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but will hear me before its final decision is pronounced." (Much cheering.)

Mr. Bright and Sir De Lacy Evans pressed the adjournment of the debate, which had been moved by Mr. Anstey. Mr. Osborne advised Mr. Salomons to keep his seat until he should be taken into custody. Lord John Russell urged the House to support the authority of the Speaker and its own dignity. Divisions then took place, first on the question of adjournment, which was negatived by 237 against 75; then on the original motion of Lord John Russell, that Mr. Salomons be required to withdraw, which was carried by 231 against 81, Mr. Salomons again voting in both divisions.

The Speaker now directed Mr. Salomons to withdraw, but as he did not comply, the Sergeant at Arms touched him lightly on the shoulder; Mr. Salomons then stood up and said he yielded, and the Sergeant at Arms conducted him

below the bar.

Mr. Osborne asked whether Mr. Salomons, having taken his seat, voted three times and spoken, the Ministers would now prosecute him. Lord John Russell answered that if the Member for Greenwich wished to be prosecuted, he had no doubt some one could be found to undertake that office. The noble Lord stated that he should, on the following day, propose a resolution similar to that adopted in the last year in Baron Rothschild's case. The next day accordingly Lord John Russell moved a resolution to the following effect:-"That Mr. Salomons is not entitled to vote in this House or to sit in this House during any debate until he shall take the oath of abjuration in the form appointed by law."

He observed that this matter had been fully debated last year, when he had specified the statutes which rendered it incumbent upon the House to require that the portion of the oath excepted to by Mr. Salomons in the oath of abjuration should be taken before a member could take his seat. Some had made it a question how a Jew should be excluded when a Quaker had been admitted; but there was a very great distinction in point of law between the case of a Quaker, when Mr. Pease was admitted, and the case of a Jew when Baron Rothschild came to take his seat. He regretted and complained of the state of the law; but as that distinction existed he was bound to move the resolution.

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Mr. Chisholm Anstey moved an amendment, to the effect that the Attorney General be ordered to prosecute Mr. Salomons for having sat and voted without taking the oath in the required form; but, on the suggestion of Sir B. Hall, the amendment was withdrawn to admit of another by Mr. Bethell, who moved that, Baron de Rothschild and Alderman Salomons having taken the oaths of allegiance and supremacy, and also the oath of abjuration, in the manner in which this House is bound by law to administer the same, are entitled to take their seats as members of this House." This question, he observed, had not yet been fully discussed. The 9th George I. threw upon all subjects of the realm, Jews included, the obligation of taking the oath of abjuration, and that obligation was to be discharged by the Jews in the form and manner laid down in the statute 10th George I. The Legislature, by 10th George I., declared

that the rule adopted in courts of justice, in administering oaths to Jews, should be followed in other places with reference to the oath of abjuration, which was a political or civil oath-a mere creature of the Legislature, not known to the common law. In the case of Mr. Pease the House had taken upon itself to modify this oath, and it had no authority to mould an oath except by giving a construction to the statute; yet, having admitted Jews to take the oaths at the table, it refused to adapt this oath to the circumstances of Jews. If the House declined to follow this precedent, he entreated it to consider whether it was not fit to appoint a Committee to take the law upon this particular point into consideration.

The Attorney General (Sir Alexander Cockburn) briefly explained the view he took of the question, which was not a question of policy, but of law; the House was bound to act judicially after ascertaining the true sense and construction of the Act of Parliament. The simple point was this -the Legislature having imposed a certain oath to be taken by a member before he took his seat in that House, and that oath containing a certain form of words, did it, when it imposed the necessity of taking this oath, intend these words as a formal incident, or as an essential part of the oath? He admitted that this point was not free from doubt; but those who contended that this oath might be modified had misapprehended the history of this oath, which Sir Alexander traced from the statute 3rd James I., and from which he drew the conclusion that the Legislature intended the words in question to be a substantial part of the

oath.

The precedent of Mr. Pease had been pressed, but there was a wide distinction between the cases. From the 7th and 8th William III. there were precedents for the relief of Quakers in regard to this oath. He freely acknowledged that Roman Catholics were the object of this oath; that it was never intended to apply to Jews; but, unfortunately, the enactment was general; no subtlety of construction afforded an escape from it. The law was anomalous and unsatisfactory, and there was abundant reason for altering it; but however grievous the state of the law, that House could not assume the right to alter it by its own authority.

Mr. John Evans controverted the positions of the Attorney General, contending that the words in question were not of the substance of the oath, but merely a formula, which might be adapted to the circumstances of the party swearing. Mr. Napier, on the other hand, argued that the words "upon the true faith of a Christian" were of the matter of the oath, and though the modus jurandi might be altered according to the exigency, yet the juramentum itself could not. If the House by its own resolution could dispense with the positive words of the statute, it would assume a power of setting aside the law.

Mr. Aglionby, after hearing the conflicting arguments of the lawyers, adhered to those who held that Mr. Salomons had taken the oath as required by law.

Mr. Henry Drummond, though no lawyer, felt assured that it could not be law that any person taking a statutory oath might omit as many words as he pleased. He had always objected to Jews sit

ting in that House upon principle; but he could not take advantage of a law never intended to apply to Jews in order to carry out his principle. If a motion were made to exclude Jews eo nomine, he would vote for it; but he would not fight in ambush against them behind a dyke raised to keep out a Sardinian Prince.

Mr. Anstey supported the view of the law taken by Mr. Bethell. At all events he considered that the difficulty, if there was any, was removed by the Act of 1st and 2nd Victoria.

Sir R. Inglis contended that, even admitting that the words in question were introduced into the oath by accident, there never was a time in which the oaths were not administered upon some symbol that would exclude members of the Jewish persuasion.

Upon a division the amendment was rejected by 118 against 71, and another motion proposed by Mr. Bright for the adjournment of the debate, was negatived by 119 to 69. Mr. George Thompson then moved as another amendment that the following words be added to Lord John Russell's resolution:-"And that this House, having regard to the religious scruples of the hon. Member for Greenwich, will exercise its undoubted privilege in that behalf, and pro-, ceed forthwith to cause such alterations to be made in the form and mode of administering the said oath as will enable the hon. Member to take and subscribe the same." Mr. Thompson also threw out some censures on the conduct of Lord John Russell in reference to the transaction before the House.

Lord John Russell complained of the manner in which the latter part of this debate had been con

ducted, and repelled indignantly the attacks which had been made upon him. It appeared to him, he said, that the House was fully competent to decide the question before it, and was bound to do so. He considered that the emancipation of the Jews from all political disabilities was a great public cause connected with religious liberty, in which he meant to persevere, though in a due and regular course, by asking the House next session to assent to a Bill, believing that if there was a considerable majority of the House in favour of such a Bill, and the voice of the country supported that opinion, they would not have to wait long before, in due course of legislation, a statute would be passed; but he would not vote that to be law which he believed to be contrary to law.

Mr. Bethell urged the House not to adopt the resolution, which contained a wretched truism, deciding nothing, and which would make the House ridiculous in the eyes of the country.

After another division on the question of adjournment, in which the Ministers had a large majority, Lord John Russell, in consideration of the lateness of the hour, said he would no longer oppose the postponement of the discussion, which was accordingly adjourned.

In the interval between the postponement and resumption of the debate, a petition numerously signed by electors of Greenwich, praying to be heard at the bar of the House in support of the right of their representative, Mr. Alderman Salomons, to take his seat, was presented to the House by Sir Benjamin Hall. An influential meeting was also held, and a similar petition was adopted and

numerously signed in the City of London, with reference to the corresponding case of Baron Roths child, the Jewish Member for the City. These petitions came under consideration on the 28th of July, concurrently with the adjourned debate on Lord John Russell's resolution.

The Speaker commenced by communicating to the House a letter which he had received from Mr. Alderman Salomons, informing him that notices of actions for penalties had been served upon him in consequence of his having sat and voted in the House.

On the first order of the day, the consideration of the Greenwich petition,

Sir B. Hall, after adverting to the circumstances attending the election of this gentleman, to the position in which the House was placed with reference to the question, to the unsatisfactory arguments urged by the Government and the law officers of the Crown, and to the precedent of Mr. Wilkes, said that the electors of Greenwich. considered that the resolution before the House would subvert their rights and those of the whole body of electors in the kingdom, and he moved that they be heard by counsel at the bar in support of those rights, pursuant to the prayer of their petition.

The Attorney General opposed the motion. The subject, he said, had been well considered, and very fully discussed in two sessions of Parliament, and it could not be expected that counsel could throw any additional light upon the question.

Mr. Anstey supported the motion, arguing that the House was pushing its privileges too far, and

counsel would endeavour to show that the resolution was repugnant to the law of the land. By refusing to hear the advocates of the petitioners in support of their rights, the House would violate the forms as well as the substance of justice.

Sir F. Thesiger observed, that although a sufficient reason had been assigned by the Attorney General against agreeing to a motion for hearing a one-sided argument at the bar, there was another objection on the face of the petition, which prayed that the petitioners might be heard in defence of their undoubted right to be represented by the representative they had chosen. This right had never been disputed; the question was, whether the representative they had chosen had qualified himself by law to sit in that House.

Mr. Aglionby and Mr. Villiers spoke in favour of the motion; Mr. Newdegate, Sir John Hanmer, and Sir Robert Inglis, against it.

Lord J. Russell, being called upon, was perfectly willing to state his opinion, which was that the electors of Greenwich, in supposing that their rights were interfered with, had misapprehended the question before the House. No measure was contemplated which would interfere with the rights of the electors of Greenwich. member returned to that House must comply with the conditions which the law required; it was thought that Mr. Alderman Salomons had not complied with those conditions; and this was a matter which concerned, not Greenwich only, but the whole kingdom.

Α

After some remarks from Alderman Sidney and Mr. MacGregor in

favour of the motion, it was rejected, on a division, by 135

to 75.

Mr. R. Currie thereupon forebore to repeat the same motion in the case of Baron Rothschild, urging Lord John Russell at the same time to bring in a measure in the next session for securing to the electors of the kingdom their indefeasible right to return to that House the men they deemed best qualified to represent their interests. Mr. Anstey, however, moved that the petition from the electors of the City of London be taken into consideration, and that the petitioners be heard in support of its prayer by counsel at the bar. This motion was supported by Mr. Aglionby, Mr. B. Osborne, and Mr. T. Hobhouse; opposed by Mr. Newdegate and Sir John Tyrrell. On a division it was negatived by 77 to 41. The adjourned debate on Lord John Russell's resolution was then resumed. Mr. Anstey proposed an amendment, pledging the House to make such alterations in the words of the oath as would enable Mr. Salomons to take it.

Mr. Headlam considered that, great as were the evils attending the exclusion of Mr. Salomons, the House would not be justified in taking upon itself to cure them by its own inherent power. Whether the words in question were of the substance of the oath or of an adjuratory character, he could find no authority for omitting them. In the case of Quakers there was a statutory authority. These words were by law made a part of the oath, and it was the duty of the House to enforce them. There was only one constitutional mode of remedying the evil-by legisla

tion, which would be a far more satisfactory method of settling the question.

Mr. John Evans again argued that on legal principles the words at the conclusion of the oath were capable of being varied according to circumstances. Mr. Anstey's amendment was then negatived, 50 members voting for, and 88 against it.

Mr. Bethell then addressed the House at some length on Lord John Russell's resolution. The question, he said, was now fairly evolved, whether a citizen of this empire should be excluded from a seat in the House on the ground of his religious faith? This question never was raised in the case of the Roman Catholics; they were excluded, not on the ground of their religious faith, but because it was believed that they held a particular political tenet-namely, that subjects might be absolved from their allegiance. This question having arisen, and the principle being at stake for which it was the pride of the noble Lord that he had struggled, he might, the moment that technicality was introduced, have risen in his strength and crushed the attempt. He might have appealed to a great principle, if he had faith in it, and the House and the country would have abided by it: he might have declared that the Jew, not excluded by common law principle, or by statute, ought not to be excluded by a wretched attempt to convert formal language into substance, to pervert words to a purpose utterly alien from their intent. But the noble Lord had played the game of his adversaries. If there were any difficulty in "another place," the Judges would

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