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factory of earthen ware, in the township of H. The partnership was rated for lands and buildings in H. to the amount of 2701. a-year, of which 231. a-year is the appellant's share. Two of the partners resided within the township, and had each of them an apprentice. B. resided in L. a township adjoining; and upon a poor child from H. being appointed and tendered to him to be his apprentice individually, he appealed. But the court of quarter sessions, and afterwards the King's Bench, upon a case stated, held him liable to take one. For the appellant occupied lands in the parish to the amount of 231. per annum, that being his aliquot part of the whole; and in respect of that occupation, he is bound, according to the case of Rex v. Clapp, to take the apprentice. (1) It is not an occupation of the partnerships' land and houses by two of the partners, to the exclusion of the rest. Each may reside there if he pleases. (2)
And land is not the only property, in respect of which 4. Occupier of a person becomes liable to receive an apprentice. An in- tithes liable,
and a custom habitant was held liable to receive one, for the sheaf or to the contrary great tithes of the parish, although the case stated that, immaterial. in respect of the said tithes, no apprentice had heretofore been bound; but that the custom of binding in that parish had been upon lands of ten pounds per annum, and upwards. (3)
No case determines whether a rateable inhabitant of suf- 5. Quære,
whether inhaficient ability, but without real property in the parish, be bitants not occompellable to receive an apprentice. But the principle of cupiers liable. those already cited, namely that this is one mode of contributing to the sustentation of the poor, seems to extend to such cases, and decide, that all who are liable to con
(1) Rex v. Barwick, 7 Term Rep. 33.
tribute to the relief of the poor of the parish, must receive apprentices, provided they are enabled by their circumstances to do so. Indeed it seems to have been determined that clergymen are compellable to take them, or at least are chargeable to contribute towards putting apprentices out. (1)
6. A binding A person who is neither an inhabitant nor occupier of to a stranger property in the parish cannot be compelled to receive an another coun- apprentice from it; yet, if he consent to take one, the ty is valid.
binding is good, and confers a settlement(2), although the master reside in a different county. (3)
Of compelling Masters to provide for their Apprentices.(4)
Justices might It seems to have been the better received opinion, that compel master to take ap
the justices might force a master to take an apprentice, prentice prior prior to 8&9 W.III. c. 30.; for a power to compel the to 8&9W.III. c. 30. master to receive him, is consequential to the authority But not to given the justices by the statute to put him out. (5) But provide for them.
the point was considered as doubtful, and Lord Kenyon C. J. observes, “masters could not be compelled to
(1) i Bott, 608. Pl. 841. cites Dalton, who states it upon credible information, as the opinion of all the judges.
(2) Rex v. St. Margaret's, Lincoln.
(4) As to discharging an apprentice from his indentures, see ante, Vol. I. chap. xxi. sect. 3.
(5) Anon. Salk. 67. Rex o. Gillifer, T. Raym. 65. Lev. 84. S.C. Henton v. Steers, T. Raym. 65. in marg. Rex r. Fairfax, 1 Show. 76. 3 Mod. 269. S.C. But see Rex v. Trevilian, 2 Str. 1268.
provide for their apprentices under 43 Eliz., and the statute 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30. was made for the purpose.” (1)
It seems to have been held in one case prior to 8 & 9 W.III. c. 30. that as the statute has intrusted the churchwardens and overseers of the poor, by and with the approbation of two justices, to bind apprentices, the child must appear upon the face of the order to be put out by the assent of the churchwardens as well as the overseers; and the churchwardens not being mentioned in that order, it was quashed. (2) This determination proceeds on the ground that the churchwardens are to be considered as an integral part of the parish officers (3), and as having in this
(1) Per Lord Kenyon C. J., Rex v. Leighton, 4 Term Rep. 732. ante Vol. I. . A similar act was passed relative to incorporated districts, 20 Geo. III. c. 36. See Rex v. Tunstead and Happing, 3 Term Rep. 523. (2)
(2) Rex v. Fairfax, 3 Mod. 269.
(3) Per Lord Kenyon C. J., Rex v. Beeston, 3 Term Rep. 592. where the same great judge doubts the authority of that case.
But the reports of it, Show. 76., Comb. 164., Carth. 94., state the order to be quashed on other grounds, and not upon this one. In Rex v. Beeston, supra, Lord Kenyon expressed himself thus, as to the power of the majority of parish officers to bind the whole. “I do not mean to say, that the church wardens and overseers are technically a corporation : but as far as concerns the regulations of the poor of the parish, they stand in pari ratione. And in the instance of corporations, the act of the majority binds the whole; so much so, that the court will compel the person who has the custody of the corporate seal, to affix it to any act, according to the vote of the majority, though against the consent of such person, as was done in the case of Wadham college, Cowp. 377. However, I do not go on the grounds of this similitude; but the foundation of my opinion is this, the 43 Eliz. c. 2. has directed that the general acts to be done by the churchwardens and overseers, shall be done by the majority of them, and I think that the spirit of that statute pervades all the subsequent acts respecting the government of the poor. Besides, in common understanding, what is required to be done by the churchwardens and overseers, is satisfied by being done by a majority. And, indeed, if we were to determine otherwise, the inconvenience would be so great as to make it necessary for the legislature to interfere and pass another law. The court, therefore, held, that the assent of the
particular instance a discretionary power, separate and independent from that of the overseers chosen by the parish.
Master must When an apprentice is effectually bound, his master provide for ap- takes him for better or worse, and is to provide for him prentice. But justices cannot in sickness and in health. (1) But the justices cannot ororder wages or der him wages during the term of his apprenticeship, or end of appren- any thing to be given him after the term is ended. (2) ticeship. And if the master dies, neither his executors nor adminis
trators are compellable, by a justice's order, to receive and provide for an apprentice, either as a pauper (3), or, if bound under 5 Eliz. c.4. as an apprentice (4), because an apprenticeship is a personal trust between master and servant, and determined by the death of either; for instruction which is the end and design of the apprenticeship, cannot be obtained from the personal representative.(5) But covenant lies against the executor, in which there is no inconvenience, as the executor may make his defence by pleading no assets; or debts of a higher nature. (6)
majority of parish officers, was sufficient to bind the whole in a contract for maintaining the poor, under 9 Geo.I c. 7. post, chap. xxxiv. s. 2. As to how a certificate is to be signed by them, see ante, 167. et seq. also ante, Vol. I. 61.
(1) Rex v. Hales Owen, 1 Str. 99. See also Rex v. St. Nicholas, Nottingham, 3 Term Rep. 726. ante.
(2) Rex v. Wagstaff, Fol. 225. 1 Bott, 609. Pl. 846.
(6) Per Eyre J., ibid. But now by 32 Geo. III. c. 57. s. 1. covenants for maintenance of parish apprentices, with whom no more than 5l. is given, are to continue in force no longer than three months after the master's death. By sect. 2. the surviving husband or wife, or a son, daughter, brother, sister, executor or executrix, administrator or administratrix, of the master or mistress, (having lived with, and become part of their family, at the time of the death,) may, within the three months, have such apprentice assigned to them by two justices. By sect. 3. the same provisions are extended to the case of that master's
The 8&9 W.III. c. 30. enacts, that if the master does 101.penalty for not receive and provide for the apprentice, or refuses to
an apprentice execute the other part of the indentures, he shall forfeit for under 8 & 9
W.III. c. 30. every such offence 10l. to be levied by distress and sale, for the use of the poor where such offence was committed. (1) But it seems further, that an indictment will lie Indictment for disobedience, either in case of not receiving, turning lies. off, or not providing for such apprentices as the law requires to be received. (2)
But to render the indictment good, the binding must Where bindappear to be within 43 Eliz. c. 2. (3), and the sessions have ing within
43 Eliz. c.2. no original jurisdiction to put out an apprentice, but only by way of appeal. (4)
Of the Party's Redress against an Order to take an Ap
The 8&9W.III. c. 30. gives a power of appeal to the Appeal under next general quarter sessions, whose order shall be final 8 & 9 W.III and conclusive upon all parties. (5)
death, &c. to whom the apprentice is assigned. But by sect. 4. if the justices shall not in either case, think fit that the apprenticeship should be continued, it is thereby determined. For the remaining provisions of this statute, see the act itself in Vol. III.
(1) If the occupier of lands in A. resides in B., and upon application to him in B. refuse to receive an apprentice from A., quære, whether the poor of A. or of B. are to have the penalty ?
(2) Reg. v. Gould, 1 Salk. 381. In Rex v. Trevilian, the court said hey would not meddle with the general question, whether an indictment would lie for refusing to take an apprentice or not. 2 Str. 1268. But see Rex v. Gillifer, ante, 344. (5), and the cases cited, ib. and Rex o. Robinson, 2 Burr. 769.
(3) Rex v. Trevilian, 2 Str. 1268.