1. Property within a State, which is in the possession of a receiver by
virtue of his appointment as such by a Circuit Court of the United
States, is not subject to seizure and levy under process issuing from a
court of the State to enforce the collection of a tax assessed upon its
owner under the laws of the State. In re Tyler, Petitioner, 164.
2. The exclusive remedy of the state tax collector in such case is in the
Circuit Court which appointed the receiver, where the question of the
validity of the tax may be heard and determined, and where the prior-
ity of payment of such amount as may be found to be due which is
granted by the laws of the State will be recognized and enforced. Ib.
3. After a state court has appointed a receiver of all the property of a
corporation, and while the receivership exists, stockholders of the cor-
poration cannot bring a suit against the officers in a court of the
United States for fraudulent misappropriation of its property, with-
out making the receiver, as well as the corporation, a party to the
suit; although the state court has denied a petition of the receiver for
authority to bring the suit, as well as an application of the stockholders
for leave to make him a party to it. Porter v. Sabin, 473.
See RAILROAD, 1, 2, 3, 4.
RULE OF DECISION.
See FRAUDS, Statutes of.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
SERVICE OF PROCESS.
See LOCAL Law, 1.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.
See JUDICIAL NOTICE.
B. STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9;
CRIMINAL LAW, 1;
CUSTOMS DUTIES, 1, 2, 6, 7, 10, 12, 13, 15;
INTERNAL REVENUE;
JURISDICTION, C, 2;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF ;
PATENT FOR INVENTION, 11;
POSTMASTER GENERAL;
PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2, 3, 7.
1. Irrespective of any question of trade-marks, rival manufacturers have
no right, by imitative devices, to beguile the public into buying their
wares under the impression that they are buying those of their rivals.
Coats v. Merrick Thread Co., 562.
2. The proofs establish that there was no intention on the part of the
appellees to impose their thread upon the public as that of the plain-
tiff in error, or to mislead the dealers who purchased of them. Ib.
3. When the letters patent to Hezekiah Conant, protecting “a new design
for embossing the ends of sewing-thread spools" expired, the public
became entitled to use them for the purpose for which the assignee of
Conant used them. Ib.
TRIAL BY JURY.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3.
M. subscribed to the capital stock of a company about to be formed a
large sum on his own account, and $60,000 as trustee. B., who was
the cestui que trust, subsequently asked him to acknowledge that he
held it in trust for S. who had purchased it of B. M. thereupon
wrote under date of November 22, 1869, "To whom it may concern:
I hereby acknowledge to hold in the Southern Railroad Association as
trustee for S. under an arrangement with B. an original subscription
of $60,000 on which 70 per cent has been paid. This motion is in
conformity with an arrangement made some two months ago between
B., S. and myself. (Signed) M." In 1875 S. commenced an action
at law against M. in a state court of Massachusetts to recover on an
alleged contract by M. to invest for S. the sum of $45,000 then in M.'s
hands, in the stock of that association, and such proceedings were had
that it was finally determined there that no such contract as charged
existed, or if it existed, was broken. Subsequently facts were dis-
closed which showed a breach of trust by M. His administrator and
administratrix filed this bill. Held,
(1) That the paper given by M. to S. in 1869 was an absolute and
unqualified declaration of trust, for the amount of the subscription so
far as it had been paid;
(2) That one essential to an estoppel by judgment is identity of cause of
action, and that examination of the pleadings and proceedings in the
case in Massachusetts showed that the cause of action there was not
identical with the cause of action here;
(3) That in view of the fact that M. when called as a witness in the action
at law testified that the stock stood as it always had stood, and of the
further fact that no breach of trust was discovered until just before
the commencement of this suit, the plaintiffs had not been guilty of
laches;
(4) That in view of the circumstances detailed in the opinion of the
court the decree of the court below awarding a return of the amount
for which M. acknowledged himself as trustee with interest reached,
as nearly as possible, what justice demanded. McComb v. Frink, 629.
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