those things may be done, and must be had, which CHAP. I. necessarily conduce to the protection of life and members, it follows, that in the state of nature, to have all, and do all, is lawful for all. And this is that which is meant by that common saying, nature hath given all to all. From whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature profit is the measure of right. all to all is 11. But it was the least benefit for men thus to The right of have a common right to all things. For the effects unprofitable. of this right are the same, almost, as if there had been no right at all. For although any man might say of every thing, this is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his neighbour, who having equal right and equal power, would pretend the same thing to be his. without society a state of war. 12. If now to this natural proclivity of men, to The state of men hurt each other, which they derive from their is passions, but chiefly from a vain esteem of themselves, you add, the right of all to all, wherewith one by right invades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetual jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to provide against an enemy invading us with an intention to oppress and ruin, though he come with a small number, and no great provision; it cannot be denied but that the natural state of men, before they entered into society, was a mere war, and that not simply, but a war of all men against all men. For The definition of what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force is fully declared, either by words or deeds? The time remaining is termed PEACE. war and peace. CHAP. I. War is an ad preservation. 13. But it is easily judged how disagreeable a thing to the preservation either of mankind, or of versary to man's each single man, a perpetual war is. But it is perpetual în its own nature; because in regard of the equality of those that strive, it cannot be ended by victory. For in this state the conqueror is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a miracle, if any, even the most strong, should close up his life with many years and old age. They of America are examples hereof, even in this present age other nations have been in former ages; which now indeed are become civil and flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and deprived of all that pleasure and beauty of life, which peace and society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all things were lawful for all men, he contradicts himself. For every man by natural necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteems a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a state, to be good for him. And so it happens, that through fear of each other we think it fit to rid ourselves of this condition, and to get some fellows; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps. That by the right of nature, any man to com 14. Fellows are gotten either by constraint, or it is lawful for by consent; by constraint, when after fight the pel him whom he conqueror makes the conquered serve him, either hath in his pow-through fear of death, or by laying fetters on him: caution for his by consent, when men enter into society to help each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the conqueror may by right er, to give future obedience. compel the conquered, or the strongest the weaker, CHAP. I. (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper years a child), unless he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting ourselves according to our own wills, proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equality, it is more consonant to reason, and more certain for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure ourselves by taking caution, than when they shall be full grown and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power again by doubtful fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, than by discharging whom you already have weak in your power, to make him at once both an enemy and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a corollary in the natural state of men, that a sure and irresistible power confers the right of dominion and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things that can be done, adheres essentially and immediately unto this omnipotence hence arising. tates the seek 15. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preser- Nature dicvation, continuing thus in the state of nature, that ing after peace. is, of war, by reason of that equality of power, and other human faculties they are endued withal. Wherefore to seek peace, where there is any hopes of obtaining it, and where there is none, to enquire out for auxiliaries of war, is the dictate of right reason, that is, the law of nature; as shall be showed in the next chapter. CHAP. II. That the law CHAPTER II. OF THE LAW OF NATURE CONCERNING CONTRACTS. 1. That the law of nature is not an agreement of men, but the 1. ALL authors agree not concerning the definition of the natural law, who notwithstanding do very of nature is not often make use of this term in their writings. The men, but the die. method therefore wherein we begin from definitions tate of reason. and exclusion of all equivocation, is only proper an agreement of an agreement of tate of reason. to them who leave no place for contrary disputes. CHAP. II. For the rest, if any man say that somewhat is done That the law against the law of nature, one proves it hence; be- of nature is not cause it was done against the general agreement of men, but the dicall the most wise and learned nations: but this declares not who shall be the judge of the wisdom and learning of all nations. Another hence, that it was done against the general consent of all mankind; which definition is by no means to be admitted. For then it were impossible for any but children and fools, to offend against such a law; for sure, under the notion of mankind, they comprehend all men actually endued with reason. These therefore either do nought against it, or if they do aught, it is without their own consent, and therefore ought to be excused. But to receive the laws of nature from the consents of them who oftener break than observe them, is in truth unreasonable. Besides, men condemn the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they publicly commend what they privately condemn; and they deliver their opinions more by hearsay, than any speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, than true reason. And therefore it comes to pass, that whole bodies of people often do those things with the greatest unanimity and earnestness, which those writers most willingly acknowledge to be against the law of nature. But since all do grant, that is done by right, which is not done against reason, we ought to judge those actions only wrong, which are repugnant to right reason, that is, which contradict some certain |