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tinue chargeable,” is good, although it is not adjudged that so much as 50s. had actually been expended by the parish. For the justices may indemnify the parish in gross, for the charges of lying-in, and other incidental charges, and the charges of the midwife, &c. fall upon the parish. (1) And it need not state by whom the money May order the is disbursed. (2) It is likewise no objection that it orders money to be
paid to the the money to be paid to the overseers. (3)
13. In some cases, the court of king's bench seem to 13. Should or
der reasonable have quashed an order, where the sum thereby required
maintenance. to be paid was either unreasonably small or excessively 1 large. (4)
14. The justices have power to order the parent to 14. Should repay so far as is necessary to indemnify the parish for the strict mainteexpence of maintaining the bastard, but no further. The child is charge payment, therefore, should be limited in the order to suchable. time as the child shall be a burthen upon the parish. An order to pay so much a-week indefinitely, is bad. (5) The usual form is, “ during so long a time as the said bastard child shall be chargeable (6);" or if it be “till it shall be no longer chargeable,” it is good. (7) So it is well enough, if it directs 4s. a-week to be paid, during so long as the
(1) Rex v. Fox, 1 Bott, 493. Pl. 638. Rex v. Hartington, Upper Quarter, 4 M. & S. 559. But see Rex v. Sherman, 1 Vent. 210.
(2) Reg. v. Smith, 1 Bott, 487. Pl. 618.
(3) Rex v. Weston, Salk. 122. The objection was, that by the order the father was directed to pay to the overseers of the poor, and that it ought to have been to the inhabitants of the parish generally; but the Court were of opinion, that, as before the institution of overseers, the justices might order the money to be paid to two or three of the inhabitants, so now they may to the overseers.
(4) An order to pay 2d. a-week, quashed, as too small. Rex v. Perkasse, 1 Sid. 365. Also, an order to pay 78. a-week, 24 Car. II. quashed, as excessive, Rex v. Sherman, 1 Vent. 210.
(5) Rex v. Matthews, 2 Salk. 475.
460. Pl. 574.
(7) Rex v, Johnson, Comb. 69. See 13 East, 57. (a). VOL. II.
If while two
two female bastard children shall be chargeable, without specifying how much for each ; for if either die, the party is discharged. (1) But orders requiring the payment “ till the child was eight years old (2),” or “ nine, if it should so long live (3),” or till twelve years old (4), have been held good, because it cannot be intended to be able to provide for itself sooner.
Yet it seems to have been plausibly objected in the first of these cases, that possibly the child might gain a settlement, or a person might give him an estate, or his father might take him. But the Court thought these possibilities too remote. (5)
Such orders when bad.
But an order to pay 3s. weekly, “ till the child attains the age of fourteen years, was held bad.” (6) And in one case, an order adjudging the reputed father to pay so much, till the child be of seven years of age, was quashed; for they cannot charge the father for any certain determinate time, but as long as the child shall be chargeable to the parish. (7)
15. Cannot 15. Further, the justices cannot order a sum to be paid order a sum in at a future day for a particular purpose, as for binding gross to be paid the child apprentice, for perhaps it may never be neces
sary. (8) And if the order direct that the putative father
(1) Rex v. Skinn, 1 Bott, 470. Pl. 587.
(4) Rex v. Buckall, 1 Barnard. K. B. 261. But Barwell's case, i Vent. 48. is contra, and in Reg. v. Collins, 11 Mod. 178. Reg. s. Atkins, ib. 172. orders to pay till child be ten years old, quashed for this defect.
(5) Smith's case, ante, (2). But see the reasoning of Twisden J., Rex v. Sherman, 1 Vent, 210.
(6) Rex v. Barebaker, 2 Salk. 486. Semb. Rex v. Sharpe, i Sid. 222.
(7) Rex v. Brown, 2 Salk. 480. and see the reasoning of Twisden J., supra, (5), and the cases cited, supra, n. (4).
(8) Rex v. Willey, i Bott, 490. Pl. 632. Rex v. Brown, Comberbach, 448. Rex v. Atkins, 11 Mod. 172. S.P.
“ shall give security to the parişh to perform the order," it is bad as to that. (1)
16. By 49 Geo.III. c.68. s.1.4. the putative father is 16. Nor father made liable to pay all reasonable charges and expences
to give secu
rity. incident to the birth of the child, and also the reasonable costs of apprehending and securing him, and likewise those of the order of filiation, all which are to be at the discretion of the justices or court making the order of filiation, who are authorized to order payment of the whole or part thereof, provided that the costs of apprehending and securing the father and of the order of filiation shall not in any case exceed 101. But to render him thus liable, the child must be born alive; for all the provisions in the several statutes respecting bastardy assume that the child is born alive, and many provisions in this as well as the former acts are inapplicable to a dead child. (2)
Of Orders of Filiation by the Justices at their Quarter
BEFORE 3 Car.I. c.4. the sessions had no authority to Power by
3 Car. I. c.4. meddle in the case of bastardy, till the two next justices, according to the statute of 18 Eliz. c.3. had made an order therein; and then, and not before, the justices in sessions might make a new order, &c. otherwise not. (3) But they
(1) Rex v. Fox, 1 Bott, 472. Pl. 590. and the cases in the margin. Rex v. Eve, 2 Show, 256. See Rex v. Sharpe, 1 Sid. 222. Smith's case, 2 Bulst. 342. Also post, 314. (5).
(2) Rex v. De Brouquens, 14 East, 277.
(3) Slater's case, Cro. Car. 471. 1 Bott, 498. Pl. 727. The authority of the sessions, where it is not expressly given by statute, is thus declared by Lord Hardwicke: “ If authority be given to two justices of peace, to do an act, and no appeal is given, then it may commence at sessions; but if an appeal be given, then it cannot be begun at sessions. Rex v. Bartlett, 1 Bott, 306. Pl. 320.
have authority to make an original order in such cases, under the first-mentioned statute. (1)
Orders of bas- Original orders of this sort are not commonly made at tardy by ses- sessions; the usual way being, to bring the matter before sions rare.
that court by way of appeal, from an order of two justices. (2) The same formality and precision is required in orders of this kind when made there, as if they had been made by two magistrates out of session.
It is essential to right and justice, that the party should party. be summoned previous to their making an order upon Order need not him; but that summons need not be set forth on the face set it forth.
of the proceeding, as the superior court will presume there was one, unless the contrary appear. (3)
Order on constable and the mother, quashed as to the constable.
Where the putative father was apprehended upon a warrant, and the constable let him escape, an order of sessions made upon the constable, to pay 31. towards the expences the parish had been at, and Is. a week towards the maintenance of the child, and the mother to pay
6d. a-week, was quashed, as to the constable, the justices not having authority to make it, but confirmed as to the mother. (4)
May quash or- It seems as if the justices may at the same sessions der on appeal, quash, upon appeal, an order of bastardy made by two and make another.
(1) Slater's case, ante, 307.(3). Wood's case, 2 Bulst. 355, Rex v. Mes senger, 1 Bott. 491. Pl. 633. Rex v. Clegg, 1 Str. 475. Rex v. Greaves, Dougl. 632. Rex v. Price, 6 Term Rep. 147.
(2) They are said to be very rare. Per Pratt C.J., Rex v. Clegg, supra,(1). But the practice seems to have altered in this respect, in some counties, since statutes 6 Geo. II. c.31. and 49 Geo. III. c.68.
(3) Rex v. Clegg, supra, (1). Pratt C.J. at first contra. Rex v. Clayton, 3 East, 58. and see ante, 299. (5). Rex v. Hawkins, Poor Sett. 127. contra.
(4) Reg. v. Ridge, 11 Ann; 1 Bott, 499. Pl. 651.
justices, and also make an original one upon another person, for the same child. (1)
The appeal given by the 18 Eliz. c.3. to the party ac- Appeal to what cused, arose only from his being bound over to the sessions, and the parish enjoyed no such power. (2)
49 Geo. III. c.68. s.5. gives an appeal to any person or 49 Geo. III. persons aggrieved by an order made by justices under c. 68. s.5. the provisions of the act not originating in sessions, to the next sessions for the county where the order is made, on giving notice to such justices or one of them, and to the overseers of the parish on whose behalf the order is made, or one of them, ten clear days before the quarter sessions, of bis, her, or their intention to appeal, and the cause and matter thereof, and entering into a recognizance within three days after such notice before some justice for the county, with sufficient surety conditioned to try such appeal, and abide the judgment and order of and pay such costs as shall be awarded by the sessions, who are empowered to hear and determine the appeal, and give relief and costs to either party in their discretion.
And there must be ten clear intervening days of notice Ten clear days. exclusive both of that of serving the notice, and the day of holding the sessions. (3)
It is requisite that the causes and matters of the appeal should be specified in the notice, the object of the legislature being that the respondents should know precisely what
(1) Burrell's case, 1 Mod. 20. Pridgeon's case, 1 Bulst. 255. Pl. 648. Rex v. Smith, 2 Bulst. 342.
(2) Per Lord Hardwicke, Rex v. Jenkin, Cases Temp. Hardw. 301. post, 315. (4). (5) Rex v. Justices of Herefordshire, 3 B. & A. 581.