Bars for the support of the roof, particularly at the face, are not used as frequently as they should be. If they were there would not be so many deaths from accidents at the face to record. When investigating accidents where falls have occurred in thin seams at slips, one just over the coal and the other parallel to it, above the place where the unfortunate man, who has been killed or injured, was working, I have suggested that nothing but the use of bars can prevent such accidents. I have been told that it is impossible to use them, owing to the space they occupy not allowing room for the men to work. This is so with wooden bars, but in such seams steel or iron bars can, and should be used. I attach two sketches showing (1) a place where a fatal accident occurred by a fall of roof from parallel slips, which in the ordinary mode of timbering with props with lids was, in order to allow men space to work, as closely timbered as it was possible to be, and (2) a longwall face under similar conditions where steel bars are used in such a way as would, in all probability, have prevented the accident. This is being done at several Collieries, and I should be more satisfied if the practice were the rule instead of the exception. The question whether the compulsory supporting of all roof at the face by bars is one, I think, that must soon be seriously considered.

The result, if the Notice required by the Special Rules, to be posted by the Manager, instead of stating the maximum distance at which roof supports are to be set apart at the face, as at present, were worded so as to make the distance to be from the place the man is working, both at the face and on roads and other parts of the mine, would be a great saving of life; it would make it illegal for any person to work, more than a stipulated distance from timber or other roof supports, wherever they might be. At present the notice can be complied with and the man be working as much as six feet from any roof supports although it is the fall which occurs at the place where he is working that kills or seriously injures him. If this suggestion were carried out more temporary timber would be set, in all parts of the mine, which, in my opinion, is desirable.

The number of deaths at the working face was 40, on the roads enlarging or repairing, 13, and on roads while otherwise working or passing, 16. The figures in 1905 were 39, 19, and 14. It will thus be seen that the accidents at the face are practically the same, and the decrease in falls is on roads where repairing and enlarging were being carried out.

Analysing the fatal accidents I find that 33 of them were due to slips, weight breaks, or timber being displaced by sudden weighting of the strata, 10 to want of care or timber, 5 when drawing timber, and 19 from other causes.

As I have pointed out in previous reports the "dog and chain" or other suitable appliance, which the Special Rules require, should be in the possession of the man when timber is being drawn, is not actually used as frequently as it should be. In one of the fatal accidents during the year (No. 173 on the list) when timber was being drawn the appliance was 30 yards away. I am strongly of opinion that this is a breach of the Special Rule, as to comply, it should be close to the man when the dangerous work is being carried out. If it is some distance away there is always a temptation for a man to run the risk rather than go for the "dog and chain " or other appliance.

The Special rule in this district does not make the use of this appliance compulsory in all cases of timber being withdrawn, it is sufficient if the workman has it with him. It would be much better if it as is necessary at least in one of the inspection districtsrequired that it should always be used.

I fear that the attention of all concerned in mining is more concentrated on the prevention of accidents such as the explosion of gas and coal dust, to the detriment of those from falls of roof and side. Important as the adoption of such measures as will prevent explosions undoubtedly is, the fact remains, that one of these accidents, often responsible for a great loss of life, such as occurred at Courrières Collieries, appeals more forcibly to the public mind, and also to those engaged in mining operations than those from the latter which, in the aggregate, cause the deaths of more persons than any other class of accident, and serious attention is necessary to the important question of the prevention of such accidents, in order to reduce the long list of fatalities which occur year after

year.

The descriptions of the various fatal accidents in Appendix I., are this year given fully that it is not necessary to add anything to them in the body of this report.

They should be carefully perused as from many of them useful hints may be obtained as to the precautions necessary to be taken in order to prevent such

Occurrences.

TABLE NO. 9.

ACCIDENTS from FALLS of ROOF and SIDE, classified according to the PLACE where

Five fatal accidents, causing five deaths, the same number as occurred in the previous year, were reported. This, considering the millions of times cages, containing men or full and empty tubs, are raised and lowered in shafts in this district, is distinctly a satisfactory record. I regret, however, to say, as will be seen from the description of them given below, that three of the accidents were due to preventable causes, viz., the first to distinct breaches of the rules framed for the safety of the persons employed when ascending or descending shafts by machinery, the second to an unauthorised person giving a signal to the winding engineman when a corporal was oiling a pulley wheel in the shaft, and the third by the deceased man crossing the bottom of the shaft when the cages were in motion in the shaft, and the descending cage caught, and killed him. Of the fourth and fifth accidents, one was caused by a guide rail breaking, and thus allowing the cage to get free of the guides, and at meetings it collided with the descending cage, causing the rope to break and the cage to fall into the sump which contained some water, and the flooring boards, on which the hanger-on was standing, were so violently displaced that he was thrown some distance and so severely injured that he died a few days afterwards. The other was due to a semaphore signal at the top of two landings at the bottom of a winding shaft becoming fixed and not working properly, and the hanger on at the top landing, thinking a signal had been given by the one on the lower landing, signalled to the winding engineman to take the cage away, and the man on the lower level was fatally crushed.

OVERWINDING ACCIDENTS.

Four cases of overwinding have been reported, or have come to my knowledge during the year. One, at Hickleton Main Colliery, might have had very serious results. Men were being lowered to their work when something-probably a piece of dirt or scum-caused one of the valves of the winding engine to stick, and before the engineman could do anything the ascending eage was taken up to the pulleys where the detaching hook liberated the rope, but the descending cage went on to the bottom of the shaft with such violence that all the men suffered more or less from shock, but fortunately no one suffered serious injury.

At Brodsworth Colliery, where shafts are being sunk, the hoppit was standing on the folding doors with men in it ready to descend the shaft. The signal was given to the engineman to raise the hoppit so as to allow the doors to be lifted; he did so, but failed to stop at the proper place, and but for there being a detaching hook on and its acting satisfactorily some, if not all, of the men would undoubtedly have been seriously injured, or killed.

The other two occurred at a sinking pit at the Middleton Colliery (New Pit). Mr. Mellors, on visiting the Colliery on June 22nd, reported to me that there was no detaching hook, and I, at once, took the matter up with the manager, with the result that one was put on. Since then, on the 5th and 10th December last, a full hoppit was taken into the headgear, the detaching hook operated each time and, as a consequence, no one was any worse. On both occasions nine sinkers were in the shaft below.

All these accidents show the efficiency of detaching hooks in the event of overwinding, and also the real necessity of every working shaft being provided with one.

To prevent accidents such as that at Hickleton Main Colliery, winding engines should be fitted with an automatic contrivance to cut off the steam and apply steam brakes when the cages reach certain points in the shaft. In this In this way the numerous accidents caused by the descending cage being lowered with great force would be prevented.

On the Continent the use of such apparatus is compulsory when men are being raised or lowered, and a few winding engines in this country are also fitted with them; they might, I think, now that shafts are deeper and the rate of winding much quicker, be universally adopted with advantage.

No. 81 on the list occurred at Barnsley Main Colliery, belonging to Messrs. The Barnsley Main Colliery Company, Limited, on February 20th, and caused the death of a fitter.

The shaft in question is sunk to 40 yards below the Silkstone Seam, or a depth of 662 yards from the surface; the lower seams, however, are not being worked, and water has accumulated to a depth of about 200 yards.

The Abdy Seam is being opened out at a depth of 148 yards from the surface, and the Ardsley and Lidgett Seams, which are 358 and 391 yards respectively from the surface, are also being worked; 33 yards below the latter seam the shaft was boarded over by means of sump boards, 3 inches in thickness. There was only one cage in the shaft, and the guides were of the wire rope type. At the Abdy Seam, hanging-on the space between the cage and the landing or platform was about 15 inches, and to enable persons to pass over it, and also in order that full tubs could be got into and empty tubs taken out of the cage at this level, an iron door, hinged at the side next to the platform, was provided, and in connection with it there was a pin to fasten into a hole in the floor of the cage to keep it steady. It was an upcast shaft, and the means of lighting the hangings-on or mouthings was by safety lamps, and at this seam two were provided.

Shortly after 4 o'clock on the day in question the deceased was going from the surface to the Abdy Seam to repair a coal cutting machine in that seam. The banksman allowed him to get into the cage, and gave the signal to the winding engineman to lower it to the Abdy Seam, and this was done. Contrary to the Special Rules, there was no hanger-on to receive him at that seam, and, from the position of the door on the cage, and the evidence of a deputy in the seam, who happened to be 40 yards away and in a direct line with the shaft, it appears that he had been reaching out of the cage for the door and got hold of it, and then either stepped into the space between the cage and the landing and pulled the door over, or had got on to the door, and in passing over it had slipped and fallen over the side of it into the shaft as it was in position on the cage, but the pin was not in the hole. He, in his fall, crashed through the sump boards 276 yards below and fell into the water, from which his body was recovered on February 23rd, after much arduous and hazardous work on the part of the officials and other men.

An inquest was opened by Mr. Coroner P. P. Maitland on February 24th, and formal evidence of identification was taken, and the inquiry was adjourned to February 27th. On that date further evidence was taken, and another adjournment made to the 8th of March. After a careful inquiry and hearing all the evidence, the jury returned the following verdict, viz. :

"That the deceased met his death by accidentally falling down the No. 4 shaft of the Barnsley Main Colliery owing to the absence of a hanger-on, such absence occurring through a breach of the Statutory Rules, and the persons to blame are the enginewright, the banksman, and the under-manager, who are guilty of grave negligence, but not amounting to criminality."

Very serious breaches of the Special Rules on the parts of the persons named in the verdict were divulged during the inquiry.

Special Rule 51 requires that when persons are about to descend a shaft the banksman must signal "Three" to the hanger-on and before the persons enter the cage, the hangeron must answer by striking the signal twice, and according to Special Rule 61, " He (the hanger-on) must be in the porch and attend carefully to his duty when a person descends or ascends the shaft," and Special Rule 62 says, "he (the hanger-on) or another competent persons appointed for the purpose must remain at the signal when a person ascends or descends.' On this occasion there was no hanger-on at the Abdy Seam, although four persons were employed in it. The banksman, in allowing the deceased man to get into the cage, and the engineman in lowering the cage before a signal was sent to the Abdy

Seam that a person was coming down, and before a reply was received from the hangeron, both contravened Special Rule 51. The enginewright was also to blame, as he knew that men, such as fitters, joiners, &c., were being sent down the shafts without the required signals being given and a hanger-on being at the Abdy Seam, and took no steps to have these contraventions remedied, and the under-manager (he had ceased to be under-manager, and became a deputy a few days before the accident occurred) was also guilty in that he did not see the rules were carried out. He had, by the orders of the manager, appointed three of the trammers, one in each shift, to act as hangers-on as far as sending up full and taking off empty tubs at the seam was concerned, but he did not explain to them their duties when persons were being raised and lowered in the shafts, or see that they were carrying out the requirements of the Special Rules.

These violations appear to have been going on for a considerable time and the banksman did not give and receive signals before men entered the cage on the surface as required by Special Rule 51 when any class of men were descending to any of the seams at this shaft. Not having a hanger-on only occurred when occasional persons such as fitters, joiners, and officials descended to this seam during the shift but it, nevertheless, was a breach of Special Rules 61 and 62.

But for the breaches of the rules the accident would not have occurred, and as there appeared to have been considerable laxness in carrying out these rules for sometime, of which the Manager and other officials must have been cognisant, I reported the circumstances to you, and by your directions I took proceedings against the Manager for a breach of Special Rule 7 by not enforcing the requirements of the Act and Special Rules, and he was fined £20 and £2 4s. 6d. costs. He had overlooked the requirements of the Special Rules 61 and 62 as although he instructed the under-manager to appoint hangers-on he failed to see that their duties were properly carried out. He had only been in charge of the Colliery for 11 weeks, but during that time he ascended and descended this shaft to and from the Abdy seam on several occasions. The engineman and banksman were also proceeded against by the owners for the breaches of the Special Rules committed by them and were fined £2 and 15s. costs each.

Since the accident the rules have been strictly complied with, and alterations have been made at the Abdy seam which have made it much safer when men are getting off the cage into the porch.

MISCELLANEOUS UNDERGROUND.

I have to record 36 accidents, causing the same number of deaths, under this head, as compared with 23 accidents and deaths in 1905, or an increase of 13. This is a large increase, and it is due to an increase in the number of haulage accidents under the sub-head (b), Run-over or crushed by trams and tubs and in those classified as "Sundries." In the former the increase is eight, and in the latter six. Several of the accidents and their causes are discussed hereafter under their different heads.

BY EXPLOSIVES.

It is gratifying to have no fatal accidents to report from this cause, but injury to seven persons occurred by five non-fatal accidents. When it is remembered that 1,691,749 shots were fired at the mines, under the Coal Mines Act, in the district during the year (see page 29) this is a record on which those engaged in the operations in connection with them are to be congratulated. It shows that the work has been carried out with care, and the result must be a source of satisfaction to the management and workmen.

TABLE NO. 10.

ACCIDENTS with EXPLOSIVES, classified according to the NATURE of the EXPLOSIVE.

TABLE NO. 11.

ACCIDENTS with EXPLOSIVES, classified according to their CHARACTER OF CAUSE.

Of the five non-fatal accidents, the first, which injured two persons, was due to the use of stowite in a frozen condition. Instead of thawing it as required by Explosives in Coal Mines Order, in a proper warning pan, a shot-firer finding that he could not make a hole in one of the cartridges for the detonator with a piece of wood provided for the purpose, put it on a sleeper and took a nail to do so and was striking it with a piece of wood when the cartridge naturally exploded, and blew one of his thumbs and a finger off, and a man, who was standing near, was slightly injured. It is difficult to comprehend how a duly authorised shot-firer can be guilty of such a foolhardy and reprehensible action as this. He admitted afterwards that he knew it was contrary to the rules and illegal. There is no doubt that the explosive was taken into the mine in a frozen condition, and that proper care was not taken to prevent this occurring and on taking the matter up with the manager, he promised to take such measures as would prevent a recurrence of an accident of this kind.

In the second, a shot-firer and a collier charged a shot hole with three cartridges of gelignite, and attempted to fire it with fuse when it apparently missed. After waiting 4 hours they returned, began to drill another hole about 18 inches from and parallel to the other, and when doing so the missed shot exploded and both men were injured about the legs. This undoubtedly was a hang-fire and probably due to defective fuse.

The third caused injury to a deputy, he was examining a shot firing cable owing to a shot having missed and when he got to the face it exploded and he was injured by the flying stone and dust. At first it was thought that it was a case of "hang-fire," but after careful enquiry this was found to be unlikely, as all the detonators were tested before being taken into the mine. The cable was partly coiled up, and he had left his battery close to it instead of putting it into his pocket as instructed by the manager and under-manager. When examining the cable these coils probably became untwisted and the loose ends brought into contact with the battery. A similar accident, when the latest Explosives in Coal Mines Order comes into force, will be impossible as a battery like this must then be fitted with a detachable or push button. The careful attention of managers should be given to this point.

The fourth was caused by a missed shot. A shot-firer had attempted to fire a shot in coal charged with Rippite with a No. 7 detonator, at 9.30 in the morning, but it missed. Another hole was drilled parallel to and 8 inches away from the first but 6 inches shorter, and it was charged and fired at noon. The shot-firer, however, did not, as he should have done, go back to the place or take any steps to warn the men who were filling the coal into tubs to do so with care, as the missed shot might not have exploded. The colliers went in and filled the coal without seeing anything of the detonator or charge. At 2 o'clock they went out of the pit and on the surface saw their mates, and told them of having had a missed shot, and filling the coal away, but did not say the detonator had not been recovered. On reaching the place one of the colliers stated that they examined it carefully, and although the coal had been filled away they did not see the detonator. They then commenced to cut up some of the floor with picks and did so for about two and a half hours when there was a report, and their lamps were extinguished, and the coal flew in all directions. There can be no doubt that one of the men had struck the detonator with his pick. He was injured about the face and abdomen.

The shot-firer was very much to blame for not going back after firing the second