sufficient, there will no sedition follow; every man CHAP. XII. will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen than hazard a heavier weight. There are four things necessarily requisite to this hope. Numbers, instruments, mutual trust, and commanders. To resist public magistrates without a great number, is not sedition, but desperation. By instruments of war, I mean all manner of arms, munition, and other necessary provision: without which number can do nothing. Nor arms neither, without mutual trust. Nor all these, without union under some commander, whom of their own accord they are content to obey; not as being engaged by their submission to his command; (for we have already in this very chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes); but for some opinion they have of his virtue, or military skill, or resemblance of humours. If these four be near at hand to men grieved with the present state, and measuring the justice of their actions by their own judgments; there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the realm, but one to stir quicken them. up and without wisdom culty needful to 12. Sallust's character of Cataline, than whom Eloquence alone there never was a greater artist in raising sedi- is the only fations, is this: that he had great eloquence, and raise seditions. little wisdom. He separates wisdom from eloquence; attributing this as necessary to a man born for commotions; adjudging that as an instructress of peace and quietness. Now eloquence is twofold. The one is an elegant and clear expression of the conceptions of the mind and VOL. II. M Eloquence alone CHAP. XII. riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, partly from an understanding of words without wisdom taken in their own proper and definite significais the only fa- tion. The other is a commotion of the passions raise seditions. of the mind, such as are hope, fear, anger, pity ; culty needful to and derives from a metaphorical use of words fitted to the passions. That forms a speech from true principles; this from opinions already received, what nature soever they are of. The art of that is logic, of this rhetoric; the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use; that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never disjoined from wisdom, but this almost ever. But that this kind of powerful eloquence, separated from the true knowledge of things, that is to say, from wisdom, is the true character of them who solicit and stir up the people to innovations, may easily be gathered out of the work itself which they have to do. For they could not poison the people with those absurd opinions contrary to peace and civil society, unless they held them themselves; which sure is an ignorance greater than can well befall any wise man. For he that knows not whence the laws derive their power, which are the rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evil; what makes and preserves peace among men, what destroys it; what is his, and what another's; lastly, what he would have done to himself, that he may do the like to others is surely to be accounted but meanly wise. But that they can turn their auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected, seem worse, to them who are well-affected, seem evil; that they can enlarge : their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: CHAP. XII. this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving their minds, makes all things to appear to be such as they in their minds, prepared before, had already conceived them. the common peo quence of ambi. cur to the disso 13. Many men, who are themselves very well How the folly of affected to civil society, do through want of know- ple, and the eloledge co-operate to the disposing of subjects' tious men, conminds to sedition, whilst they teach young men a lution of a comdoctrine conformable to the said opinions in their monweal. schools, and all the people in their pulpits. Now they who desire to bring this disposition into act, place their whole endeavour in this: first, that they may join the ill-affected together into faction and conspiracy; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction. They gather them into faction, while they make themselves the relators and interpreters of the counsels and actions of single men, and nominate the persons and places to assemble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed, according as it shall seem best to their interests. Now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction, the faction must be kept in a faction; that is to say, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of them shall speak, and how they may draw the powerfullest and most popular men of the faction to their side. And thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence, they How the folly of the common people, &c. CHAP. XII, move it to take upon it the managing of affairs. And thus they sometimes oppress the commonwealth, namely, where there is no other faction to oppose them; but for the most part they rend it, and introduce a civil war. For folly and eloquence concur in the subversion of government, in the same manner (as the fable hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Pelias, king of Thessaly, conspired with Medea against their father. They going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again, by the counsel of Medea they cut him into pieces, and set him in the fire to boil; in vain expecting when he would live again. So the common people, through their folly, like the daughters of Pelias, desiring to renew the ancient government, being drawn away by the eloquence of ambitious men, as it were by the witchcraft of Medea; divided into faction they consume it rather by those flames, than they reform it. CHAPTER XIII. CONCERNING THE DUTIES OF THEM WHO BEAR RULE. 1. The right of supreme authority is distinguished from its exercise. 2. The safety of the people is the supreme law. 3. It behoves princes to regard the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this or that man. 4. That by safety is understood all manner of conveniences. 5. A query, whether it be the duty of kings to provide for the salvation of their subjects' souls, as they shall judge best according to their own consciences. 6. Wherein the safety of the people consists. 7. That discoverers are necessary for the defence of the people. 8. That to have soldiers, arms, garrisons, and moneys in readiness, in time of peace, is also necessary for the defence of the people. 9. A right instruction of subjects in civil doctrines, is necessary for the preserving of peace. 10. Equal distributions of public offices conduces much to the preservation of peace. 11. It is natural equity, that monies be taxed according to what every man spends, not what he possesses. 12. It conduceth to the preservation of peace, to keep down ambitious men. 13. And to break factions. 14. Laws whereby thriving arts are cherished and great costs restrained, conduce to the enriching of the subject. 15. That more ought not to be defined by the laws, than the benefit of the prince and his subjects requires. 16. That greater punishments must not be inflicted, than are prescribed by the laws. 13. Subjects must have right done them against corrupt judges. The right of su is distinguished 1. By what hath hitherto been said, the duties of CHAP. XIII. citizens and subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the power of the supreme ruler preme authority over them are apparent. But we have as yet said from its exercise. nothing of the duties of rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their subjects. We must then distinguish between the right and the exercise of supreme authority; for they can be divided. As for example, when he who hath the right, either cannot or will not be present in |