that is bound, not to be sufficiently tied by any CHAP. VIII. other obligation. 5. The lord therefore hath no less dominion Servants have no propriety over a servant that is not, than over one that is in their goods bound; for he hath a supreme power over both, against their lord and may say of his servant no less than of another thing, whether animate or inanimate, this is mine. Whence it follows, that whatsoever the servant had before his servitude, that afterwards becomes the lord's; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his lord. For he that can by right dispose of the person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the servant may retain as his own against the will of his lord; yet hath he, by his lord's distribution, a propriety and dominion over his own goods: insomuch as one servant may keep and defend them against the invasion of his fellow-servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject hath nothing properly his own against the will of the supreme authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow-subject. sell his servant, alienate him by testament. 6. Since therefore both the servant himself, and The lord may all that belongs to him are his lord's, and by the or right of nature every man may dispose of his own in what manner he pleases; the lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by testament convey the dominion he hath over his servant, according to his own will and pleasure. not be injuriou 7. Furthermore, what hath before been demon- The lord canstrated concerning subjects in an institutive go-to his servant. vernment, namely, that he who hath the supreme power can do his subject no injury; is true also CHAP. VIII. concerning servants, because they have subjected their will to the will of the Lord. Wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their will; but no injury can be done to him that willeth it. He that is lord of the of his servants. 8. But if it happen that the lord, either by caplord, is lord also tivity or voluntary subjection, doth become a servant or subject to another, that other shall not only be lord of him, but also of his servants; supreme lord over these, immediate lord over him. Now because not the servant only, but also all he hath, are his lord's; therefore his servants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate lord dispose otherwise of them than shall seem good to the supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civil governments the lord have an absolute power over his servants, that is supposed to be derived from the right of nature, and not constituted, but slightly passed over by the civil law. By what means ser 9. A servant is by the same manner freed from vants are feed. his servitude, that a subject in an institutive government is freed from his subjection. First, if his lord enfranchise him; for the right which the servant transferred to his lord over himself, the same may the lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called manumission; which is just as if a city should permit a citizen to convey himself under the jurisdiction of some other city. Secondly, if the lord cast off his servant from him; which in a city is banishment; neither differs it from manumission in effect, but in manner only. For there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, as a punishment in both, the dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old : servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other CHAP. VIII. things, so servants also are acquired by war, whom in equity the lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successor, the lord dying (suppose) without any testament or heir. For no man is understood to be obliged, unless he know to whom he is to perform the obligation. Lastly, the servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporal liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract. For there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given. But the lord who himself serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme; for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme lord's. over beasts 10. We get a right over irrational creatures, in The dominion the same manner that we do over the persons of is by the men; to wit, by force and natural strength. For right of nature. if in the state of nature it is lawful for every one, by reason of that war which is of all against all, to subdue and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good; much more will the same be lawful against brutes; namely, at their own discretion to reduce those to servitude, which by art may be tamed and fitted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpetual war as dangerous and noxious. Our dominion therefore over beasts, hath its original from the right of nature, not from divine positive right. For if such a right had not been before the publishing of the Sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have VOL. II. I The dominion over beasts is by the right of nature. CHAP. VIII. killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy writ; a most hard condition for men indeed, whom the beasts might devour without injury, and yet they might not destroy them. Forasmuch therefore as it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast may kill a man, it is also by the same right that a man may slay a beast. CHAPTER IX. OF THE RIGHT OF PARENTS OVER THEIR CHILDREN, AND 1. Paternal dominion ariseth not from generation. 2. Dominion from generation. creature, is right reasoning; and that most evi- CHAP. IX. dent, because there is nothing needful to the ac- Paternal domiknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but nion ariseth not that the word man be understood; because a living creature is in the definition itself of a man, and every one makes up the proposition which was desired, namely this, man is a living creature. And this, Sophroniscus is Socrates' father, and therefore his lord, is perhaps a true inference, but not evident; because the word lord is not in the definition of a father: wherefore it is necessary, to make it more evident, that the connexion of father and lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the dominion of a parent over his children, have brought no other argument than that of generation; as if it were of itself evident, that what is begotten by me is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a triangle, it appears presently, without any further discourse, that its angles are equal to two right. Besides, since dominion, that is, supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two masters; but two persons, male and female, must concur in the act of generation; it is impossible that dominion should at all be acquired by generation only. Wherefore we will, with the more diligence, in this place inquire into the original of paternal government. first hath them 2. We must therefore return to the state of na- Dominion over infants belongs ture, in which, by reason of the equality of nature, to him who all men of riper years are to be accounted equal. in his power. There by right of nature the conqueror is lord of the conquered. By the right therefore of nature, the dominion over the infant first belongs to him |