress.

Notwithstanding the desire of congress that New York should be held, Washington remained convinced that it was impossible; and on the seventh he convened his general officers, in the hope of their concurrence and support. The case was plain; yet Mercer, who was detained at Amboy, wrote his untimely wish to maintain the post; others interpreted the vote of congress as an injunction that it was to be defended at all hazards; and as one third of the army had no tents, and one fourth were sick, many clung to the city for shelter. The majority, therefore, decided to hold it with five thousand men, and to distribute the rest of the army between Kingsbridge and Harlem heights. The power to overrule the majority of his general officers had not been explicitly conferred on Washington, and as he might be considered but as first among his peers, he most reluctantly submitted to their advice till he could convince congress that the proposed evacuation was an absolute necessity. Meantime he removed such stores as were not immediately needed, and began the slow and difficult task of transferring the sick to the inland towns of New Jersey.

The plainly perceptible hesitancy of decision was very unjustly attributed by the ill-informed to the general himself. In August congress had sent for Charles Lee, as the proper head of the army, should any accident befall Washington; and now

1776.

Sept.

7.

VI.

CHAP. officers of merit as well as privates "were continually praying most earnestly for the arrival of General Lee as their guardian angel."

1776.

Sept.

8.

Abandoned by his council, Washington still adhered firmly to his plan for the campaign; and foreseeing the danger of risking by delay the loss of arms and stores, he appealed to congress with increased earnestness. While the troops voted him did not arrive, the militia were all the time returning home, so that the number from Connecticut was reduced from six thousand to two thousand. To those members of congress whose unreasoning zeal would not surrender an inch of land, still less the city which was the point of connection between the north and the south, least of all, fortifications which represented the labor of thousands of men during many months, Washington replied: "To be prepared at each point of attack has occasioned an expense of labor which now seems useless, and is regretted by those who form a judgment from after-knowledge; but men of discernment will think differently, and see by such works and preparations we have delayed the operations of the campaign till it is too late to effect any capital incursion into the country. It is now obvious that they mean to enclose us on the island of New York, by taking post in my rear, while the shipping secures the front; and thus oblige us to fight them on their own terms, or surrender at discretion. On every side there is a choice of difficulties. Every measure is to be formed with some apprehension that all our troops will not do their duty. On our side the war should be defensive; it has even been called a

VI.

1776.

Sept.

8.

war of posts; we should on all occasions avoid a CHAP. general action, and never be drawn into a necessity to put anything to risk. Persuaded that it would be presumptuous to draw out our young troops into open ground against their superiors both in number and discipline, I have never spared the spade and pickaxe. I have not found that readiness to defend even strong posts at all hazards which is necessary to derive the greatest benefit from them. We are now in a post, strong, but not impregnable; nay, acknowledged by every man of judgment to be untenable. It has been considered as the key to the northern country; but by establishing strong posts at Mount Washington on the upper part of this island, and on the Jersey side opposite to it, and by the assistance of obstructions in the water, not only the navigation of Hudson river, but a communication between the northern and southern states, may be more effectually secured. I am sensible that a retreating army is encircled with difficulties, that declining an engagement subjects a general to reproach, and may throw discouragement over the minds of many; but when the fate of America may be at stake on the issue, we should protract the war if possible. That the enemy mean to winter in New York, there can be no doubt; that they can drive us out, is equally clear; nothing seems to remain, but to determine the time of their taking possession."

Congress received with coldness this remonstrance of Washington; but it was unanswerable, and they resolved, on the tenth, that it had not been “their sense, that any part of the army should remain in

10.

CHAP. New York a moment longer than he should think it proper for the public service."

VI.

1776.

Sept.

11.

On the eleventh, Lord Howe sent his barge for Franklin, John Adams, and Rutledge; relying on his honor, they took with them the officer sent as a hostage for their security. They were met by him at the water's edge, and conducted through files of grenadiers, armed with fixed bayonets, to a large stone house, where, in a room carpeted with moss and green boughs, they partook of an excellent collation. In the discussion of business, a difficulty presented itself at the outset. As they had been formally announced as a committee from congress, Lord Howe premised, with some embar rassment of manner, that he was bound to say he conversed with them as private individuals. At this, John Adams came to his relief, saying: "Consider us in any light you please, except that of British subjects." During a conversation which lasted for several hours Lord Howe was discursive in his remarks: he went back to the last petition of congress to the king, and to the time anterior to the declaration of independence; he hoped that this interview might prepare the way for the return of America to her allegiance, and for an accommodation of the two countries. To bring the discussion to a point, Edward Rutledge cited to him the declaration of Sullivan, "that he would set the acts of parliament wholly aside, because parliament had no right to tax America, or meddle with her internal polity."

Lord Howe had no discretionary power whatever with regard to these two vital points in the con