complaining may be amended. Power to amend rates extends to matter of substance. 17 Geo. II. c. 38. 2. Species of amendment prior to 41 Geo. III. c. 23. If an omission in the rate, no amendment. the justices ordered the paupers to be carried to Harrow. Upon appeal, the sessions confirmed this order, and amended it, by striking out Luggershall and inserting Harrow. It was moved to quash these orders, for that the judgment being defective cannot be altered. But the court seemed to be of opinion, that it was only a defect in form, being a mistake of the clerk, who filled up the blank order with the name of Luggershall instead of Harrow; but they granted a rule to shew cause, and in the Trinity term following, the order of sessions was confirmed by consent. (1) The power of the sessions to amend rates, extends beyond matters of form. By 17 Geo. II. c. 38. s. 6., and indeed by 43 Eliz. (2), the justices, where they see just cause to give relief, are required to amend the rate, in such manner only as should be necessary for giving relief, without altering such rate or assessments, with respect to other persons mentioned in the same. But all amendments of rates were confined to two cases, prior to 41 Geo. III. c. 23. 1st, Mere defects of form under 5 Geo. II. c. 19. 2d, Where the appellant, being overcharged, might be reduced. (3) Where the names, therefore, of one or more persons were omitted in a rate, which ought to have been inserted (4), or persons were under-rated, which is an omission of property, the rate (1) Rex v. Harrow on the Hill, 2 Bott, 706. Pl. 773. (3) Rex v. Cheshunt, 2 Term Rep. 623. (4) Rex v. Maddern, 1 Term Rep. 625. Rex v. St. Agnes, 5 Term Rep. 480. Rex v. Darlington, 6 Term Rep. 468. Rex v. Ambleside, 16 East, 580. acc. The opinion of Aston J., in Rex v. Whitney, 5 Burr. 2634. and of Lord Mansfield C.J. Rex v. Ringwood, Cowp. 326. are contra. But these opinions are adverted to, and noticed as being over-ruled in Rex v. Darlington, supra. must have been quashed; for the due proportion of every other person rated was thereby affected; and as they could not be concluded by proceedings to which they were no parties, it became necessary to regulate the proportional assessment of the parish by a new rate. alter But the law is altered by 41 Geo. III. c. 23. s. 6. which Power of requires, that persons appealing, because any other person 41 Geo. III. amendment by is rated or omitted to be rated, or because any other per- c. 23. son is rated for any greater or less sum than they ought to be, or for any other cause that may require any ation in the rate, with respect to any other person, shall give notice to the persons interested in the event of such appeal, who may appear and be heard, if they think fit. It further provides, that the majority of justices may order the names of such persons to be inserted and rated at any sum, and that of others to be struck out, or the sum at which they are rated altered, in such manner as they shall think right. under that act. The true principle to regulate the amendment, or Principle of quashing of rates, so far as it can be laid down in the ab- amendment stract, where a good deal must depend upon the peculiar circumstances of each case, seems to be; whether the amendments sought to be introduced are such as must essentially alter its proportion and character, so as rather to render it a new than an amended rate. If they cannot have this effect, the magistrates should amend; but otherwise, as they are expressly prohibited from making a new rate, they ought to quash. Thus, if the ground of complaint is, that personal pro- Instances perty is altogether omitted (1); or, that the real estate is where rates may be quash taxed ten times more in proportion than the personal (2); or, that the rate is made upon a principle altogether erro (1) See Rex v. Dursley, 6 Term Rep. 53., and the case of St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, Holt. 508. (2) Ib. ed. neous (1); or, that a large portion of property is omitted and it does not clearly appear what persons ought to be rated for it (2): these seem cases in which the rate ought to be quashed. Because, otherwise the sessions must examine into the circumstances of every person in the parish, in order to render the rate perfect, and so make one altogether new, which they are forbidden to do by 17 Geo. II. c. 38. SECT. III. Sessions not their reasons. Of stating a Case for the Opinion of the Court of King's Bench. THE justices are not bound to state in their judgment bound to state the reasons upon which it is founded any more than other courts; it must be collected from the record. (3) They need not set forth, therefore, whether they quash an order upon the form or the merits (4); but if they give a reason which is a bad one, the court must take notice of it, and quash their order. (5) But if they give a bad reason, B. R. will quash. Cannot be compelled to state a case. It has been shewn, that no bill of exception lies against the justices' determination (6); neither can they be compelled to state a special case for the opinion of the court of king's bench, because a case must always depend upon (1) Rex v. Sandwich, Doug. 562. Cald. 105. S. C. But these cases were prior to 41 Geo. III. c. 23., and are only put by way of examples, and not as judicial determinations. (2) Rex v. Aberavon, Mich. 45 Geo. III. ante, 532. (3) South Cadbury v. Braddon, 2 Salk. 607. Rex v. Audley, 2 Salk. 526. (4) South Cadbury v. Braddon, supra (3). But that they ought to do so, see post, 558. (5) Rex v. Audley, supra, (3); and see Rex v. Browne, ante, 303.(5). See also Rex v. Gayer, 1 Burr. 245. Ante, Vol. I. 57. (6) Rex v. Preston, ante, 543. (1). particular facts, which it is the exclusive province of the sessions to find. (1) On appeal from an order of removal, the sessions confirmed the order, but refused to state a special case. The counsel for Oulton, the appellant parish, excepted against their refusing to state the case specially, and the exception was returned into B. R. together with the orders. The court refused to grant a rule to shew cause for quashing these orders, because they can take notice of nothing but what was contained in the order. The counsel for Oulton No amendthen obtained a rule to shew cause why the return should ment of clerk of peace's renot be amended, and the state of the case inserted by the turn, without clerk of the peace in the body of the order of sessions. session's conOn shewing cause, the clerk of the peace's counsel had no objection, if the court thought he might do it. But the respondents contended, that the return was perfect, and opposed the rule. Lord Hardwicke-I do not see what it is possible for the court to do in this case without Here is no consent; so far from it, that, on the contrary, the parish concerned in interest opposes it. Here is an order of removal made by two justices; an consent. (1) "To be sure it is a thing very much to be censured and discommended, when an inferior jurisdiction endeavours to preclude the parties from applying to a superior jurisdiction." Per Lord Hardwicke C. J., Rex v. Oulton, Burr. S.C. 64. S.P. Per Dennison J., Rex v. Mayfield, Burr. S.C. 455. But in determining on the propriety of granting or refusing a case, the justices should be guided by the consideration, whether the question involves any difficult point of law; for though, as Lord Hardwicke says, it is censurable in an inferior jurisdiction, to endeavour to preclude the parties from applying to a superior jurisdiction; they are not through ill-founded fear of such a censure, to suffer parties to run into unnecessary expence, where there is little probability that the superior court will alter their determination. A similar observation has not unfrequently been made of late years, by the judges of K.B. on some cases which have been brought before them. Though the court of quarter sessions refuse to grant a case, the parties may bring up the order by certiorari for any defect apparent on the face thereof. sent. appeal therefrom; and a general order on that appeal, for confirmation of the order of two justices. The counsel at sessions except to the order of sessions in the words of a bill of exception, and state the fact. If the fact be true, the ground of the exception is right; but the exception sets forth, that the court of sessions refuse to state the matter specially. How then shall we do this that is now desired of us without their consent, even though the clerk of the peace should consent? It does not appear to us that the fact alleged is true; it is only the allegation of counsel, or perhaps there might be evidence given of it, and the sessions might not believe the evidence. Page J. -I do not know that this court ever enquires into the facts upon which the justices have determined; and they themselves have stated none, but have adjudged generally. (1) But if the sessions entertain any doubt upon a point of law, they may either refer the matter to the judge of assize for his opinion, or state a case for the determination of the court of king's bench, and this without the consent of the parties. (2) "The sessions do not always refer the whole case to the judge of assize: sometimes they refer only a particular point, and reserve the final determination of the whole matter to themselves." (3) And no other sessions has power to grant a case but that before which the appeal is decided and judgment given. (4) (1) Rex v. Oulton, Burr. S.C. 64.; ante, 557. (1). (3) Per Probyn, Rex v. Tedford, Burr. S. C. 57. But see Lord Hardwicke C.J., ib. (4) By an order of two justices, William Thomas and Mary his wife were removed from the parish of Michaelstone Vedoes, to the parish of Koedhermeer, both in the county of Monmouth. |