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law now in being;" and if the sessions are of opinion that the sum awarded is more than ought to be paid, they may strike it out and insert such sum as in their judgment ought to be paid.

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It is decided upon the construction of this clause; 1st, After pauper's that an appeal lies against an order of removal which was suspended, and against a subsequent order for costs, notwithstanding the pauper's death prior to her removal, and though the costs are under 20l.; for 3 W. & M. c.11. s.9. gives an appeal to the party aggrieved by the justices' determination respecting the pauper's settlement; and though the grievance grows by a subsequent statute, the party is still aggrieved by the order of removal. Before 35 Geo. III. there was no grievance to the parish to which the order of removal was made until it was executed; but that statute attaches a contingent consequence to the order of removal, being coupled with the order for payment of costs, which makes it a grievance, though the pauper died before any removal in fact took place. Then the appeal against the order for costs is not against the quantum, but against the liability of the parish to pay any costs at all in this case, taking it as a consequence of the order appealed against. (1)

2. That the meaning of that part of the clause which mentions the demand and notice of appeal within three days, is, “that if the party aggrieved by the order, and intending to appeal against the amount of the charges, will give notice of appeal within three days after demand made, he shall be relieved from the inconvenience of a distress; but though he neglect to do so, he only subjects himself to that inconvenience, but his right of appeal, which is afterwards given, is not thereby taken away; and if he afterwards think proper to appeal within the time allowed by law for appeals against orders of removal, he is expressly empowered so to do. Then if the order is quashed, or the sum directed to be paid reduced upon an appeal, it is a

(1) Rex v. St. Mary le Bow, 15 East, 51. See ante, 572. (1).

consequence of law that the money paid upon it must be refunded by those who received it, or an action for monies had and received will lie to recover it back again. (1)

By 43 Eliz. 1. Appeal

against rates

quarter sessions, &c.

SECT. III.

To what Sessions an Appeal must be made in point of
Jurisdiction.

I. APPEALS against poor's rates.

Under 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 6. it must be to the general quarter sessions for the county, provided the place for which to the general the rate is made be within that jurisdiction. But sect. 8. enables the justices of peace of towns, places corporate, and cities, at their quarter sessions (if they hold any), "to do and execute for all the uses and purposes in this act prescribed, and no other justice or justices of the peace to enter or meddle there."

Jurisdiction reserved to corporate justices.

Sect. 5. gives

party rated,

within a fran

Under this section, therefore, the appeal against a rate made for any parish or place within corporate towns, places, or cities, must be to the corporation sessions, and cannot be to the general quarter sessions of the county; for the justices at the quarter sessions for the county have no jurisdiction, as there are negative words in the clause which excludes them. (2)

But 17 Geo. II. c. 38. sect. 5. provides, that in all corporations or franchises, who have not four justices of the peace, chise not hav-persons, if they think fit, may appeal to the general or quarter sessions for the county, riding, or division, wherein such corporation or franchise is situate.

ing four jus

tices, an appeal to the county

sessions.

This act does not include appeals against orders of removal (3), and it applies only to corporations and franchises

(1) Rex v. Bradford, 9 East, 97.

(2) Rex v. St. Mary in Taunton, 1 Bott, 265. Pl. 260. S. C. ib. Pl. 261. (3) Per Abbot C. J. 4 B. & A. 293.

where there are not more than four justices in point of fact (1) it seems that the words of the statute are to be construed with literal strictness.

The corporation of Saffron Walden had six justices, and regularly held a court of quarter sessions for the town and its precincts. In the rate appealed against all the justices but one were rated; and one ground of appeal was, that the appellant was over-rated in respect to the assessments made upon two of them. The court of king's bench was of opinion that these justices of the borough were not disqualified from sitting as a court of appeal under the poor laws, on the ground of their being rated or chargeable with the rates of the place wherein their jurisdiction is to be exercised. Upon a view of the statutes, and adverting to their policy and object, the legislature appear to have meant in the case of borough justices, where the whole number of them was four or more, to leave their jurisdiction under 43 Eliz. entire; not curtailed or abridged from suspicions of possible abuse. (2)

17 Geo. II. c. 38. s. 4. gives the "appeal to the next ge- 17 Geo. II. neral or quarter sessions for the county, riding, division, c.38. s.4. corporation, or franchise, where such parish, township, or place (3) lies."

And it has been decided that notwithstanding the expression general or quarter sessions, the appeal in counties where both are held, must be made to the general quarter sessions notwithstanding the intervention of a general sessions: For it appears from other parts of the act as well as from other statutes made in pari materia, that the word general is not used with a view to those places that have both general and quarter sessions, such as London and Middlesex, but as another word for quarter sessions in con

(1) Eod. Jud. ibid.

(2) Rex v. Justices of Essex, 5 M. & S. 513. But see 1 Geo.IV.c.36. post, 495.

(5) For which the rate is made.

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tradistinction to a special sessions, every quarter sessions being a general sessions. (1)

(1) Rex v. Justices of London, 15 East, 632. Lord Ellenborough C.J. This was a motion for a mandamus to enter continuances upon an appeal by John Stocks, against a poor-rate: and the question was, whether in London, where there are eight sessions every year, four general quarter sessions, and four general sessions, a party is bound to appeal to the general sessions, if they occur first after the rate; or whether he is entitled to pass over the general sessions, and appeal to the next general quarter sessions? The rate in this case was published in the church on the 28th October, 1810; the next general quarter sessions were on the 29th of the same month, but as there was no interval between them and the publication, it could not be expected that the appeal should be made at those sessions. The next general quarter sessions were in January, 1811, and to that sessions Mr. Stocks appealed; but as a general session had intervened, the question is, whether the appeal was not out of time. The appeal was adjourned to the three following quarter sessions; and at an adjournment of the October quarter sessions, in November, 1811, the sessions decided that Mr. Stocks had not appealed in time; and on that ground dismissed the appeal. By the stat. 43 Eliz. c. 2. s. 4. if any person shall find himself aggrieved, the justices of peace, at their general quarter sessions, shall take such order therein as to them shall be thought convenient. This statute, therefore, gave the appeal to the quarter sessions indefinitely, without even limiting it to the next which should occur. By stat. 17 Geo. II. c.38. s. 4. a person aggrieved may appeal to the next general or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, riding, division, corporation, or franchise, where the township, parish, or place, for which the rate is made, lies: but if it shall appear that reasonable notice was not given of the appeal, the justices shall adjourn it to the next quarter sessions, and then finally hear and determine it: And the said justices may award to the party, for whom the appeal shall be determined, reasonable costs, in the same manner as they are empowered to do in case of appeals concerning the settlement of poor persons by stat. 8&9W.III. c.30. This statute, therefore, limits appeals (in terms) to the next general or quarter sessions, and the question is, whether the word "general" is used with a view to those places which have both general and quarter sessions, as London and Middlesex; or whether it is not used as another word for quarter sessions, in contradistinction to a special sessions; every quarter sessions being a general session? And we are of opinion that the latter is the true construction; and that an appeal to the next quarter sessions, notwithstanding the intervention of a general sessions, is in time. The direction to adjourn to the next quarter sessions, if proper notice be not given, dropping the word general, falls in with the notion that the legislature used it in the sense we adopt; for if these appeals were to be heard at the general sessions, which inter

II. As to appeals against orders of removal.

There is a difference in the wording of the several statutes, by which this right of appeal is given or confirmed.

2. Appeals against removals.

c.11. s. 10.

13 & 14 Car. II. c.12. provides, "that all such persons 15&14 Car. II. who shall think themselves aggrieved by any judgment of c. 12. s. 2. the said two justices, may appeal to the justices of the peace of the said county (1) at their next quarter sessions," &c. 3 & 4 W. & M. c.11. s. 10. enacts, "that all persons who 3&4 W. & M. think themselves aggrieved with any such judgment of the said two justices, may appeal to the next general quarter sessions of the peace to be held for the county, riding, city, town corporate, or liberty, from which the said person was so removed." But it is enacted by 8 & 9 W. III. c. 30. 8&9 W. III. s.6." that the appeal against any order for the removal of any poor person from any parish, township, or place, shall be had, presented, and determined at the general or quarter sessions of the peace for the county, division, or riding, wherein the parish, township, or place from whence such poor person shall be removed, doth lie, and not elsewhere, any former law or statute to the contrary notwithstanding."

c. 30. s. 6.

neral sessions.

In construing this latter statute, it has been held, that if Appeals to gethere be an appeal to the sessions of a town which is a county of itself, where by charter only general sessions are held, it must be made to such general sessions. (2)

vened between the quarters, no reason can be given why the adjourn-
ment should not have been to the next general as well as to the next
quarter sessions. The direction, too, as to costs raises an inference that
this is the right construction; for no costs can be given under the stat.
8&9 W.III. but at the quarter sessions; inasmuch as the appeal against
an order of removal is, under the stat. 13 & 14 Car. II. c. 12. s. 2., con-
fined to the quarter sessions. The next section, too, in the stat. 17 Geo.II.
c. 38. viz. s. 5., speaks of the general or quarter sessions for a county,
riding, or division; whereas there is no county but Middlesex in which
there are in fact general sessions in addition to the quarter sessions;
and they do not occur in any riding or division. We therefore think
that the appeal was in time, and that the rule should be made absolute.
(1) i. e. in which the order of removal is made.

(2) Rex v. Justices of Carmarthen, 4 B. & A. 291.

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