nine members had been previously appointed to try the rebels.

Though the provisional government was strong enough to suppress these disturbances, they had the effect of making the people of the Morea, who placed their confidence almost exclusively in Colocotroni, backward and slack in the approaching campaign. Another disastrous result of them was, preventing the reduction of the fortress of Patras, which, it was supposed, might easily have been taken during the winter. But in consequence of these internal dissentions, it was the middle of January before a few vessels sailed up the Gulf of Corinth, and, aided by some land forces, recommenced the blockade. The blockading squadron was raised to the number of thirty vessels: and the garrison began to be straitened for provisions: so that hopes were entertained that this important fortress, which, with Modon and Coron, were the only forts in the Morea now occupied by the Turks, would be forced to surrender. On the other hand, the Porte made all the preparations it could for a vigorous campaign. Aware of the importance of the Albanians for the conquest of Western Greece, a person was appointed to the command of that district, who was supposed to have influence with the soldiery. For this purpose, Omar Pacha was removed to Salonika, whilst Redschid Pacha was transferred from Larissa, as a person qualified to accomplish the views of the Porte in the Pachalic of Jannina and Delvinatsi, to which the Sultan promised to add Roumelia, with Missolonghi and Anatolia, in the event of his subduing them. Being furnished with full power and means to raise the requisite troops, he immediately

commenced to do so at Larissa, intending afterwards to pass over to his new Pachalic; and, having there likewise increased his army, to descend upon Missolonghi with his united forces, levying soldiers as he passed along by Prevesa and Arta While he was to advance from the North, the troops of Mahomet, Ali Pacha of Egypt, who had by this time succeeded in suppressing, for the present, the insurrection in Candia, were to land in great force upon the Morea. As they were disciplined in the European manner, and were well supplied with all the necessaries of war, the irregular troops of the Greeks would be unable to stand before them; and by these means the Morea, it was expected, would again be brought under the yoke of its old masters.

Mahomet Ali's fleet, which wintered in the harbour of Suda in Candia, set sail under the command of his step-son Ibrahim Pacha, on the 23rd of December, for Rhodes, where it arrived on the 1st of January, 1825. There 5,000 disciplined soldiers awaited him: with these he was to return to Candia; and, having completed his armament there, to sail for the Morea without delay. At the same time, transports with provisions, were actively fitting out at Constantinople for the use of the garrisons at Modon and Patras.

The blockade of Patras was now going on with vigour; orders were issued daily for the collecting fresh troops, and the sending of additional ships from Hydra; and the direction of the forces both by land and sea, as well as the presidency of the government, was conferred on Conduriotti. check the approach of Redschid Pacha, Nota Bozzaris, and generals

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Suka and Milios were sent forward with a body of troops to occupy the pass of Makrinovo, the ancient Olympus, through which it was necessary he should pass. As frequent letters from Crete informed the government of the return of Ibrahim Pacha from Rhodes, and of the vigour with which he was hastening the completion of his preparations, the progress of the blockade at Patras, was observed with double interest; for its fall was daily expected, and there was no probable means of checking the armament of the Egyptians, except by withdrawing the squadron which was cruising before the fortress. At length advices arrived of the departure of the expedition from Candia: further delay was impossible; and the Greek squadron sailed from Patras, but unfortunately too late. Such was the deficiency of communication across the Morea, that almost on the same day that the fleet sailed from Patras (24th of February), the Egyptian squadron of four corvettes, and numerous brigs and transports, in all 30 sail, anchored off Modon, and disembarked 6,000 soldiers, infantry and cavalry, well disciplined and commanded chiefly by European officers. These troops immediately encamped round Modon, wailst the ships returned without delay to Suda, in Candia. A few days after, Ibrahim Pacha, at the nead of 800 men, advanced to the summit of the range of hills, which rise at the back of Navarino. The inhabitants flew to arms, whilst 700 Roumeliots, under the command of general Ciabella, hastened into the fortress. The Pacha s object, however, appeared to be merely to take a survey of the situation of the fortress: he remained quietly at his station for

some hours, and then returned to his encampment.

As it was now clear that Navarino and the adjacent country was to be the immediate seat of war, the storming of Patras was abandoned, and the troops were drawn off to be marched farther south. Upwards of 2,000 soldiers, principally under the command of Hadji Christo Joannes Mavromichales, son to Petro Bey of Maina, were thrown into Navarino; a small corps of artillery, amounting to 50 or 60 men, were sent off with all haste from Napoli; and the command of the fortifications was given to major Collegno, who lost no time in assuming his post. Provisions were sent in from all parts of the Morea, sufficient for a long siege; large bodies of Roumeliots, under the command of their respective generals Giavella, Karatasso, Constantine Bozzaris, brother of Marco, and general Karaiscaki, took positions in the rear of the enemy. While Conduriottis and Prince Mavrocordato prepared to set out from Napoli with fresh troops, Ibrahim received reinforcements from Candia; in March a second debarkation took place, which made his force amount to upwards of 15,000 men: and before the end of that month, a battery had been erected against Neo-Kastro, or Navarino.

This place, which had been taken by the Greeks in the first year of the war, instead of having been repaired and strengthened, so as to be an effectual protection to the harbour, which, in respect of its capaciousness and commodious situation, was one of the most important in Greece, had been left nearly in the same state in which it was, when taken from the Turks, in 1821. Its defences

were a low wall without any ditch, flanked on the land-side by some small bastions, and still weaker towards the sea. Opposite to it is the island of Sphacteria, two miles in length and a quarter of a mile broad; and separated from Navarino, at its South Eastern extremity, by a channel six hundred yards wide, which leads into a noble basin six miles in circumference. The northern end of the island is separated by a channel of about a hundred yards in width, from a peninsular, promontory anciently called Coryphasium. A ruined castle of the middle ages, which stands upon the summit of this headland on the site of the ancient Pylus, and is known by the appellation of old Navarino, was occupied by the Greeks; the hill is steep and rocky, and a large lagune on the land side, separated from the sea at either end of the promontory by a narrow strip of land, renders the position naturally very strong. But the castle, having neither been repaired nor armed, was incapable of long defence against a very superior force; and being commanded, at the distance of one thousand yards, by the highest point of Sphacteria, there remained little hope to the Greeks of preserving either of their posts at Navarino, unless, by the assistance of their ships, they could retain possession of the island.

By the middle of April, Conduriottis had succeeded in assembling about 6,000 men at Cremidi. But after several desultory actions with small bodies of the Greeks, Ibrahim, on the 19th of April, attacked, and completely defeated in their position, all the troops which the president had been able to collect. To take Sphacteria, was the next object of the

Pacha; but it was not until the return of his ships from Suda in Candia, whither they had gone in order to transport a third division of land forces, that he could attempt to put this part of his design into execution.

On Sunday the 1st of May, the Egyptian fleet, amounting, transports included, to 65 or 70 sail, came out of the port of Suda, where it had been for some days closely watched by a Greek squadron of 29 sail, under Miaoulis. The latter immediately endeavoured to oppose their progress, but the light breezes were unpropitious to his purpose. There was a distant cannonade kept up for some time with little or no effect, and two fireships were sent off by the Greeks without success. A third was

more fortunate. The rigging of a large frigate was seriously injured, and a large portion of her crew, who leaped overboard in their terror, were either taken prisoners, or perished in the waters. The Greeks having failed in their principal object, the Egyptian fleet succeeded in reaching Modon, whence 46 ships, followed by Miaoulis, proceeded to cruise off Navarino. In the harbour of Navarino there was then only one Greek vessel, the brig Mars, commanded by the Hydriote captain Tsammados. It was engaged in provisioning the fortress and in covering the landing of the water, which was brought in boats from the coast of the modern province of Arcadia. Miaoulis, shortly after his arrival, sent in seven vessels, of which Tsammados was to take the command, and to proceed with them to reinforce the squadron of five ships which remained off Patras. On Sunday, the 8th of May, the squadron of Miaoulis

reduced by the detachment abovementioned to twenty-two vessels, was at a considerable distance towards Zante: the Egyptian fleet, in numbers forty-six, were off the island of Sphacteria; Tsammados's eight vessels were inside the harbour. The neck of land, formed by a swamp and the sea, which connects old Navarino with the main land, as also the plain at its extremity, were occupied by Ibrahim Pacha in person, with all his cavalry. The island was occupied by about 300 irregular Greek soldiers, and 200 sailors, who had been sent on shore from the ships. A battery of two small guns, wrought by a party of sailors, defended the landing place towards the sea; three others, also of small size, were placed higher up among the rocks; and a battery of three pieces of heavy artillery at the southern end of the island, defended the only practicable entrance into the harbour. At 10 o'clock in the morning (of Sunday, the 8th), the Turkish fleet was observed standing in towards the shore. At noon they were ranged along the whole length of the island, keeping up a tremendous fire to cover the landing of the boats; and at the same time, the besiegers on the main land feigned to commence a general attack on the fort.

In a very short time a number of troops, estimated at from two to three thousand, disciplined in the European fashion, dressed in red uniforms, and armed with muskets and bayonets, succeeded in forcing their way into the island. The sailors at the lower battery were surrounded and destroyed to a man; and in the space of about an hour, the enemy had traversed the whole island victoriously from end to end. Of the 500 men

who defended it, not quite 150 escaped. Among the slain were captain Tsammados; and count Santa Rosa, who acted a conspicuous part in the revolution of Piedmont. The slaughter would not have been so great, had the vessels in the harbour exerted themselves to save the fugitives, or even left their boats on shore so as to facilitate their escape. But as soon as the Turks had made good their landing on the island, the Turkish fleet also began to extend itself for the purpose of blockading the mouth of the bay. Upon this, captain Badouri, a Hydriote, gave the signal of flight; six others followed his example. Fifty or a hundred masket shots were fired after them in vain rage by the victims on the shore.

The only vessel which re.nained was the Mars, belonging to captain Tsammados. After waiting for her captain, till the crew were informed of his death, and having taken on board prince Mavrocordato and the governor of old Navarino, this small vessel, a brig of only 18 guns, prepared to force her way through the fleet of the enemy. The Turkish squadron had by this time extended itself nearly across the mouth of the harbour, and the battery commanding the passage was in the hands of the enemy. An officer on board the Mars, addressed the men from the quarter deck, declaring that they should not fall alive into the hands of the barbarians; for that, in case of necessity, he would set fire to the powder magazine, and involve both in one common destruction. The men received this announcement with loud cheers. The breeze being light, for three successive hours, the brig remained almost in the middle of the Turkish fleet, during

which time she exchanged broadsides with several frigates, besides many corvettes and brigs, none of which was under her own force. Considerably damaged in her hull and rigging, but with a loss of only two men killed, and eight or ten wounded, she at last escaped.

On the evening of the 8th, old Navarino remained without commander, without water and provisions, and with only twenty barrels of powder. On the morning of the 10th, the garrison capitulated, on terms which the Pacha faithfully observed.

At noon two brigantines, in spite of the fire of Navarino, entered the harbour, and were followed the next day by eleven frigates and four more brigantines, which anchored within pistol shot of the walls of the city. They immediately sent a Greek prisoner on shore with a message; but he was not received, and the fleet having anchored, immediately commenced a brisk fire. On the morning of the 12th, the enemy renewed the offer of allowing the garrison to retire without their arms, and by land. This proposal was also rejected, and the fire was continued. It was also continued on the 13th and 14th, interrupted only by proposals, which were rejected like the rest. In the mean time, the Egyptians had raised four new batteries; and by the morning of the 15th, there were forty-six pieces of cannon and ten mortars directed against the city on the land side. capable of resisting a fire so disproportioned to the strength of the place, it only remained for the Greeks to endeavour to gain time, in the hope of succour either by sea or land; and it was at length agreed to come to terms, on condition that the firing should first

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cease. A whole week passed in negotiations, purposely prolonged by the Greeks; and the garrison finally marched out on the 23rd, leaving water in the place for four days' supply only, and bread for ten. The conditions of the surrender were, that the Greeks should march out without arms, and be embarked in neutral vessels, to be conducted to Calamata, under the escort of two galliots; one Austrian, the Arethusa, captain Bandiera; the other English, the Amaranth, captain Bezar. The capitulation was observed strictly by the Pacha; except only that Satracco, and the son of Petro Bey, Georgio Mauromicali, were detained prisoners by him, on the pretext that the Greeks had detained two Pachas after the capitulation of Navoli. The Pacha promised to give them up, as soon as the two Pachas should be restored to him.

The garrison of Navarino, after the capture of Sphacteria had been reduced to about 900 men from losses in killed, wounded, and desertion; exclusive of 100 Roumeliots, who set out to march to Missolonghi; of these 900, 300 were Mainotes, 300 Cranidiotes and the rest Roumeliots, with the exception of fifty Cephalonians. The cannon of the place was served by Roumeliots and Cephalonians, and by a company of artillery, which was reduced at the end of the siege to only thirty men.

After the capture of Sphacteria, six ships of war and about thirty transports, part of the Egyptian fleet, were followed by Miaoulis into the harbour of Modon, where more than half of them were destroyed by the Greek fire ships. When Navarino capitulated, the Morea had already been abandoned by the troops of northern