Hun.] THIRD DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1895. She voluntarily resided in Washington county in this State. appeared by attorney in said action, served an answer therein and was sworn as a witness. The case was tried and judgment for an absolute divorce was granted in favor of the defendant and against plaintiff on the ground of desertion, in compliance with the laws of the State of Nebraska. No appeal has been taken from this judg ment and it remains in force. It provided, among other things, that the marriage contract theretofore existing between the parties be, and the same was, dissolved, and that both parties were relieved from the obligation thereof. Plaintiff having voluntarily appeared in said action, the judgment is to be considered in all regards the same as if plaintiff, at the time it was granted, was a resident of Nebraska. Hence, by the judgment of a court of general and competent jurisdiction, and having jurisdiction over the parties and subject-matter, an absolute divorce has been granted in pursuance of the laws of Nebraska to the defendant. That judgment is as binding upon the plaintiff in this State as in Nebraska. Full faith and credit must be given in each State to the judicial proceedings of every other State. Such proceedings have the same effect in every court within the United States as they have by law or usage in the courts of the State in which they are taken. (U. S. Const. art. 4, 1; Act of Congress, May 26, 1790, 2d sess. chap. 11; U. S. R. S. 170, § 905. See, also, Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; Jones v. Jones, 108 id. 415; de Meli v. de Meli, 120 id. 485-495; Kinnier v. Kinnier, 45 id. 535–539.) It follows, in answer to the first question submitted, that the plaintiff, Alice E. Rich, is not the lawful wife of the defendant, Adelbert E. Rich. In answer to the second question propounded, we are of the opinion that the plaintiff cannot recover of the defendant any sum for the past education, support and maintenance of the infant child of the parties. In the judgment granted in the District Court of Cass County, Nebraska, an allowance was made of $100 to the plaintiff for alimony, and she was also awarded costs. She was given the custody of the infant child of the parties until he attained the age of eight years. No allowance was made for his support and maintenance. The court could have made a provision for the maintenance of the child, but failed to do so. On the question under con THIRD DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1895. [Vol. 88. sideration this case should be regarded the same as it would have been had the judgment of divorce been granted by the courts of this State. The law presumes that every question involved in the action in which the judgment was rendered — and the right of the plaintiff to an allowance for the maintenance of the child was one of those questions was passed upon by the court, and that the claim for such maintenance was decided adversely to the plaintiff. We think the judgment in the Nebraska court is a bar to plaintiff's claim. The principle declared in Kamp v. Kamp (59 N. Y. 212) prevents an allowance to plaintiff for the support and maintenance of the child of the parties. Let a judgment be entered in pursuance of this memorandum and the stipulation of the parties, without costs. HERRICK and FURSMAN, JJ., concurred. Judgment for defendant as per opinion, without costs. Hun.] THE NEW YORK SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent, v. WILLIAM V. REYNOLDS, as Receiver, Appellant, v. THE NEW YORK SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY and Others, Respondents. THE NEW YORK SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent, v. THE NEW YORK SECURITY AND TRUST COMPANY, Respondent, v. Equity — trust mortgage executed by a corporation — cross-action · -a stranger cannot question the irregular appointment of a trustee-notice of the exercise of an option to declare due all the bonds secured by a mortgage is an executive duty not requiring a resolution of the board of directors· confirmation by the board. a mortgage covering after-acquired personal property of a corporation power to mortgage it — effect of recording the mortgage — rule as to fixtures between mortgagee and bondholders- what are fixtures— necessity of proof that the property was subsequently acquired - property necessarily consumed in the conduct of a business when separate judgments in two actions are necessary - nature of a cross-action in chancery -discretion of the court in taking property from one receiver and transferring it to another. In 1887 the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company, a domestic corporation, in 88 569 9ap 90 88 569 26ap557 88 569 30ap 93 155a 698 88 569 157a 689 88h 569 f52ad222 THIRD DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1895. [Vol. 88. In May, 1891, the American Loan and Trust Company was dissolved because of its insolvency, and J. Edward Simmons was appointed its permanent receiver. In May, 1892, Walter Stanton applied to the court by a petition, in which he stated that he owned or controlled a majority of the bonds of the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company, and asked for the appointment of a new trustee; the president of the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company consented in writing to the appointment of the New York Security and Trust Company, and on May 23, 1892, on notice to the Attorney-General and to Simmons, as receiver, the New York Security and Trust Company was appointed trustee under the mortgage or deed of trust. The order appointing the New York Security and Trust Company as trustee was made in the first judicial district and not in the fourth judicial district, as it was provided that it should be in the mortgage. The trustees of the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company confirmed this action by a resolution, and later, by an agreement executed on June 10, 1892, conveyed all the property covered by the mortgage, subject to the same conditions, to the new trustee, which accepted the conveyance and trust. This agreement was executed by the president of the gas and electric light company, and by its treasurer, William V. Reynolds, but as alleged without authority. Thereafter a reorganization was undertaken, under which the bondholders deposited with the New York Security and Trust Company 271 bonds out of a total of 300- the latter company acting as trustee and paying interest on the bonds until August 1, 1893, when a default occurred. On the 11th day of November, 1893, the secretary of the New York Security and Trust Company notified the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company, in writing, that the former company exercised its option to declare the principal of all the bonds immediately due, and on the same day the New York Security and Trust Company, upon the written request of a majority of the bondholders of the Saratoga Gas and Electric Light Company, began a foreclosure of the mortgage, and in the action first above entitled, on November 16, 1893, Lafay ette B. Gleason was appointed receiver of the gas and electric light company for the benefit of the plaintiff. An amended complaint was filed December 23, 1893. The First National Bank of Saratoga Springs, which was made a party defendant to the foreclosure action, answered, alleging that on the 27th day of September, and on the 11th day of November, 1893, it recovered judgments against the gas and electric light company and levied on its property, and that its executions were liens "upon any property acquired by said gas company after the execution and delivery of the mortgage set out in the complaint, prior and superior to the lien of said mortgage;" that the mortgage, so far as it related to personal property, was void because the mortgagor used and sold property covered by the mortgage and applied the proceeds to the purchase of other property instead of applying them to the payment of the mortgage debt, and that the appointment of the plaintiff as trustee was void, and asked judgment that its liens be declared absolute for the balance due it; that the property used and sold by the gas and electric light Hun.] THIRD DEPARTMENT, JULY TERM, 1895. company since the execution of the mortgage be deemed a payment of the mortgage pro tanto; that the mortgage be declared fraudulent as against the bank, and that the plaintiff be declared to be neither a trustee nor entitled to maintain the action. Edward F. Andrews, also made a party defendant, interposed an answer in which he alleged that he had obtained a judgment against the gas and electric light company and that under it sequestration proceedings were taken against the corporation, resulting in the appointment of William V. Reynolds as receiver on the 16th day of December, 1893; he attacked the legality of the appointment of the trust company as trustee; the use of the corporate property by the corporation, and in all other respects asked the same relief as the First National Bank. William V. Reynolds, also made a party defendant, set forth his appointment as receiver in the sequestration proceedings, put in issue the legality of the appointment of the trust company as trustee and its exercise of the option to declare the whole amount of the principal of the bonds to be due, and asked that the appointment of the trust company as trustee be vacated. On the 28th day of April, 1894, William V. Reynolds, as such receiver, began the action secondly above entitled and alleged in his complaint the commencement of the foreclosure action and the appointment of the New York Security and Trust Company as trustee; he further alleged that the notice upon which this appointment was made was given only to the Attorney-General and the attorney for the American Loan and Trust Company; that Walter Stanton did not at the time of his petition own or control any of the bonds, and that neither Simmons, as receiver, nor the People owned any of the bonds; and he asked as relief that the order appointing the trustee be vacated and that the complaint in the foreclosure action be dismissed. The two actions, the first for a foreclosure of the mortgage and the second by Reynolds, as receiver, were tried at the same time. A foreclosure was directed in the first action; in the second the complaint was dismissed; separate judgments were entered in each action. The Saratoga National Bank, Andrews, and Reynolds, as receiver, appealed in the first action. In the second action Reynolds, as receiver, appealed. In both actions Reynolds, as receiver, moved to have the judgments set aside and to have one judgment entered upon the ground that in both there was but one cause of action. These motions were denied and the appeals of Reynolds therein constitute the third and fourth appeals above entitled. Finally Reynolds made a motion for an order directing Gleason, as receiver, to deliver to Reynolds, as receiver, the possession of the mortgaged property. The motion was denied, and Reynolds' appeal from that order constitutes the appeal fifthly above entitled. Held, upon a consideration of the appeals of Reynolds from the two judgments, that as the original trustee under the mortgage had become insolvent, the court had power to appoint a new trustee, and that while the appointment of the New York Security and Trust Company as trustee might have been irregular, it was not void; |