the officers belong, not having gained a legal settlement there. 2d, That they are actually chargeable to the said parish 2d, Is chargeor township. able. 1st, As to coming to inhabit, "Endeavour to intrude," 1st, In one case, an order stating that the pauper and his wife do "endeavour to intrude into the parish, &c.," was quashed, because an endeavour to come in does not import that he actually was come in. (1) But in a sub- bad. Ifimplisequent case, where the order ran, "whereas J. C. and sufficient. citly set forth, his wife is come into your parish, endeavouring to settle themselves contrary to law, and are likely to become chargeable, &c." Per Pratt, C. J.-"I do not think it necessary to show they came in, but only an endeavour to settle; and that may be, where the party never came in, as the case of children born in one parish, when the settlement of the parent is in another. But if it was necessary, it is implicitly set forth in the complaint, which is sufficient." (2) So where an order stated that the paupers "lately came, and intruded themselves into the said parish," it was objected that it did not appear that the paupers were then in the parish, i. e. at the time of the removal. But it was answered, that the order states, and the magistrates adjudge it to be true, that the paupers are likely to become chargeable to the parish, which could not be if they were not in the parish at the time. (3) remove no complained of. more than are But as the complaint is the foundation of the jurisdic- Justices can tion, the justices cannot remove more than are complained of. An order, stating, "whereas J. S. had intruded into the parish of A., and is likely to become chargeable; these (1) Rex v. Graffham, Sett. & Rem. 16. Although the order proceeded to state" that he is likely to become chargeable," as to which, see Rex v. Binegar, infra, (3). (2) Rex v. South Marston, 1 Str. 189. But see the effect of 35 Geo.III. post. 220. (3) Rex v. Binegar, 7 East, 377. Complaint 2d, Must state actualpauper ly chargeable, as in case of certificate. Single woman pregnant. then are to remove him, with three children," was quashed for this defect. (1) Yet this is well enough, if it appears that the father's becoming chargeable is a good ground for removing those of his family named in the order. An order, adjudging the husband settled at K., and that he was likely to become chargeable to H., and sending him, his wife, and son of one year old, to K. was held good. (2) 2d, Since 35 Geo.III. c.101. the complaint should state that the paupers are become actually chargeable, as it must have done previously where persons resided under a certificate (3); or it should set out facts from whence that conclusion necessarily arises. (4) Thus, where the order stated that E. M. single woman is with child and unmarried, and that the justices do adjudge the same to be true, it was held ill; for if it were an irrefragable conclusion that being a single woman and with child, the party removed must be deemed chargeable within the meaning of the statute, the order would be good; otherwise the justices ought to have drawn the conclusion to show that in their judgment she was a proper object of removal within the poor laws: for though a person unmarried, and with child, is presumptively chargeable from the strong probability that she must be so; yet as there may be circumstances, such as the substance of the party, or the giving a complete indemnity to the parish, which may exclude that presumption; it ought to appear by the order that the justices had exercised their (1) Rex v. Newington, Sett. & Rem. 45. (3) Great Bedwin v. Wilcot, 2 Str. 1158. Burr. S. C. 165. "In this case the order stated, that C. M. being reduced to great poverty, lately applied to the churchwardens and overseers of the parish of W. aforesaid, who accordingly did relieve him." But adjudged insufficient, for it does not appear that it was at the parish expence. See ante, 197. (2), (4) Rex v. Inskip with Sowerby, 5 M. & S. 299. judgment, and repelled the existence of such circumstances, by their adjudication that she was chargeable, in order to show that she was a proper object of removal, within the meaning of the law. (1) But an order for the removal of a single woman under this act, stating, "that A. E., single woman, is, by being pregnant, deemed to have become chargeable to the said parish, &c.," is good in form, for the premises are stated as in the statute itself, from whence the conclusion is drawn; and therefore all is stated which the statute requires. (2) And it is sufficient that the order charge a woman, whether married or unmarried (if pregnant with a child likely to be born a bastard), generally, as actually become chargeable to the parish, without setting forth the manner in which she has become so. For the justices are to draw the conclusion, whether chargeable or not, and it is enough for them to state that conclusion upon the face of the order, without stating the premises on which it is founded. If that conclusion be disputed, the party is to appeal; and if upon appeal the facts are stated to the superior court, they are to see whether the premises warrant the magistrates in drawing that conclusion. (3) An order stated "that complaint was made that M. S., the wife of W. S., a soldier, and absent from her, is come to inhabit the township of I., &c., and that she is now with child of a child likely to be born a bastard, and that her last legal settlement is in the township of P." The justices adjudged "the said M. S., to be actually chargeable to the township of I., and her last legal settlement to be in P." The sessions quashed the order for insufficiency of form, because it was not stated in the complaint that the (1) Rex v. Holme Quaver, 11 East, 381. (2) Rex v. Diddlebury, East, 47 Geo. III. 9 East, 398. Examination must appear to be taken pauper had become actually chargeable. But the court of B. R. held the order of removal sufficient, and quashed that of the sessions; for the complaint states the premises from whence the conclusion necessarily arose under 35 Geo.III. c. 101. that the pauper was to be deemed chargeable, and the justices have drawn the conclusion. (1) III. Of stating the Examination. As the examination ought to be taken before two justices (2), if it states, "it appears upon examination to be before two jus- made before us, or one of us," it is bad. (3) tices. 49 Geo. III. c. 124, s. 4. ation," or But now by 49 Geo.III. c.124. s.4. in case the pauper is by age or other infirmity unable to be brought up to be examined as to his settlement, it shall be lawful for one magistrate to take his examination, and report it to another, and for those magistrates upon such report to adjudge the settlement. And the order will be good, althought it omits to set out that the examination was taken before one justice only, and was reported to the other justice, so as to show the particular jurisdiction and authority of the justices under the statute. For their jurisdiction is altogether under the statute, which does not make it necessary to state the proceedings had under it in their order. (4) Upon oath. The statute directs, that it shall be upon oath; but if "Due examin- the order profess to be made "upon due examination,” "due consider without saying upon oath, it is sufficient; for in an order, ation," tanta- it shall be intended to be upon oath. (5) So it was held sufficient to recite in the order, that "upon due examination of the party, and upon his affirmation, &c." mount. (1) Rex v. Inskip with Sowerby, 5 M. & S. 299. (2) Ante, 208. and per Lee C. J., Rex v. Stansfield, post, 224. (1). But see 49 Geo.III. c. 124. s. 4. infra. (5) Ware v. Stanstead, 2 Salk. 488. ante, 208. (2). (4) Rex v. South Lynn, All Saints, 4 M. & S. 354. (5) Munger Hunger v. Warden, 2 Sess: Cas. 40. without adding that he was a quaker (1); and if the adjudication is "upon due consideration of the complaint," and not upon due examination, &c., it will do, for due consideration implies a due examination. (2) So, if it profess to be made "upon examination of the premises upon oath," and other circumstances, it is sufficient. (3) IV. The Description of the Parties. parties. Must state the name, or that it is unknown. AN order must describe the parties with sufficient cer- Description of tainty. The form of one was: "Whereas a certain woman was brought to bed of a female bastard child in N., and afterwards dropped in S. these to convey, &c.," and held bad; for per Parker C. J.-" You must either name her, or say you do not know her." (4) An order to remove a « man and his family is bad as to the family, for it is too ge- too general. neral. (5) It is usual, therefore, and perhaps necessary, to set forth the name of the wife, and more especially of the children, where they are known. (6) Family" sary to state children's age. If an order be made for removing a man, his wife, and When neceschildren, and the adjudication respects only the father's settlement, the children's ages should be set forth (7), or the order will be bad as to them; and if it appear that the child is above seven years old, then it must adjudge that the child has not gained a settlement in its own right. (8) But if it expressly adjudges the place to which (1) Rex v. Cirencester, cited in Munger Hunger v Warden, ante,222.(5). (2) Rex v. Featherton, 2 Sess. Cas. 45. (3) Rex v. Bagworth, Cald. 179. ante, 206. (1). (4) Southell v. Needwell, Sett. & Rem. 57. (5) Beaton v. Siston, 1 Str. 114. Johnson's case, 2 Salk. 485. Anon., Salk. 482. Comb. 478. Wangford v. Brandon, Carth, 449. (6) See Flixton v. Royston, 1 Sess. Cas. 11. Fol. 278. (7) See Hobey v. Kingsbury, ante, 220. (2). (8) The order set forth, "It appearing to us,&c. that his (the father's) settlement is in A." without saying that it was likewise the settlement of his wife and children; "we do therefore adjudge the settlement of the father, wife, and children to be in A." Held good as to the father and his wife, but quashed as to the children, for the reason given in the text. When that child has gain ed no settlement in its own right. |