were last legally settled in M., that this is no adjudication of a present settlement. But by Lord Ellenborough C. J. It refers to the time of the complaint made, and the court cannot intend an intermediate settlement between the hearing of the complaint and the making of the order. (1)

the word

An order adjudged, "the last legal place of the said H. Omission of is at W." omitting the words of settlement, and was quashed. "settlement," Per Curiam. Here is no adjudication of a settlement, and fatal. these orders are never to be made good by implication. (2)

cate.

An order which states that the pauper came into the How far must parish under a certificate, need not set forth that it was state certifiallowed by two justices, at least if it go on to adjudge his settlement to be in the parish by which it was granted. (3)

As to the description of the parties, both in the complaint and adjudication, see ante. (4)

VI. Of the Direction of the Order.

pa

settlement rish to receive

THE remaining essential circumstance is the fruit or Require offieffect of the order, which is to require the officers of the cers of complaining parish complaining parish to remove the pauper; and, those of to remove. Of the place in which the settlement is adjudged to be, to receive and provide for him. If, therefore, it does not say and provide which is to convey, and which is to receive, the persons to for. Not stating be removed (5); or if it directs both to remove and re- which to receive (6), it is bad; and it is à fortiori defective, where it ceive, and is directed solely to the officers of the parish in which the vey, bad. settlement is adjudged to be, and requires them to convey Or if it directs the pauper thence; for the justices ought, and can only move and re

(1) Rex v. Binegar, 7 East, 377. See Rex v. Honiton, ante, 226. (2). (2) Rex v. Warnhill, 2 Sess. Cas. 91. ante, 226. (4).

(3) Reg. v. Newton, 1 Sess. Cas. 161.

(4) 223. IV., and that the power of adjudication and removal is limited

by the complaint, ante, 218.

(5) Binfield v. Banstead, 11 Mod. 268.

(6) Bedwitch's case, Comb. 525.

which to con

both to re

ceive.

Quære, if good,

to a constable

to remove.

order the parish officers, where the intrusion is made, to make the removal. (1)

It seems, that an order directed to the constable of a when directed parish, commanding him to remove a pauper, is well enough, if he remove under it. For if a justice direct a warrant to a person by name, who is no officer, he is not bound to obey it; but if he do, and it is a matter within the jurisdiction of a justice, the warrant will bear him out. (2)

Mistake in

A mistake in the name of the parish to which the rename of parish. moval is made does not vitiate the order, where that used is sufficiently descriptive, according to common intendment; more especially if the parish officers have recognised its sufficiency by any act of their own, as by receiving the pauper, or appealing to the sessions against the

order.

A pauper was removed from the parish of Topsham, by an order addressed "To the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Poole, or town and county of Poole;" and that parish was described in the same terms in that part of the order which adjudged the settlement to be there. Upon appeal to the quarter sessions, it was objected, that the town and county of Poole consisted but of one parish, and that the name of that parish was St. James's, in Poole. The sessions over-ruled the objection, and the court of king's bench were of the same opinion. They said there was no objection to this description of the parish of Poole, although the name of its tutelary saint was omitted; there being but one parish in the town and

(1) St. George's v. St. Olave's, 2 Salk. 495.

(2) Wangford v. Brandon, Carth. 449. In this case, three poor men and their families were removed by the same order, which was ultimately quashed for another defect. But quære, whether a distinction may not exist between an order or warrant of removal, and a warrant founded upon it? However, in 13& 14Car.II. c.12., and 3 W.&M. c.11., that which is now called an order of removal, is denominated a warrant of removal.

county of Poole, and Poole being the common name of the place. And it was added, that the parish officers had themselves considered this description as sufficient to call upon them to appeal to the sessions against the order, by whom the objection to the misnomer had been overruled. (1)

But if the name of the parish removed to is altogether mistaken, as if the parish of Woking is called Waking, it seems as if it would be bad; at least, where the officers of the parish have not acknowledged the description to be sufficient by some act of their own. (2)

The parish of Kirkby Stephen consists of ten townships, of which the township of Wharton, and the township of Kirkby Stephen, are two. A pauper was removed from the parish of Wharton to the township of Kirkby Stephen, by an order directed to the officers of the parish of Kirkby Stephen, and his settlement was thereby adjudged to be

(1) See Vowles v. Miller, 3 Taunt. 140., that it is sufficient in trespass to use the name of the parish commonly used; also Rex v. Topsham, 7 East, 466. In Rex v. St. Nicholas, in Harwich, the certificate was directed "To the churchwardens and overseers of the poor of the parish of Harwich, near Dover Court, in the county of Essex." The case stated by the sessions, found that the proper name of the parish was St. Nicholas in Harwich, and that there is no such parish as that of Harwich, near Dover Court, and that it did not appear to them that the borough or corporation of Harwich contained any more parishes than one. The court of K. B. was of opinion, that supposing this to be a mis-direction, the certificate was good notwithstanding, because the 8&9 W.III. c.50. does not require any direction of a certificate, and a mis-direction is as a void direction, ante, 173.(5). But ChappleJ., in giving his opinion, added, "Besides, if a direction were necessary, I should doubt whether this mistake of the name would make it bad. I remember a case of a carrier, in Lord Raymond's time, where the plaintiff recovered, though there was no such parish as Wicomb, the true name being Chipping Wycomb." Burr. S. C. 176. As to a mistake in the local name of a county in an order, see ante, 215., and how far a misnomer may be amended by the justices at sessions, under 5 Geo.II. c.19. see post, chap. xxxviii. sect. 2. and seq.

(2) See Rex v. Oswell, 2 Salk. 472. tamen quære.

Where ambiguity in the direction does

not vitiate.

"in the parish of Kirkby Stephen." This order was delivered to an overseer of the township of Kirkby Stephen. In a question between the township of Wharton and Kirkby Stephen, respecting the pauper's settlement, the latter was held to be concluded, by not having appealed against this order; for the removal to the parish of K. S. must mean the township of K. S. (1)

And it seems no objection to the direction of an order that it is to the churchwardens of the parish, township, or division of U. (2)," or to the churchwardens and overseers of the township of H. (3)

Yet where an exception was taken to an order of removal, that the removal was to the parish or hamlet of A. as being uncertain, the court are reported to have quashed it. (4)

SECT. III.

clusive.

Of the Form of a subsequent Order of Removal, after a
Pauper is removed under a former one.

Form of sub- A SUBSEQUENT order of removal, generally requires the
sequent order. insertion of something in addition to the common form
Original order,
how far con-
that has been just examined. An order of removal is in
effect a judgment. If unappealed from, it concludes the
parish which acquiesces in the removal as against the
world. (5) If the justice's adjudication of a settlement
be confirmed upon appeal, it is equally conclusive; but if
an order is quashed upon the merits, it only concludes
the contending parishes (6); for it is a decision of the

(1) Rex v. Kirkby Stephen, Burr. S. C. 664. ante, 146. (1). See Spittlefields and Bromley, 18 Vin. Abr., tit. Removal, (H.) pl. S. page 468. (2) Rex v. Ulverstone, 7 Term Rep. 565.

(3) Rex v. Holbeck, in Leeds, Burr. S. C. 198.

(4) Rex v. Grimstone, 1 Barnard. 11.

(5) Ante, 142. sect. 4.

(6) Per Foster J., Rex v.

Bradenham, Burr. S. C. 397. post, 233. (3),

appellant jurisdiction between those parties, that the settlement is not in the parish to which the removal was made.

So long as these judgments are in force, the justices have no authority to make a fresh order in direct repugnance to them. (1)

If they make one, therefore, removing the same parties to the place which appears exempted by the prior adjudication, such new order must state that a settlement has been acquired there subsequently. (2) For even if there has been time to gain a new settlement, yet the court will not intend or presume any thing of that kind; but it must be specially stated. (3) Thus, if an order removing from A. to B. is quashed by the sessions upon the merits, the pauper cannot be sent again from A. to B. by a fresh order, unless it states a subsequent settlement in B. (4) So where a pauper was removed from B. to A. by an order which was afterwards quashed, and B. then removed him to F., and F. neglected to appeal. F. removed him to A. by subsequent order, which was quashed for this defect. (5)

a

(1)" Also justices of peace may be punished in the manner above mentioned, (i. e. by attachment) for acting in a contemptuous manner against the determination of the court of king's bench; as where an order of settlement specially setting forth the circumstances of the case, is removed into the said court, and quashed there by the judgment of the court upon the merits; and yet the justices of peace afterwards made another order to remove the same person to the same place for the very same cause, without regarding the judgment of the court, though it were well known to them, and insisted on by the parties." Hawk. P. C. book 2. chap. xxii. sect. 29.

(2) Per Foster J., ante 232. (6). But see infra, (3).

(3) Rex v. Bradenham, Burr. S. C. 394. See also Rex v. Leverington, Burr. S. C. 276. Godalming v. St. Michael's, in Winchester, ib. 277. But it is not always necessary that it should shew a new settlement. A right of removal, accruing subsequent to the former order, is sufficient. Rex v. Osgathorpe, Burr. S. C. 261. post.

(4) Rex v. Leigh, Cald. 59. Foster v. Carlton, 1 Str. 567.

(5) Alderton v. Fellingtowe, 2 Bott, 691. Pl. 751. But it would be otherwise if F. had not been concluded as against the world, by neglect

Second order, place exempted by first order, must state a subsequent settlement.

removing to

Court will not

presume one.

Second order removing to a third parish, must state subsequent settlement, where parish removing, concluded by the first.