CHAP. IX. who first hath him in his power. But it is manifest that he who is newly born, is in the mother's power before any others; insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own will, either breed him up or adventure him to fortune.

Dominion over infants is originally

the mother's.

3. If therefore she breed him, because the state of nature is the state of war, she is supposed to bring him up on this condition; that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; which is, that he obey her. For since by natural necessity we all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such terms afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy. But each man is an enemy to that other, whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bears children, becomes both a mother and a lord. But what some say, that in this case the father, by reason of the pre-eminence of sex, and not the mother becomes lord, signifies nothing. For both reason shows the contrary; because the inequality of their natural forces is not so great, that the man could get the dominion over the woman without war. And custom also contradicts not; for women, namely Amazons, have in former times waged war against their adversaries, and disposed of their children at their own wills. And at this day, in divers places women are invested with the principal authority; neither do their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth they do by the right of nature; forasmuch as they who have the supreme power, are not tied at all (as hath been shewed) to the civil laws. Add also,

that in the state of nature it cannot be known who CHAP. IX. is the father, but by the testimony of the mother the child therefore is his whose the mother will have it, and therefore her's. Wherefore original dominion over children belongs to the mother: and among men no less than other creatures, the birth follows the belly.

preserves him.

4. The dominion passes from the mother to The exposed others, divers ways. First, if she quit and forsake infant is his that her right by exposing the child. He therefore that shall bring up the child thus exposed, shall have the same dominion over it which the mother had. For that life which the mother had given it, (not by getting but nourishing it), she now by exposing takes from it. Wherefore the obligation also which arose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made void. Now the preserved oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a mother, or of his service as to a lord. For although the mother in the state of nature, where all men have a right to all things, may recover her son again, namely, by the same right that anybody else might do it; yet may not the son rightly transfer himself again unto his mother.

5. Secondly, if the mother be taken prisoner, her son is his that took her; because that he who hath dominion over the person, hath also dominion over all belonging to the person; wherefore over the son also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing chapter, in the fifth article. Thirdly, if the mother be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will also have the dominion over him that is born of her; for he is lord also of the mother, who

The son

of a subject and chief, is his

that commands.

CHAP. IX. is bound to obey him in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for society's sake give herself to a man on this condition, that he shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the contribution of both parties, is the father's, in regard of the command he hath over the mother. But if a woman bearing rule shall have children by a subject, the children are the mother's; for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her authority. And universally, if the society of the male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himself to the other, the children belong to him or her that commands.

In such a conjunction of male and female, as

commanding

6. But in the state of nature, if a man and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the neither hath the command of the other, the children are the mopower over the ther's, for the reasons above given in the third article, unless by pacts it be otherwise provided. by pact or civil For the mother may by pact dispose of her right as wise determined, she lists; as heretofore hath been done by the

other, the children are the

mother's; except

law it be other

Amazons, who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed them the males, and retained the females to themselves. But in a civil government, if there be a contract of marriage between a man and woman, the children are the father's; because in all cities, to wit, constituted of fathers, not mothers governing their families, the domestical command belongs to the man; and such a contract, if it be made according to the civil laws, is called matrimony. But if they agree only to lie together, the children are the father's or the mother's variously, according to the differing civil laws of divers cities.

Children

ject to their pa

lords, and sub

jects to their city.

7. Now because, by the third article, the mother CHAP. IX. is originally lord of her children, and from her the father, or somebody else by derived right; it are no less subis manifest that the children are no less subject to rents, than serthose by whom they are nourished and brought vants to their up, than servants to their lords, and subjects to him who bears the supreme rule; and that a parent cannot be injurious to his son, as long as he is under his power. A son also is freed from subjection in the same manner as a subject and servant are. For emancipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication with banishment.

due to parents

8. The enfranchised son or released servant, of the honour do now stand in less fear of their lord and father, and lords. being deprived of his natural and lordly power over them; and, if regard be had to true and inward honour, do honour him less than before. For honour, as hath been said in the section above, is nothing else but the estimation of another's power; and therefore he that hath least power, > hath always least honour. But it is not to be imagined, that the enfranchiser ever intended so to match the enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things as if he were become wholly his equal. It must therefore be ever understood, that he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a servant, son, or some colony, doth promise all those external signs at least, whereby superiors used to be honoured by their inferiors. From whence it follows, that the precept of honouring our parents, belongs to the law of nature, not only under the title of gratitude, but also of agreement.

CHAP. IX.

Wherein liberty

9. What then, will some one demand, is the difference between a son, or between a subject and doth consist; and a servant? Neither do I know that any writer between subjects hath fully declared what liberty and what slavery

the difference

and servants.

is. Commonly, to do all things according to our own fancies, and that without punishment, is esteemed to be liberty; not to be able to do this, is judged bondage; which in a civil government, and with the peace of mankind, cannot possibly be done; because there is no city without a command and a restraining right. Liberty, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets and hindrances of motion; as water shut up in a vessel is therefore not at liberty, because the vessel hinders it from running out; which, the vessel being broken, is made free. And every man hath more or less liberty, as he hath more or less space in which he employs himself: as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, than he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may be free toward one part, and yet not toward another; as the traveller is bounded on this and that side with hedges or stone walls, lest he spoil the vines or corn neighbouring on the highway. And these kinds of lets are external and absolute. In which sense all servants and subjects are free, who are not fettered and imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary, which do not absolutely hinder motion, but by accident, to wit, by our own choice; as he that is in a ship, is not so hindered but he may cast himself into the sea, if he will. And here also the more ways a man may move himself, the more liberty he hath. And herein consists civil liberty ; for no man, whether subject, son, or servant, is