first to the laft, arifes folely from their undiftinguifhable co-operation in producing the fame agreeable effect, in confequence of their being all perceived by the fame organ and at the fame instant.”’ P. 234. Mr. Stewart does not attempt to inveftigate the principles on which colours, forms, or motion give pleafure to the eye. For this he refers to a new work by Mr. Alison, of which we shall embrace an early opportunity of giving fome account to our readers; but in the mean time we agree with the author of the effays now before us, that each of thefe claffes (comprehended under the generic term Beautiful) ought, in a philofophical enquiry, to form the object of a feparate inveftigation; and that the fources of thele pleafing effects fhould be traced in analytical detail, before we prefume to decide how far they are all fufceptible of explanation, from one general theory. As Mr. Burke and Hogarth were of another opinion, Mr. Stewart thinks it incumbent on him, to examine their prin ciples, before he proceeds to illuftrate further and establish his own. He fays little indeed of Hogarth's line of beauty, referring his readers, for a due eftimate of that theory, to the work of his friend Mr Alifon; but he analyzes Mr. Burke's theory of foftness and smoothness, as the effential ingredients of all beauty, with great minutenefs; and completely proves it to rest on a false foundation. We cannot however adopt his opinion that "the zig-zag courfe of the ragged lightening," is among thofe angular forms, which mankind at large deem beautiful. Sublime it certainly is; and it is equally certain that there is no incongruity between the fublime and the beau tiful. The emotions however denoted by thefe two words are not the fame; and the fublimity of the courfe of the rugged lightening predominates to completely over its beauty, that we recollect not another writer who has mentioned the beauty of ragged lightening. Beautiful it would indeed be confi dered probably by all men, were it a thing perfectly harmlefs; but as that is far from being the cafe, the influence of the affociating principle keeps the beauty of the course of lightening out, of the view of its beholder. That influence Mr. Stewart difcuffes with his wonted ability, after making fome judicious remarks on the pi&urefque of Meffrs. Price and Gilpin-remarks however, for which, as they are not fufceptible of abridgement, we muft refer our readers to his work itself. The effect of affociation in heightening the beauty of colour is thus happily illuftrated by our author, The qualities which excite the agreeable fenfations exclufively appropriated to the noftrils, cannot be faid to be beautiful L 4 without without departing altogether from the common ufe of language; but who will deny, that the pleafing effect produced by the form and colour of a rose, even when viewed at a distance, is heightened by the fweet fragrance which we know that it poffeffes? The ef fect of the appearance here prefented to the eye, and that of the affociated pleasure, are fo intimately and fo neceffarily blended together in the mind of every individual, that it is impoffible for any person to say, how much of the complicated delight is to be afcribed to each of the two ingredients; and therefore the pleafing conception which is linked with the appearance of the object, no less than the appearance itself, may be justly regarded as a conftituent of its beauty it is unquestionably the union of both, which has fecured to the rofe her indifputed title as Queen of Flowers. The principle of affociation is not, in this inftance, employed to account for the pleafing effect which the smell of the rofe produces on its appropriate fenfe; but to explain in what manner the recollection of this agreeable sensation may enter, as an element, into the com pofition of an order of pleasures diftinguished by a different name, and claffed with the pleafures of a different organ." P. 290. : What is here remarked with refpect to smell the author fhows to be equally applicable to every other pleafing impref fion or emotion, which affociation can attach to a visible object, It is, however, as he justly obferves, chiefly by intellectual and moral afsociations, that our notions of beauty are influ enced; the most ftriking illuftration of which that can be produced, is the complicated affemblage of charms, phyfical and moral, which enter into the compofition of female beauty. This is a compofition which he pronounces it impoffible for any philofopher to analyze into its different ingredients, or to affign to thofe of them which are intellectual and corporeal, their respective fhares in exciting the emotion produced by the whole object. As intellectual and moral qualities are in our imaginations thus intimately combined with our ideas of female beauty, he fhows, how, by natural proceffes, the denomination of beauty comes to be, in all languages, applied to those qualities them, felves; and how, by fimilar proceffes, the epithet beautiful is gradually transferred to the objects of hearing, although in its original fenfe it is applicable only to objects of fight. He then attempts, though we think unfuccefsfully, to overturn Sir Joshua Reynolds's theory of the beauty of form, of which we have delivered our own opinion elsewhere; but as our limits will not admit of the reafoning by which he endeavours to fupport his objections, we must refer to the work itself, Brit. Crit. vol. xxix. p. 18. requesting requesting only that before Mr. Stewart's objections be admitted, the whole of Sir. Jofhua's effay may be read. In this request we are confident that Mr. Stewart will himfelf unite with us; as he does ample juftice to the genius of the great artift, and does it with that readinefs, which is fo becoming in one man of genius when writing of another. This elaborate Effay concludes with fome judicious obfervations on the beautiful, when prefented to the power of imagination. In thefe obfervations, the reflecting fchodar will not find much that is new or uncommonly profound; but youthful readers of all defcriptions may profit by the fol lowing remarks. "A long and exclufive familiarity with fictitious narratives (it has been often obferved) has a tendency to weaken the intereft we take in the ordinary bufinefs of the world; and the flighteft attempt to fashion the manners after fuch models as they fupply never fails to appear ludicrous in the extreme. The cafe is nearly fimilar with the painter, who applies to the beauties of a rich and varied profpect, the rules of his own limited art; or who, in the midft of fuch a fcene, lofes its general effect, in the contemplation of fome accidental combination of circumftances fuited to his canvas." P. 333. In his fecond Effay Mr. Stewart employs the fame mode of analysis by which he explains the emotion excited by beauty, to the explanation of the fublime, and employs it with equal fuccefs. He does not advance any new theory of his own, nor cenfure indifcriminately any one of the theories advanced by his predeceffors in this department of literature; but he contends that there is not in the fublime any more than in the beautiful, any one quality, effential to all the objects which excite those emotions in the human mind. He thinks indeed, that from objects of great elevation and profundity are derived our firft emotions of fublimity; but he confiders thefe objects as exciting fuch emotions chiefly by leading the thoughts almoft inftantly to ideas of power, which he confiders, and, we think, juftly confiders, as the chief ingredient in that complex emotion or conception, to which we give the epithet of the fublime. He fo far adopts Mr. Burke's theory, as to admit, that a certain degree of terror heightens that emotion, though he does not confider terror as abfolutely effential to it. In these opinions, and indeed in all his opinions refpecting the fublime, he feems to agree more exactly, with the anonymous author of the review of Burke's theory, which Sir John Hawkins erroneously attributed to Johnson, than with any other other author with whom we are acquainted; though he cer tainly does not follow that author with fervility, as he has thrown much additional light on the fubject. To us, however, he appears to carry his attachment to his own mode of tracing the emotion from its firft source, too far, when he contends, that whatever is fublime muft be fomehow connected in our imaginations with great elevation. We think that whatever expands the mind (if we may ufe fuch an expreffion) and leads immediately to the notions of great energy or great power, is fublime; and therefore we cannot adopt his opinion, that the science of modern times by difcovering that there is no fuch thing as abfolute high or low, has diminifhed the fublimity of the ftarry heavens. On the contrary, the fublimity of this fcene feems to us to be heightened by the difcoveries of modern aftronomy, which fhow fo directly that not only the earth but all the heavenly bodies, have no other fupport than that Almighty Power, by which, in the language of fcripture, they are faid to be "hung upon nothing.' Perhaps the following extract will furnish the reader with a more correct view of Mr. Stewart's theory of the fublime, than any abridgment whatever of his Effay. "Although I have attempted to fhew, at fome length, that there is a fpecific pleasure connected with the fimple idea of Subli mity or Elevation, I am far from thinking, that the impreffions produced by fuch adjuncts as Eternity or Power, or even by the phyfical adjuncts of Horizontal extent and of Depth, are wholly refolveable into their affociation with this common and central conception. I own, however, I am of opinion, that in most cafes, the pleafure attached to the conception of literal fublimity, identified, as it comes to be, with thofe religious impreffions which are infeparable from the human mind, is one of the chief ingredients in the complicated emotion 3 and that in every case, it either palpably or latently contributes to the effect. } From this conftant or very general connection, too, which thofe different ingredients have with each other, as well as with the central idea of elevation, they muft neceffarily both lend and bor. row much neceffary influence over the mind. The primary effect of Elevation itself cannot fail to be aftonishingly increased by its affociation with fuch interefting and awful ideas as Immenfity, Eternity, Infinite Power, and Infinite Wisdom; blended as they are in our conceptions with that ftill fublimer attribute of God, which encourages us to look up to him as the Father of All. On the other hand, to all of thefe attributes, Elevation imports, in its turn, a common character, and a common epithet.” P. 411. The next Effay in this volume is on the intellectual power of Taftea fubject which has been difcuffed by many emi nent nent writers; which is interefting to every reader; and on which the author has thrown out many hints, which will be highly useful to all who afpire to the character of philofophical critics. Tafte is often confidered, not by popular writers only, but even by philofophers, as a fimple and original faculty of the mind, and confounded with fenfibility; but Mr. Stewart has bestowed too much time, talents, and attention on the analysis of our intellectual powers, to fall into this mistake. Tafte, he obferves, is fufceptible of improvement from culture, in a higher degree perhaps, than any other power of the mind; whereas the acuteness of all our feelings is diminished by a repetition of the impreffion. Tafle therefore must include in its compofition, other elements than mere fenfibility. To prove the truth of this pofition, and to clear the way for afcertaining what these elements are, he begins his Effay with fome general obfervations, on our acquired powers of perception and judgment; among which he enumerates the acquired perceptions of fight, first perfpicuously and philofophically explained by Berkeley; the proceffes of thought which pafs through the mind with fuch wonderful rapidity, in the common operations of reading and writing; the quickness of that glance, by which an expert accountant, is able to tell at once, the fum refulting from the addition of long columns of figures; the intuitive perceptions of Newton, and (we add) of Berkeley and others, of mathematical conclufions, by no means obvious to ordinary capacities; the rapidity with which the practifed mechanician, comprehends the relations and dependencies of all the parts of a complicated machine; and the quicknels and variety of intellectual combinations, which are exemplified in every fentence uttered by an accomplished orator. All these powers have the appearance of being innate and original, and are generally supposed to exalt those, who are poffeffed of them, far above the rest of mankind in the fcale of genius. Mr. S. however, is decidedly of opinion, and in that opinion we agree with him, that these powers are for the moft part the refult of obfervation, ftudy, and the affociating principle; and that, though in point of quickness, or of any other mental quality, our species ftand not all originally on the fame level, yet a remarkable celerity of this kind, is much more frequently the offspring of thofe habits of obfervation, to which fome particular profeffion, or peculiarity of fituation has trained the mind, than of any original fuperiority of genius. To thefe acquired perceptions and judgments-efpecially thofe of fight,-Mr. Stewart compares the power or faculty of Tafte; and observes that to ascertain by what process that faculty |