In reply to these arguments we may observe, in the first place, "that notwithstanding the knowledge of God is such, that he must be sensible of all our wants before we express them, and that, in fact, we cannot communicate any thing to him, of which he was not fully informed long before; yet it is fit and reasonable that, as we are really in want, we should acknowledge our wants to him; that, as we are really dependent upon him, we should confess our dependence; confess that we are weak and indigent creatures; that we cannot supply our own wants, and that God alone is able to supply them. By so doing, though we can convey no knowledge to a Being of infinite knowledge, yet we humbly profess and acknowledge those truths of which we are fully and feelingly convinced; viz.—our own weakness and the all-sufficiency of our Heavenly Father."

Secondly.- "In like manner, though the goodness of God be infinite, i. e. we cannot set any bounds to it; yet it may truly be limited by his Wisdom and Justice. We must not ascribe to any one of the divine attributes a greater or less degree of perfection than to another. We cannot doubt that our Creator and Preserver is as good, and gracious, as an infinitely just and wise Being can be; but

neither can we suppose that he is good and gracious beyond what is wise and just. Should he therefore be so indulgent as to give us every thing which we may want, without asking, however such indulgence may exalt our ideas of his mercy and goodness, it could not be thought so conformable to our notion of his wisdom; since we might thus be tempted to forget our dependence upon him, and impute his blessings either to accidental events, or the general course and order of Nature. Whereas, when good things are in a great measure withholden from us till we pray for them, and are made the consequence, as it were, and result of our petitions, (according to that admonition of our Saviour,-"Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and you shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you;") by this we perceive from whose hand every "good and perfect gift" cometh, and by this we are convinced how highly it concerns us to procure the favour and good will of the Almighty."

To the third Objection, which is founded on the unchangeable Nature of God, and the inference that his counsels and designs must be fixed and irreversible, it may not be so easy to give a satisfactory reply. "It has been said that though God's purposes are unchangeable, yet they are not so absolute as to exclude all

conditions: that he determines to supply the wants of his Creatures, but of such of them only as are qualified to receive that supply: that the chief of the qualifications required is dependence upon him, and entire confidence in his goodness and bounty: that when, therefore, we, by becoming supplicants at the throne of Grace, qualify ourselves for the reception of God's mercies, and so obtain the blessings which we had not before, the change is not in God but in us; since, by performing the conditions which he requires of us, we approve ourselves to be such devout and humble persons as those on whom he has unalterably purposed to bestow his blessings."

But, after all, in discussions of this kind there must always be some obscurity. It is difficult for us to conceive how infinite mercy can subsist together with infinite justice; how the determinate counsels and purposes of God can be reconciled to the free agency of Man. But it is enough for us to know that Prayer is a duty absolutely and expressly injoined in Scripture; and, with this authority for it, we have no business to inquire further. As a matter of curiosity, however, it may not be amiss to observe that Calvin and his followers, though the advocates of that absurd Doctrine of unconditional Decrees, and unconditional

Predestination, (i. e. of our Election to Eternal Life, or Condemnation to Eternal Misery, not as the consequence of our actions here upon earth, but as a thing fixed and predetermined thousands of years before we were born ;)* even these rigid and enthusiastic reformers will not allow that their Doctrine is inconsistent with the duty and efficacy of Prayer. "It is not in vain," says Calvin himself, "that we are so frequently commanded to be instant in Prayer.

Whether in prosperity or adversity, we have occasions sufficient to induce us to pray, and are constantly exposed to dangers, against which we have need to solicit the divine protection. But more especially as to our spiritual concerns, we are conscious of so many sins, and so liable to fall into temptations, that we ought not to rest thoughtless and secure; but earnestly to solicit the Grace of God, and humbly to deprecate the guilt and punishment of our offences."†

* Quod Scriptura clare ostendit dicimus; æterno et immutabili consilio Deum semel constituisse quos olim semel assumere vellet in salutem, quos rursum exitio devovere. Hoc consilium quoad electos in gratuita ejus misericordia fundatum esse asserimus, nullo humanæ dignitatis respectu: quos vero damnationi addicit, his justo quidem et irreprehensibili, sed incomprehensibili ipsius judicio, vitæ aditum præcludi.-CALVIN. INSTIT. 1. 3, c. 21. The same doctrine is still more strongly (if possible) expressed in the Scotch Catechism.

+ Calvin.-Ubi supr. c. 20, 24, 27.

Not only Jews and Christians, however, but Heathens also had so full a persuasion of the Efficacy of Prayer, that they considered it as a thing of the utmost importance, to be cautious in regard to the matter of our prayers; lest we should, through ignorance, pray for that which may be pernicious to us, and thus bring down upon ourselves a curse instead of a blessing.* Hence one of the most celebrated of the Heathen Philosophers was induced to argue against the duty of prayer in general; advising that, because we know not for what to pray, and are apt to mistake evil for good, we should suspend all addresses to the Deity, till some one might arise capable of instructing us how to pray as we ought.† But this strange conclusion must evidently have arisen from an imperfect conception of the duty of prayer: the essence of which does not consist either in the nature of our petitions, or in the form of words in which they are expressed, but in a due sense of our dependence upon God, in humiliation and self abasement before him, in acknowledgment of his mercies and our own unworthiness. It

* Evertère domos totas, optantibus ipsis, Dî faciles.—Juv. SAT. x. v. 7, 8. It is said that this Satire was recommended by Bishop Burnet to his younger Clergy, as furnishing good common-places for their Sermons.

+ See the 2nd Alcibiades of Plato.