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then are to remove him, with three children,was quashed for this defect. (1)

Complaint Yet this is well enough, if it appears that the father's that father chargeable,

becoming chargeable is a good ground for removing those when a ground of his family named in the order. An order, adjudging for removing the husband settled at K., and that he was likely to become his family.

chargeable to H., and sending him, his wife, and son of one year old, to K. was held good. (2)

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2d, Since 35 Geo.III. c.101. the complaint should state that the paupers are become actually chargeable, as it must have done previously where persons resided under a certificate (3); or it should set out facts from whence that conclusion necessarily arises. (4)

Single woman pregnant.

Thus, where the order stated that E. M. single woman is with child and unmarried, and that the justices do adjudge the same to be true, it was held ill; for if it were an irrefragable conclusion that being a single woman and with child, the party removed must be deemed chargeable within the meaning of the statute, the order would be good; otherwise the justices ought to have drawn the conclusion to show that in their judgment she was a proper object of removal within the poor laws: for though a person unmarried, and with child, is presumptively chargeable from the strong probability that she must be so; yet as there may be circumstances, such as the substance of the party, or the giving a complete indemnity to the parish, which may exclude that presumption; it ought to appear by the order that the justices had exercised their

(1) Rex v. Newington, Sett. & Rem. 45.
(2) Hobey v. Kingsbury, 1 Str. 527.
(3) Great Bedwin v. Wilcot, 2 Str. 1158. Burr. S. C. 163. “ In this
case the order stated, that C. M. being reduced to great poverty, lately
applied to the church wardens and overseers of the parish of W. afore-

said, who accordingly did relieve him.” But adjudged insufficient, for it does not appear that it was at the parish expence. See ante, 197.(2),

(4) Rex v. Inskip with Sowerby, 5 M. & S. 299.

judgment, and repelled the existence of such circumstances, by their adjudication that she was chargeable, in order to show that she was a proper object of removal, within the meaning of the law. (1)

But an order for the removal of a single woman under this act, stating, that A. E., single woman, is, by being pregnant, deemed to have become chargeable to the said parish, &c.,” is good in form, for the premises are stated as in the statute itself, from whence the conclusion is drawn; and therefore all is stated which the statute requires. (2)

And it is sufficient that the order charge a woman, whether married or unmarried (if pregnant with a child likely to be born a bastard), generally, as actually become chargeable to the parish, without setting forth the manner in which she has become so. For the justices are to draw the conclusion, whether chargeable or not, and it is enough for them to state that conclusion upon the face of the order, without stating the premises on which it is founded. If that conclusion be disputed, the party is to appeal ; and if upon appeal the facts are stated to the superior court, they are to see whether the premises warrant the magistrates in drawing that conclusion. (3)

An order stated “ that complaint was made that M. S., the wife of W. S., a soldier, and absent from her, is come to inhabit the township of I., &c., and that she is now with child of a child likely to be born a bastard, and that her last legal settlement is in the township of P.” The justices adjudged “the said M. S., to be actually chargeable to the township of I., and her last legal settlement to be in P.” The sessions quashed the order for insufficiency of form, because it was not stated in the complaint that the

(1) Rex v. Holme Quaver, 11 East, 381.
(2) Rex v. Diddlebury, East, 47 Geo. III. 9 East, 398.
(3) Rex v. Tibbenbam, 9 East, 388.

pauper had become actually chargeable. But the court of B. R. held the order of removal sufficient, and quashed that of the sessions; for the complaint states the premises from whence the conclusion necessarily arose under 35 Geo.III.c. 101. that the pauper was to be deemed chargeable, and the justices have drawn the conclusion. (1)

III. Of stating the Examination.

Examination As the examination ought to be taken before two jusmust appear to be taken tices (2), if it states, “ it appears upon examination to be before two jus- made before us, or one of us,” it is bad. (3) tices. 49 Geo.III. But now by 49 Geo.III. c.124. s.4. in case the pauper c. 124, s. 4.

is by age or other infirmity unable to be brought up to be examined as to his settlement, it shall be lawful for one magistrate to take his examination, and report it to another, and for those magistrates upon such report to adjudge the settlement. And the order will be good, althought it omits to set out that the examination was taken before one justice only, and was reported to the other justice, so as to show the particular jurisdiction and authority of the justices under the statute.

For their jurisdiction is altogether under the statute, which does not make it necessary to state the proceedings had under it in their order. (4)

Upon oath. The statute directs, that it shall be upon oath; but if "Due examin- the order profess to be made “upon due examination,” ation," or “due consider. without saying upon oath, it is sufficient; for in an order, ation,” tanta- it shall be intended to be upon oath. (5) So it was held

sufficient to recite in the order, that“ upon due examination of the party, and upon his affirmation, &c."


(1) Rex v. Inskip with Sowerby, 5 M. & S. 299.

(2) Ante, 208. and per Lee C. J., Rex v. Stansfield, post, 224. (1). But see 49 Geo.III. c. 124, s. 4. infra.

(3) Ware v. Stanstead, 2 Salk. 488. ante, 208. (2).
(4) Rex v. South Lynn, All Saints, 4 M. & S. 354.
(5) Munger Hunger v. Warden, 2 Sess: Cas. 40.

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without adding that he was å quaker (1); and if the adjudication is “upon due consideration of the complaint,” and not upon due examination, &c., it will do, for due consideration implies a due examination. (2) So, if it profess to be made “ upon examination of the premises upon oath,” and other circumstances, it is sufficient. (3)

IV. The Description of the Parties.

An order must describe the parties with sufficient cer- Description of tainty. The form of one was : " Whereas à certain woman parties. Must

state the name, was brought to bed of a female bastard child in N., and or that it is afterwards dropped in S. these to convey, &c.," and held unknown. bad; for per Parker C. J.-—“You must either name her, or say you do not know her.” (4) An order to remove a “ Family” man and his family is bad as to the family, for it is too ge- too general. neral. (5) It is usual, therefore, and perhaps nécessary, to set forth the name of the wife, and more especially of the children, where they are known. (6)

If an order be made for removing a man, his wife, and when neceschildren, and the adjudication respects only the father's sary to state

children's age. settlement, the children's ages should be set forth (7), or the order will be bad as to them; and if it appear that the child is above 'seven years old, then it must adjudge that the child has not gained a settlement in its own When that

child has gainright. (8) But if it expressly adjudges the place to which

ed no settlement in its

own right. (1) Rex v.Cirencester, cited in Munger Hunger v Warden, ante,222.(5). (2) Rex v. Featherton, 2 Sess. Cas. 45. (3) Rex v. Bagworth, Cald. 179. ante, 206. (1). (4) Southell v. Needwell, Sett. & Rem. 57.

(5) Beaton v. Siston, i Str. 114. Johnson's case, 2 Salk. 485. Anon., Salk. 482. Comb. 478. Wangford v. Brandon, Carth. 449.

(6) See Flixton v. Royston, 1 Sess. Cas. 11. Fol. 278. (7) See Hobey u. Kingsbury, ante, 220. (2).

(8) The order set forth," It appearing to us,&c. that his(the father's) settlement is in A.” without saying that it was likewise the settlement of his wife and children; “ we do therefore adjudge the settlement of the father , wife, and children to be in A.” Held good as to the father and his wife, but quashed as to the children, for the reason given in the text.

they are removed to be the last legal settlement of the children, it need not specify their ages. (1)

V. Of the Adjudication. Adjudication An order of removal is a judgment which must be cermust be certain.

tain and positive; although, therefore, there is no necessity for any particular form of words (2), yet it ought, in averring all essential facts, to use express and positive

words of adjudication; as, “we adjudge;" or, “ it appears May refer to to us, &c. ;" “ the parties are, &c.;" and it must either set statement in

them forth in the adjudication, or plainly refer to them complaint.

when sufficiently stated in the complaint. (3)

“ On examin- Thus, where it only stated, “we, on examination do ation believe, believe the same to be true;" this was held to be no adjuthe same true," bad.

dication, and the order was quashed. (4)



So, if it adjudge that the pauper was last legally settled cording to pur in B. “ according to their knowledge,” it is uncertain ; for knowledge,”

the pauper might be settled elsewhere, and the justices not know it. (5)

&c. bad.

Two things to The same things must be adjudged in this part of the be adjudged. order, as should be stated in the complaint, viz.

Rex v. Trinity, in Chester, 2 Sess. Cas. 74. Rex v. Leverington, Burr. S. C. 276., where one of the children removed was eight years old; the judges in court concurred in opinion " that children of such tender age cannot be supposed to have gained any other settlement than the derivative one from their father."

(1) Rex v. Hepenstall, Burr. S.C. 88. Rex v. Ufculm, ib. 138. 2 Bott, 654. Pl. 710, 711. S. P. Rex v. Bowling, Burr. S. C. 177. Rex v. Normanton, ib. 213. Rex v. Stansfield, ib. 205. ante, 222. (2). Ringmore v. Petworth, Sett. & Remov. 41. Reg. v. Middleham, post, 228. (4). Rex v. Bucklebury, ib. (5).

(2) Per Lee C.J., Ufculm r. Clysthydon, Burr. S. C. 138.

(3) See the opinion of Lord Hardwicke C. J., Bourne v. Spalding, Burr. S. C. 38.

(4) Stallingborough v. Haxhay, 1 Sess. Cas. 131.
(5) Rex v. St. Mary Ottery, Sett. & Remov. 32.

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