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sires arising from wrong judgment. 58, 59. Our judgment of present good or evil always right.

60. From a wrong judgment of what makes a necessary part of their happiness.

6l, 62. A more particular account of wrong judgments. 63. In comparing present and future. 64, 65. Causes of this. 66. In considering consequences of actions.

67. Causes of this. 68. Wrong judgment of what is necessary to our happiness.

69. We can change the agreeableness or disagreeableness in things. 70. Preference of vice to virtue, a manifest wrong judgment. 71—73. Recapitulation.

CHAP. XXII. Of mixed modes. SECT.

1. Mixed modes, what.

2. Made by the mind.

3. Sometimes got by the explication of their names.

4. The name ties the parts of the mixed modes into one idea.

5. The cause of making mixed modes.

6. Why words in one language have none answering in another.

7. And languages change.

8. Mixed modes, wherethey exist.

9. How we get the ideas of mixed modes.

10. Motion, thinking, and power, have been most modified.

11. Several words seeming to signify action, signify but the effect.

12. Mixed modes, made also of other ideas.





§. i. Since it is the understanding, that An ui sets man above the rest of sensible beings, into the unand gives him all the advantage and domi- derstanding, nion, which he has over them; it is cer- pleasant and tainly a subject, even for its nobleness, usefulworth our labour to enquire into. The understanding, like the eye, whilst it makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a distance, and make it its own object. But, whatever be the difficulties that lie in the way of this enquiry; whatever it be, that keeps us so much in the dark to ourselves; sure I am, that all the light we can let in upon our own minds, all the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advantage, in directing our thoughts in the search of other things.

§. 2. This, therefore, being my purpose, Desi n, to enquire into the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge; together with the grounds and degrees of belief, opinion, and assent; I shall not at present meddle with the physical consideration of the mind; or trouble myself to examine, wherein its essence consists, or by what motions of our spirits,


or alterations of our bodies, we come to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our understandings; and whether those ideas do in their formation, any, or all of them, depend on matter or no: These are speculations, which, however curious and entertaining, I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the design I am now upon. It shall suffice to my present purpose, to consider the discerning faculties of a man, as they are employed about the objects, which they have to do with: And I shall imagine I have not wholly misemployed myself in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this historical, plain method, I can give any account of the ways, whereby our understandings come to attain those notions of things we have, and can set down any measures of the certainty of our knowledge, or the grounds of those persuasions, which are to be found amongst men, so various, different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted, somewhere or other, with such assurance and confidence, that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, observe their opposition, and at the same time consider the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, may perhaps have reason to suspect, that either there is no such thing as truth at all; or that mankind hath no Sufficient means to attain a certain knowledge of it.

Method §' ^' ^*s' *nerefiJre, worth while to search out the bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what measures, in things, whereof we have no certain knowledge, we ought to regulate our assent, and moderate our persuasions. In order whereunto, I shall pursue this following method.

First, I shall enquire into the original of those ideas, notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his mind; and the ways, whereby the understanding comes to be furnished with them.

Secondly, I shall endeavour to shew what knowledge the understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evidence, and extent of it.

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