FROM MR. WESLEY TO HIS FATHER.

DEAR SIR,

Lincoln, Dec. 19, 1729.

AS I was looking over, the other day, Mr. Ditton's Discourse on the Resurrection of Christ, I found toward the end of it, a sort of Essay on the Origin of Evil. I fancied the shortness of it, if nothing else, would make you willing to read it; though very probably you will not find much in it which has not occurred to your thoughts before.

Page 424. "Since the Supreme Being must needs be infinitely and essentially good, as well as wise and powerful, it has been esteemed no little difficulty, to show how evil came into the world. Unde Malum, has been a mighty question.'

There were some, who, in order to solve this, supposed two supreme, governing principles; the one, a good, the other, an evil one which latter was independent on, and of equal power with the former, and the author of all that was irregular or bad in the universe. This monstrous scheme the Manichees fell into and much improved; but were sufficiently confuted by St. Austin, who had reason to be particularly acquainted with their tenets.

But the plain truth is, the hypothesis requires no more to the confutation of it, than the bare proposing it. Two supreme, independent principles, is next door to a contradiction in terms. It is the very same thing, in result and consequence, as saying two absolute Infinites and he that says two, had as good say ten or fifty, or any other number whatever. Nay, if there can be two essentially, distinct, absolute Infinites, there may be an infinity of such absolute Infinites that is as much as to say, none of them all would be an absolute Infinite, or that none of them all would be properly and really infinite. (For real infinity is strict and absolute infinity, and only that.')

"From the nature of liberty and free-will, we may deduce a very possible and satisfactory (perhaps the only possible just) account of the origin of evil.

"There are, and necessarily must be, some original, intrinsic agreements and disagreements, fitnesses and unfitnesses, of certain things and circumstances, to and with each other; which are antecedent to all positive institutions, founded on the very nature of those things and circumstances, considered in themselves, and in their relation to each other."

"As these all fall within the comprehension of an infinite, discerning mind, who is likewise infinite, essential rectitude and reason; so those on the one side must necessarily (to speak after the manner of men) be chosen or approved of by him, as the other disliked and

disapproved and this on the score of the eternal, intrinsic agreeableness and disagreeableness of them."

"Farther, it no way derogated from any one perfection of an infinite Being, to endow other beings, which he made, with such a power as we call liberty; that is, to furnish them with such capacities, dispositions, and principles of action, that it should be possible for them either to observe or to deviate from those eternal rules and measures of fitness, and agreeableness, with respect to certain things and circumstances, which were so conformable to the infinite rectitude of his own will, and which infinite reason must necessarily discover. Now evil is a deviation from those measures of eternal, unerring Order and Reason: not to choose what is worthy to be chosen, and is accordingly chosen by such a will as the divine. And to bring this about, no more is necessary, than the exerting certain acts of that power we call free-will: by which power we are enabled to choose or refuse, and to determine ourselves to action accordingly. Therefore, without having recourse to any ill principle, we may fairly account for the origin of evil, from the possibility of a various use of our liberty; even as that capacity or possibility itself is ultimately founded on the defectibility and finiteness of a created nature."

I am, dear Sir, your dutiful and affectionate Son,

JOHN WESLEY.

A little larger answer to his famous Question, we have in a Treatise DE ORIGINE MALI, written by Dr. King, Archbishop of Dublin, of which I sent my Father the following Extract.

DEAR SIR,

January, 1731.

THOUGH some of the Postulata, upon which Archbishop King builds his hypothesis of the Origin of Evil, be such as very few will admit of, yet since the superstructure is regular and well contrived, I thought you would not be unwilling to see the scheme of that celebrated work. He divides it into five chapters.

The sum of the first chapter is this: the first notions we have of outward things, are our conceptions of Motion, Matter, and Space. Concerning each of these we soon observe, that it does not exist of itself, and consequently, that there must be some First Cause, to which all of them owe their existence. Although we have no faculty for the direct perception of this First Cause, and so can know very little more of him than a blind man of light, yet thus much we know of him by the faculties we have, that He is one, infinite in nature and power, free, intelligent, and omniscient; that consequently he proposes to himself an end in every one of his actions, and that the end of his creating the world was the exercise of his power, and wisdom,

and goodness: which he therefore made as perfect as it could be made, by infinite goodness, and power, and wisdom.

Chap. II. But if so, how came evil into the world? If the world was made by such an agent, with such an intention, how is it, that either imperfection, or natural or moral evils have a place in it? Is not this difficulty best solved by the Manichæan supposition, that there is an evil as well as a good principle? By no means: for it is just as repugnant to Infinite Goodness to create what it foresaw would be spoiled by another, as to create what would be spoiled by the constitution of its nature: their supposition therefore leaves the difficulty as it found it. But if it could be proved, that to permit evils in the world is consistent with, nay, necessarily results from Infinite Goodness, then the difficulty would vanish; and to prove this is the design of the following Treatise.

Chap. III. All created beings, as such, are necessarily imperfect; nay, infinitely distant from supreme perfection. Nor can they all be equally perfect, since some must be only parts of others. As to their properties too, some must be perfecter than others: for suppose any number of the most perfect beings created, infinite goodness would prompt the Creator to add less perfect beings to those, if their existence neither lessened the number nor conveniences of the more perfect. The existence of Matter, for instance, neither lessens the number nor the conveniences of pure Spirits. Therefore, the addition of material beings to spiritual, was not contrary to, but resulted from, infinite goodness.

Chap. IV. As the evils of imperfection necessarily spring from this, that the imperfect things were made out of nothing, so natural evils necessarily spring, from their being made out of matter. For matter is totally useless, without motion, or even without such a motion as will divide it into parts; but this cannot be done without a contrariety of motions; and from this necessarily flows generation and corruption.

The material part of us being thus liable to corruption, pain is necessary to make us watchful against it, and to warn us of what tends toward it, as is the fear of death likewise, which is of use in many places that pain does not reach. From these all the passions necessarily spring; nor can these be extinguished while those remain. But if pain, and the fear of death, were extinguished, no animal could long subsist. Since, therefore, these evils are necessarily joined with more than equivalent goods; the permitting these is not repugnant to, but flows from, infinite goodness. The same observation holds as to hunger, thirst, childhood, age, diseases, wild beasts, and poisons. They are all, therefore, permitted because each of them is necessarily connected with such a good as outweighs the evil.

Chap. V. Touching moral evils (by which I mean, "Inconveniences arising from the choice of the sufferer,") I purpose to show, 1. What is the nature of Choice or Election. 2. That our happiness consists in the elections or choices we make. 3. What elec

4. How we come to make such

tions are improper to be made. elections; and, 5. How our making them is consistent with the divine power and goodness.

1. By liberty I mean, an active, self-determining power, which does not choose things because they are pleasing, but is pleased with them because it chooses them.

That God is endued with such a power, I conclude, 1. Because nothing is good or evil, pleasing or displeasing to him, before he chooses it. 2. Because his will or choice is the cause of goodness in all created things. 3. Because if God had not been endued with such a principle, he would never have created any thing.

But it is to be observed farther, that God sees and chooses whatever is connected with what he chooses, in the same instant; and that he likewise chooses whatever is convenient for his creatures in the same moment wherein he chooses to create them.

That man partakes of this principle I conclude, 1. Because experience shows it. 2. Because we observe in ourselves the signs and properties of such a power. We observe we can counteract our appetites, senses, and even our reason, if we so choose; which we can no otherwise account for, than by admitting such a power in ourselves.

3. The more of this power any being possesses, the less subject he is to the impulses of external agents; and the more commodious is his condition. Happiness rises from a due use of our faculties: if therefore this be the noblest of all our faculties, then our chief happiness lies in the due use of this; that is, in our elections. And farther, election is the cause why things please us: he, therefore, who has an uncontrolled power of electing, may please himself always : and if things fall out contrary to what he chooses, he may change his choice and suit it to them, and so still be happy. Indeed in this life his natural appetites will sometimes disturb his elections, and so prevent his perfect happiness: yet is it a fair step towards it, that he has a power that can at all times find pleasure in itself, however outward things vary.

4. True it is, that this power sometimes gives pain, namely, when it falls short of what it chooses: which may come to pass, if we choose either things impossible to be had, or inconsistent with each other, or such as are out of our power, (perhaps because others chose them before us ;) or, lastly, such as unnecessarily lead us into natural evils.

5. And into these foolish choices we may be betrayed either by ignorance, negligence, by indulging the exercise of liberty too far, by obstinacy or habit; or, lastly, by the importunity of our natural appetites. Hence it appears how cautious we ought to be in choosing: for though we may alter our choice, yet to make that alteration is painful; the more painful, the longer we have persisted in it.

6. There are three ways by which God might have hindered his creatures from thus abusing their liberty. First, By not creating any being free; but had this method been taken, then, 1. The whole

universe would have been a mere machine. 2. That would have been wanting which is most pleasing to God of any thing in the universe, namely, the free service of his reasonable creatures. 3. His reasonable creatures would have been in a worse state than they are now; for only free agents can be perfectly happy; as, without a possibility of doing wrong, there can be no freedom.

The second way by which God might prevent the abuse of liberty, is, by overruling this power, and constraining us to choose right. But this would be to do and undo, to contradict himself, to take away what he had given.

The third way by which God might have hindered his creatures from making an ill use of liberty, is, by placing them where they should have had no temptation to abuse it. But this too would have been the same in effect, as to have given them no liberty at all.

I am, dear Sir, your affectionate and dutiful Son,

TO DR. ROBERTSON.

JOHN WESLEY.

Bristol, Sept. 24, 1753.

DEAR SIR,

I HAVE lately had the pleasure of reading Mr. Ramsay's Principles of Religion, with the notes you have annexed to them. Doubtless he was a person of a bright and strong understanding, but, I think, not of a very clear apprehension. Perhaps it might be owing to this, that not distinctly perceiving the strength of some of the objections to his hypothesis; he is very peremptory in his assertions, and apt to treat his opponent with an air of contempt and disdain. This seems to have been a blemish even in his moral character. I am afraid the using guile is another. For surely it is a mere artifice to impute to the schoolmen the rise of almost every opinion which he censures. Seeing he must have known that most, if not all of those opinions, preceded the schoolmen several hundreds of years.

The Treatise itself gave me a stronger conviction than ever I had before, both of the fallaciousness and unsatisfactoriness of the mathematical method of reasoning on religious subjects. Extremely fallacious it is; for if we slip but in one line, a whole train of errors may follow and utterly unsatisfactorily, at least to me, because I can never be sufficiently assured that this is not the case.

The two first books, although, doubtless they are a fine chain of reasoning, yet gave me the less satisfaction, because I am clearly of Mr. H's judgment, that all this is beginning at the wrong end: that we can have no idea of God, nor any sufficient proof of his very being, but from the creatures and that the meanest plant is a far stronger proof hereof, than all Dr. Clark's or the Chevalier's demonstrations.

Among the latter, I was surprised to find a demonstration of the